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POLICING POST COLONIAL DEMOCRACIES

Policing a nascent post-colonial democracy is a complex task. This is because democracy is perceived, by nearly everybody, merely as a system of governance. That democratic norms must permeate every interaction - personal, familial, social or governmental - is neither understood nor appreciated. Feudal and authoritarian social structures had flourished for centuries with the willing submission of even those adversely affected. Societies, under foreign rule for a long time, had no concept of participative governance. Therefore Rule of Law is seldom understood, even at a conceptual - let alone behavioual- level. In the neo-democracies in Asia and Africa, the citizenry do not, individually or socially, comprehend the behavioural implications of Rights and Responsibilities arising from democracy being a way of life.

Most colonies were occupied by European powers. Back in Europe, democracy had held sway for a long time. There was an inherent contradiction implicit in democratic European powers denying democracy to their subjects. This contradiction finally resulted in the dissolution of empires, in the wake of freedom struggles led by those who learned about freedom and democracy in institutions nurtured by the colonial masters.

Policing impinges on every aspect of human activity. It is a governmental agency but its authority and activity goes far beyond the relationship of the citizen with the State. It treads even into the personal space of individuals and private space of families. It affects -and is affected by- the culture, customs, values and traditions of the society in which it operates. Thus the divergence between inherited socio-departmental values and democratic values enshrined in the new constitutions, makes the policing task extremely difficult.

In a democracy, policing should reflect the recognition that democratic rights of every citizen are inviolable. But from Zaire to Bangladesh, both police personnel, as well as the public will find it difficult to believe that police are meant to protect the rights of citizens rather than deny and restrain them; that police should not seek to enforce law by scaring citizens; that police should actively seek the cooperation of the population; that police should consult citizenry on their security needs; that police stations should be institutions which the poor and the weak, women and children should be able to enter without fear and seek refuge; that police do not own the law and therefore they should never torture or indulge in custodial violence.

Such democratic perceptions were not ingrained into the social fabric and have to be newly learned by an active process of social education which is time consuming. The police were feared during colonial times, as they represented the will and force of the colonial masters. So they continue to be feared today. Police are also believed to blindly implement all the desires of the elected ruler rather than implement the enacted law impartially, rendering justice to all.

The true challenge of policing these neo-democracies is in converting police stations from symbols of authority to symbols of freedom. In fact, in many such societies, well intentioned citizens might even feel outraged by this suggestion and exclaim "how can this be!" But if police stations are institutions which enforce Rule of Law, then they must be seen to be upholding laws which the people have given unto themselves. So logically the citizen should perceive the police as friends and the style of policing should be visibly and palpably people friendly.

Policing in order to be successful must get information from the people. People must inform about crimes which are likely to occur. People must come forward as witnesses. But this does not usually happen because people are afraid of the Police and want to avoid contact with them. So police threaten them to get information from them. The more they scare the people, getting information easily from them becomes more and more difficult. This leads to yet more compulsion by police. Thus the fear syndrome ultimately defeats the goals of professional policing. Progressively either anarchy in which police are totally ineffective or total suppression with draconian laws or martial law will result.

The only way out is people friendly policing. This alone can create a police friendly people. Public attitude towards Police must change from indifference and fear to respect and cooperation. The initiative for this must come from the police. This requires changes in institutional mechanisms, systems, programmes and laws. Recognition of rights of citizens, better understanding of the police role by the citizen, highlighting areas of police public cooperation, respecting dignity of the individual, improving educational, training and service conditions of police personnel, improving standards of service delivery by the police, improvement of professional capabilities, greater transparency and accountability in policing systems etc are all required to achieve a truly democratic style of policing.

This journal is intended to highlight initiatives and experiences which will take us forward in our quest for a policing system that will truly reflect and respond to the needs of a democratic polity. We hope the readers will find the contents useful. We plan to bring out this publication bi-annually so that efforts in this regard continue to get proper attention.

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EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY POLICING:
LEADERSHIP MATTERS

Introduction

This paper explores the relevance of leadership to the effective delivery of Community Policing in England and Wales. It draws on the experience of the author, commentary from practitioners and literature compiled over the past 30 years.

The re-emergence of Community Policing in the UK in the 1970s is largely attributed to the work of former Chief Constable Sir John Alderson. At the time he was considered to be something of a maverick leader, but he had the strength of character to persist with his ideals to deliver a concept that is now highly regarded across the world. The concept became a model which remains as the bedrock of UK policing today, albeit it sits under the various titles of Neighbourhood Policing, Citizen Focus and Partnership. Over that period the popularity of the model has peaked and troughed depending on the status attributed to it by leaders in the form of politicians, chief police officers and other opinion formers such as academics. A key theme throughout has been that although officers on the ground can deliver effective Community Policing it needs robust leadership to enable it to be embedded and sustained. That leadership needs to be carefully balanced. If it is too intrusive it stifles the discretion, innovation and initiative needed to deliver for the needs of the community. If it is too relaxed each locality risks becoming an isolated fiefdom remote from the needs of the policing organisation to which it belongs.

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Leadership in the context of Community Policing can be examined from a variety of perspectives. At the most strategic level the current UK prime minister is actively involved in its leadership through his promotion of the 'Big Society'. At the local service delivery level some police forces have given their community constables the title 'community beat manager' and expect them to use their initiative to provide leadership in addressing community issues. In between there are tiers of stakeholders who fulfil strategic, governance, managerial, supervisory and operational functions that may be considered to be 'leadership' in one form or another. The main focus here will be on the strategic, governance and managerial levels over the past 30 to 40 years. The most important point to note is the concept promoted and led by Alderson in the 1970s is now, in 2010, seen as the bedrock of contemporary UK policing. It is the Alderson era that will be examined in most detail not least because it provides a useful foundation for comparison.

Looking to the future, UK policing is entering a period of austerity with a leadership that has only known financial growth. Quite how this will impact on Community Policing is unclear. Some commentators argue that it is too expensive and cannot survive; others state that the only way to reduce cost is to engage more effectively with the community and encourage them to police themselves. UK society and its politicians will need to make those decisions but they must be informed and delivered by police leaders.

Origin and leadership

Community Policing as a concept in the United Kingdom has a long history. There are examples of the community being policed and policing itself over many centuries but it is the more formalised policing and its leadership that are of interest here.

When Sir Robert Peel set up the Metropolitan Police in 1829 he rationalised its creation on the grounds that 'the police are the public and the public are the police'(Fridell,2004). In his role as the first leader of the service Peel cited his nine principles of policing which continue to have validity for the delivery of Community Policing today. They were:

1 To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment.

2 To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.

3 To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.

4 To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.

5 To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion; but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.

6 To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.

7 To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.

8 To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.

9   To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

Perhaps the last principle is the most relevant to contemporary Community Policing in the UK but it is also the principle that has been most challenged in the past two decades as the service has been subjected to centralist government control which has focused on quantitative outputs such as numbers of arrests or hours on the street, rather than outcomes in terms of what the community wants. Ironically the measurement of those quantitative outputs and the application of new managerialism as promoted by Margaret Thatcher (Farnham.D. and Horton.S. (Eds); 1996) were intended to improve the quality of service to the community.

Today the main impetus of Community Policing derives from the sense, particularly among politicians, that police community relations are not satisfactory. This has evolved over time. In the 1970s Chief Constable John Alderson argued that the traditional authoritarian model of policing was proving inadequate and inappropriate in a plural and libertarian society with increasing levels of crime. Alderson cited the objectives of Community Policing as (Alderson, J, 1977):

1.   To contribute to liberty, equality and fraternity

2.   To help reconcile freedom with security and to uphold the law

3.   To uphold and protect human rights and thus help achieve human dignity

4.   To dispel criminogenic social conditions, through co-operative social action

5.   To help create trust in communities

6.   To strengthen security and feeling of security

7.   To investigate, detect and activate the prosecution of crimes

8.   To facilitate free movement along public thoroughfares

9.   To curb public order

10. To deal with crises and help those in distress involving other agencies where needed

Through the leadership of his police force he sought to deliver those objectives (Alderson.J, 1979).

More than 20 years later a summary of the benefits of Community Policing in the international context were perceived to be (Segrave M & Ratcliffe J; 2004):

Community-specific advantages

- Mobilisation and empowerment of communities to identify and respond to concerns
- Improved local physical and social environment
- Increase in positive attitudes towards police
- Reduced fear of crime.

Police-specific benefits

- Improved police–community relationship
- Improved community perception of police 'legitimacy'
- An increase in officer satisfaction with their work.

Shared benefits

- A decreased potential for police–citizen conflict
- A reduction in crime rates
- A better flow of information between the police and community
- Better implementation of crime prevention and crime control activities, as a result of both parties working towards shared goals

Not all those benefits were fully realised in the UK, prompting the Home Secretary to introduce a target in 2009 'to increase public confidence'.

Community Policing has evolved and is now referred to as Neighbourhood Policing in England and Wales but the overall concept remains the same. The relatively new UK government is placing great emphasis on the 'Big Society' part of which promotes the idea of getting the community more actively involved in the delivery of public services, including policing.

Community Policing stresses policing *with* the community as opposed

to policing *of* the community, and it aspires to improve the quality of life for those within that community. The great challenge is that Community Policing means different things to different people. This is particularly relevant in the context of leadership as the leader, in terms of the executive, has the authority to enable or prevent effective delivery. Reiner (Reiner, 1992) cites a chief officer who states 'Community Policing doesn't mean a damn thing. It's just one of those terms you use which are a recent invention by......some of our mock academics'. This perspective was punctuated by one of Alderson's own senior management team who, in providing input for this paper stated, 'It was what we were already doing; he just put a name to it'.

The concept of community has always been ambiguous and is becoming more so with the advent of virtual communities such as that produced by Facebook. In practice 'community' for the purposes of Community Policing tends to be a 'neighbourhood' based within geographical boundaries. Most areas of the UK now refer to Neighbourhood Policing rather than Community Policing. The irony is that policing finds it almost impossible to engage fully with any neighbourhood and those least likely to engage are those whose disaffection with the police lay behind calls for Community Policing (Newburn, 2003).

Both Alderson and Peel were leaders of policing but in very different eras albeit, as Alderson pointed out, the means of crime control envisaged by Peel did not include active involvement of the community. Today the UK police service is reflecting back on their ideals; to Peel to help identify the true role of policing and how superfluous tasks might be off loaded to save money; to Alderson because the government is placing a great emphasis on the 'Big Society' of which community or Neighbourhood Policing is a core element.

Before Alderson

Prior to the 1970s the traditional image of the UK 'bobby' was that of an officer patrolling alone, using discretion and minimal force and preventing rather than responding and enforcing. During the 1970s that role changed as crime volumes increased and the public became more demanding of police services. Police leaders felt they had little option other than to place their offices in 'panda cars' enhanced by 'incident' or 'immediate response' cars to cope with increasing demand. The

problem was that the UK public soon began to lament the absence of the 'bobby on the beat'(Brain, T; 2010). Whilst some chief officers, particularly Anderton in the metropolitan area of Greater Manchester advocated a harsh enforcement approach others such as John Alderson developed a more community based approach.

The Alderson perspective

John Alderson was Chief Constable of the Devon and Cornwall constabulary in the UK from 1972 to 1983. During that tenure he built on philosophies developed in the US and drew from more practical experiments in the UK to develop a cohesive philosophy of policing which he referred to as 'proactive policing'. This was an overt attempt to break the cycle of reactive policing and return to preventive policing. In his seminal work *Policing Freedom(*Alderson, 1979*)* he argued that the purpose of policing was not simply to maintain law and order but to contribute to the maintenance of a 'free, permissive and participative society', securing liberty, equality and fraternity and reconciling freedom and security. At the time he suggested the greatest threat to policing freedom was 'police alienation' brought about by excessive reliance on technology and reaction at the expense of 'proactive measures'. It is interesting to note that it took until the year 2000 for the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) for England and Wales, to accept his argument and introduce Reassurance Policing (see later) in an attempt to address that alienation.

He saw preventive policing, which was an outcome of Community Policing as a paradigm shift in policing appropriate to changing social and cultural realities.

The purpose of preventive policing in the broad sense is to find ways of bringing joint resources to bear in times of social change and economic deterioration. Without new ideas and the will to fly in the face of tradition, we may witness a police service beginning to feel unable to cope and having to rely more and more on technologies, 'coppery' and response time evaluation for self-esteem. The fusion of social policing and legal policing has a better chance of success than either would enjoy separately. The necessary change must begin in police culture, attitudes and habits and these changes should reflect and be reflected in policies. Police efforts to harness 'society against crime' would exhibit care, education, persuasion and ultimately enforcement.

From the concept of 'proactive policing' Alderson evolved a system of 'Community Policing' which he put into practice in Devon and Cornwall, a relatively low crime predominantly rural area but with three substantial urban centres . That system consisted of a model and a method. The model was based on a local officer dedicated to a local area patrolling on foot. At the divisional or force level there were specialised units including crime prevention, a juvenile bureau tasked with diverting young people away from crime, a schools liaison and a community relations team focused on relations with and within ethnic minority communities. The method of work started with an analysis of a community problem and then engagement with the community to find a solution. Community consultative groups were established to facilitate communication. The delivery of policing fell into 3 categories; primary or proactive policing which engaged the whole community to diminish anything forbidden by the criminal law; secondary or preventive policing which consisted of foot and mobile patrols in the locality and providing crime prevention advice; tertiary which involved response and detection.

The system proved attractive to police forces and other agencies across the UK and in Europe to the extent that Alderson and some of his senior managers were in great demand to lecture on the subject. Managers working for Alderson during that time report that he inspired officers of all ranks to innovate and to use discretion, within a framework that enabled them to understand the strategic direction of the organisation. 'Try it and do it' was his mantra. This did not sit easily with some of his senior managers who feared being 'ambushed' through the initiation of projects by more junior staff without seeking approval. It is interesting to note that when Alderson retired, all promotion of the Community Policing concept stopped, illustrating the vulnerability of any such initiative to the preferences of the organisational leader. Within a few years there was little evidence remaining of the innovative culture and local discretion he had promoted. There are indications that Alderson's system and the way in which he promoted it placed him outside the police 'family' in the eyes of other police leaders. Some such as Chief Constable Anderton in Greater Manchester overtly challenged his approach. Even during Alderson's tenure there were indications of flawed delivery; perhaps best illustrated by the recollections of a community constable who reported constantly being diverted from his community work to perform response duties on the instruction of his Inspector.

For those sitting to the political left the joining of 'community' and 'policing' was seen as a move towards the authoritarian state intruding throughout society on the grounds that whole groups and neighbourhoods needed to be policed and disciplined.

Elsewhere Alderson clearly enjoyed some support. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) began to detail the emergence of Community Policing as a specific philosophy in the 1970s. In those days HMIC did not have the prescriptive authority that it has enjoyed in recent years, so although it had the facility to promote the philosophy it could not provide overt leadership that might have embedded it. At that time the UK Home Office, the ministry responsible for policing and community safety, viewed a low key version of Community Policing as the vehicle to deliver situational crime prevention strategies, victim support schemes and police community relations training (Hughes, McGlaughlin and Muncie, 2002). Whilst being supportive they found it difficult to provide leadership as Chief Constables were largely autonomous. More senior political support was best illustrated by the foreword from the Right Honourable S.C. Silkin, QC, MP in the book Community versus Crime (Moore.C. and Brown.J.; 1981) written by one of Alderson's senior managers, about the operational delivery of Community Policing.

Whilst the system looked good and Alderson articulated it well (1979) it proved almost impossible to fully embed elsewhere, primarily because it was resource intensive. This problem was illustrated by comments in Lord Scarman's report (Scarman, 1981) on the 1981 Brixton riots in London, where violent crime and robberies had increased 138 per cent during the 1970s. The local police commander had tried to implement Alderson's Community Policing model including home beat officers and a community liaison committee, but had been thwarted by a lack of officers. In 1978 the commander was forced to engage the services of the more reactive Special Patrol Group which resulted in a complete breakdown of community relations. Tensions between the police and parts of the Brixton community grew over the next 3 years culminating in street riots where 279 police officers were injured. Street riots across the country followed, resulting in police leaders calling for authorisation to use more aggressive tactics and equipment to enforce control. Political leaders agreed although some sought more political control over the police. The consequence was that in some areas communities came to

see the police as an army of occupation, albeit much of the wider public just wanted to see more officers on the beat in their local area. The riots were seen as primarily being racially based but their impact was relevant to the policing of communities across the country.

After Alderson's retirement in 1983 he continued to promote his philosophy and there were numerous sporadic attempts by police leaders, occasionally with political support, to reinstate it across the country, but few were truly effective. The greatest inhibitor being the dominant management philosophy of new public management (NPM) introduced by the Conservative Thatcher government and continued by New Labour when they were elected. NPM was a centralist approach based on commercial principles that required outputs be measured against prescribed targets, with sanctions being applied for poor performance. This conflicted with the longer term problem solving approach of Community Policing but police leaders were forced to comply as policing had become increasingly politicised.

As will be seen from the chronology below the philosophy of Community Policing remained alive in the UK through to the present day but over many of the intervening years it lacked true strategic leadership. That has recently been redressed but is now challenged by austerity measures.

1980s

In his 1981 report (Scarman, 1981) on the street riots in Brixton, London the previous year by Lord Scarman punctuated Alderson's philosophy with recommendations including commentary that policing by consent must inform all aspects of police work and that crime control was the responsibility of the whole community.

He went on to say :

"If a rift is not to develop between the police and the public as a whole, it is in my view essential that a means be devised of enabling the community to be heard, not only in the development of policing but in the planning of many, though not all operations against crime" (para 5.56)

Scarman's theme was picked up and promoted by government, 'These (community consultative groups) can have a constructive and practical purpose. The Home Secretary regards this as a crucial element of crime prevention in its broadest sense: that is in harnessing the community's

good will towards the police, in the interest of its own protection' (Heal,K and Burrows, J (eds) 1983). Over the next few years Police Community Consultative Groups were created in almost all areas police areas across England and Wales, but, as we shall see later, few delivered the level of community engagement originally intended by the politicians and policy makers.

Scarman also stated that chief police officers should re-examine their methods of policing, especially the mix of mobile and foot patrols, and home beat officers should be encouraged to be more actively involved in mainstream policing.

When Sir Kenneth Newman became commissioner of the Metropolitan police in London in1982 he spoke of 'symbolic locations' where communities or at least parts of communities view the police as intruders, a symbol of authority. He equated them with the criminal rookeries of Dickensian London. He argued that crime in those areas was so multi-faceted that it could not be effectively addressed by the police acting on their own. He sought to lift the problem to a higher level with the police and other social agencies working together to deliver a sort of benign social control. This partnership approach was replicated in much of the United Kingdom but some local authority police monitoring units sought to block police led multi-agency initiatives and community consultative groups on political grounds. Despite this the approach highlighted the complex social and communal factors that sit behind that facilitate crime but are not necessarily the responsibility of the police. From this emerged the concept of community safety rather than crime prevention (McLaughlin E ;1994).

Also in the early 1980s Maurice Buck , Chief Constable of the small provincial police force of Northamptonshire took Alderson's model and developed it. Divisions and sub divisions were abolished and replaced by locally managed command units which had the authority to respond to local need without reference to headquarters. Partnerships were formed with local authorities. 'Policing by Objectives' was introduced and formal prioritisation of police attendance at incidents was implemented (Brian, 2010).

Elsewhere in the 1980s chief officers had instigated initiatives based on Alderson's model but now referred to as neighbourhood, geographic or team policing. Most found delivery was inhibited by insufficient police

officers. Where some success was achieved it was often dependent on the enthusiasm of local middle ranking officers (Brian, 2010). Some chief officers placed higher value on response policing and investigation. For example at the 1987 ACPO conference Assistant Chief Constable David Phillips questioned the value of foot patrol. To a certain extent his argument has been substantiated over time as the response element of policing has always taken priority when resources are limited.

A further evolution of the Community Policing model took place when, in 1989, the Chief Constable of Surrey introduced a model referred to as 'total geographic policing' where much decision making was devolved to the local inspector responsible for a specific geographic area. Opinions vary on the success of the model but on some sites elsewhere it resulted in small inspector led fiefdoms which inhibited the performance of the organisation to which they belonged. An example is explored in more detail later in this paper.

In 1979 the Conservative government under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher were elected with a strong law and order mandate. Consequently as many other parts of the public sector had change imposed, the police were left largely to their own initiative; where many other budgets were cut the police enjoyed a growth in funding. In the late 1980s politicians began to articulate their concern that despite enormous funding support for the police, crime continued to increase. Chief Secretary to the Treasury said of the police 'they are overpaid, we've thrown money at them, and we have the highest level of crime in our history'. John Alderson, now retired, referred to a 'whiff of decay' within the service and called for a fundamental restructuring on community foundations. Politicians placed much of the blame with the police leadership. Thatcher argued that senior police positions would be better filled by former army officers. This was never achieved but the challenge caused chief officers to reorganise into a more powerful centralised body. Whilst this did not have a direct impact on Community Policing at the time it did play a key role in the delivery of Neighbourhood Policing later.

In 1989 the president of ACPO, Chief Constable Roger Birch, commissioned a 'wide ranging examination of issues and trends that drive to the heart of modern policing practice'. It was to be called the Operational Policing Review. It findings included:

- Improvements to productivity did not equate to improvements in service

- Efficiency programmes had been used to cope with spiralling demand, not as the politicians had hoped, to return officers to the beat

- Police officers thought they should concentrate on arrests and detections whilst the public wanted more foot patrol.

In effect it appears that the findings of the review were a thinly veiled rebuff to the new managerialist approach that the Conservative government were imposing on much of the public sector and would no doubt soon apply to policing.

1990s

In 1992, following a series of reviews examining police efficiency Howard Davies then head of the Audit Commission stated 'the police exhibit all the characteristics of a badly designed system one ripe for fundamental reform'. The following year the Home Secretary announced a raft of measures to drive reform in policing which in summary consisted of the application of new managerialism to the service. Many police leaders had always seen Community Policing as a desirable but expensive option. The problem now was that new managerialism required delivery to be measured in terms of hard outputs whereas Community Policing tended to deliver softer, longer term outcomes. The obvious response from police leaders was to focus their resources on what could be measured to prove that they were being efficient and effective. Inevitably in many cases their focus moved away from Community Policing, not least because it was seen by many as an expensive way of delivering service. There were some exceptions, often driven by local politics. An early change of particular note was in Islington in London. It had been the most anti-police borough in London, even prohibiting police officers from entering its schools, but it was under pressure from its community to reduce the level of crime. Council leaders took the initiative, developing police, local authority and community partnerships to address societal issues such as poor housing, poor street lighting and a lack of activities for young people. The outcome was a marked decrease in robbery, burglary and anti-social behaviour. The challenge for police leaders was that their traditional role of direction and control had been compromised.

For much of the remainder of the 1990s, whilst Community Policing survived in one form or another in most police areas, it did not receive a great deal of attention from police leaders as they strived to achieve centrally set performance targets and to illustrate how they had made their organisations more efficient and effective.

When New Labour won the election in 1997 it continued to apply the new managerialist philosophy and developed it further by introducing more quantitative measurement. The outcome of this was to focus chief officers on delivery against quantifiable outputs such as crimes per 1000 population and the percentage of reported crimes detected. For many of those chief officers the solution was to create specialist teams such as burglary and vehicle crime squads. This often meant a reduction in the number of officers available for community or neighbourhood policing.

2000 onwards

During the past decade chief officers have developed variations on the Community Policing theme to address particular needs, namely -

Neighbourhood policing

The aims of Neighbourhood Policing are to improve satisfaction and confidence, to reduce the fear of crime and to resolve local problems of crime and anti-social behaviour.

Citizen Focus

Citizen Focus policing is about developing a culture where the needs and priorities of the citizen are understood by staff and always taken into account when designing and delivering policing services.

Reassurance Policing

Reassurance Policing was initiated in 2000 by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) to address the 'reassurance gap', in that crime had fallen significantly but the public felt that it was still rising. It police leaders allocating small policing teams full time to clearly defined neighbourhoods. They were tasked with auditing their area for signal crimes (Innes, et al; 2002)and mounting appropriate problem solving responses. There was also an emphasis on establishing a visible police presence and being responsive to public concerns with a view to building public trust and confidence.

Despite its focus on performance outputs the Home Office maintained a keen interest in the concept of community or Neighbourhood Policing and in 2004 published the White Paper *Building Communities, Beating Crime*. Its thrust was on modernising the police service; a core element being the introduction of Police Community Support Officers. Labour Home Secretary David Blunkett saw an opportunity to address the declining number of community police officers through the introduction of 'support staff to provide a visible presence in the community', 'uniformed' and 'under the control of the chief officer'. Some police leaders, including the Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police overtly supported the idea. Others attacked it. The Home Secretary, having ultimate authority, pushed the idea through and chief police officers were allowed to use grant money from government to recruit Community Support Officers. Belatedly they were given the 'Police' prefix and became commonly known as PCSOs. The initiative was a success with 15500 being recruited by 2008 (Brian, 2010). Whilst the implementation of recommendations in the White Paper was patchy it set the policing agenda for the next few years. The Home Secretary punctuated political interest in Community Policing in 2006 with the publication of the Home Office vision for Neighbourhood Policing *Neighbourhood Policing: Your Police; Your Community; Our Commitment.* It differed from Alderson's model in that its focus was on addressing specific community concerns which would deliver reduced crime and disorder and increased levels of confidence within the community. Three chief officers agreed to take up the challenge of reconciling the competing demands of crime investigation, response and Community Policing in their respective areas. They successfully elicited overt political support and additional funding for their pilots. When reviewed those pilots were deemed a success having delivered substantial reductions in recorded crime above the national average and increased public confidence. The Home Secretary mandated that all forces must have established dedicated Neighbourhood Policing teams. Unlike previous community/Neighbourhood Policing initiatives this time implementation was to be subjected to much more scrutiny. Responsibility for national implementation was give to the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) who appointed Chief Constable Matt Baggott as the project owner. HMIC was tasked with providing rigorous inspection to monitor progress. The title Community Policing was deliberately dropped to remove any association with past failed

initiatives. By 2008 HMIC reported that all police forces had met the standard it had set for Neighbourhood Policing. Arguably Alderson's vision had finally been achieved, thirty years after it had been introduced; facilitated by governmental support, ACPO leadership and the availability of additional resources. That same year another government sponsored report *Engaging Communities in Fighting Crime* found that whilst communities liked neighbourhood policing, its style of delivery varied widely across the country and that lack of uniformity did little to enhance public confidence in the service.

It is worth noting that at the same time as mandating Neighbourhood Policing Home Secretary David Blunkett was enforcing a strict regime of comparative performance management against quantitative targets to reduce crime and increase detections. Later evidence showed that delivery had been skewed to enable police leaders to achieve those targets. They have now been abolished in favour of softer outcome based assessment.

The recent leadership perspective

In its 2008 *Serving Neighbourhoods and Individuals* review, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 2008 explored the extent to which Citizen Focus and Neighbourhood Policing had been embedded in policing in England and Wales since it had been mandated in 2006.

A key finding was that emphatic strategic leadership from chief officers was a critical factor in delivering progress. In all but two forces it found an established chief officer lead programme. Where strategic leadership was developing but less evident, progress was not so marked and, in some cases, the public confidence measures were deteriorating. In Lancashire, one of the country's highest performing police forces, leaders had developed a framework for continuing improvement and had used that to identify and address identified areas of weakness. Strong leadership, driven by chief officers, was found to be both supportive and intrusive throughout the organisations at a corporate and divisional level. The Metropolitan police were seen as high profile advocates in that their strategic assessment required engagement with partner agencies as a key part of service delivery against priority themes. Chief officers and local commanders were found to be proactive in seeking and creating opportunities for joint working and, consequently, the range and depth of MPS partnership and community engagement at strategic and local

level were impressive and in many areas ground-breaking, for example in relation to engagement with and use of independent advisory groups.

The challenge for those leaders was that other areas of policing such as the provision of protective services, risked diverting resources away from Neighbourhood Policing. Similarly elsewhere it was found that initial momentum created by leaders had waned as other matters took priority and sustaining Neighbourhood Policing had been challenged by competition for funding, buildings and resources.

In Leicestershire, a more rural force, the Assistant Chief Constable (operations), the superintendent for Neighbourhood Policing and the service improvement manager were seen to hold a quarterly forum for local policing unit (LPU) commanders and invested much time in driving forward key themes for Neighbourhood Policing and Citizen Focus. On a day-to-day basis, strategic and operational support was provided by the Neighbourhood Policing project lead (superintendent) and the neighbourhood improvement unit, which was part of the force's community safety bureau.

The review identified that local leadership within basic command units, from divisional commanders (usually chief superintendents) through to front-line supervisors, was vital for successful Neighbourhood Policing delivery, together with the support of staff and partners who were determined to deliver to the community the Neighbourhood Policing promise of:

- access – to policing or community safety services through a named point of contact;

- influence – over community safety priorities in their area;

- interventions – joint actions with communities to solve problems; and

- answers – sustainable solutions to problems and feedback on results.

Committed front-line leadership of Neighbourhood Policing teams was found to be widespread.

However, development of the skills, knowledge and understanding to fully engage with local communities and generally deliver effective joint problem solving required reinforcement. A better analysis of

learning and development needs was also required.

The review found that leaders recognised the need for staff to be rewarded for good work in the Neighbourhood Policing arena. For example in the metropolitan area of the West Midlands the Chief Constable introduced a new award. Reflecting the breadth of Neighbourhood Policing it did not have any rigid constraints. Awards were made for 'team quality achiever', 'effective partnership working', 'problem solving' and 'commitment to Neighbourhood Policing'.

Leaders in Dorset, another rural force, sought the views of their community and staff about their expectations of the force, to inform the drafting of its vision and values. This built on clear and innovative branding, facilitating communication that ensured the vision and values were fully embedded. Importantly for Neighbourhood Policing the Chief Constable had taken the long term view to ensure there was a continuity of events, long-term commitment and positive sustained leadership. Similarly in Hertfordshire chief officers and their police authority provide strategic direction through their widely publicised Statement of Purpose.

The Chief Constable in Lancashire, arguably the best performing police force in England and Wales, had adopted a slightly different approach as part of his Sustaining Excellence programme, addressing both Neighbourhood Policing and the national Citizen Focus initiative. Informed by external consultants the purpose of the programme was to shift the force's culture towards:

- understanding that members of the public are its highest priority;

- believing that 'getting it right first time' is paramount in delivering quality and Sustaining Excellence;

- working together with the community, its partners and each other to address problems and protect individuals and communities from serious harm;

- encouraging its employees to be proud of themselves and the organisation they work for;

- being visible, accessible and accountable for local policing issues; and

- treating people politely, with respect and dignity, recognising that everyone is unique.

Whilst the 2008 review demonstrated that Community Policing in its various iterations was alive and well with elements of effective leadership and opportunities for improvement, a review of the whole of policing the following year highlighted continuity as being one of the biggest inhibitors to effective delivery. Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary stated in his 2009 *Review of Policing*:

In general, the Review has found that forces appreciate the need to allow neighbourhood officers and staff to remain in a given area. However, the service is not always as aware of the need for continuity at management levels. This is particularly important amongst junior managers in charge of one or more Neighbourhood Policing teams, and BCU (basic command unit) Commanders. Whilst balancing operational needs and career development concerns, appointments to these key positions need to be made with care, and with a view to the incumbent staying in post for a fixed period of time. Evidence has shown that this should be for a minimum period of 2 years in order to enable effective relationships with partners to be developed. Although many forces already impose an expectation in this regard, it is something which should be quickly developed further and monitored.

The future of police leadership in Community Policing

The centralised target driven management style of the past 20 years or more has produced a cadre of police leaders competent at managing their organisations in the delivery of prescribed quantifiable outputs but, with a few exceptions, lacking the confidence and dynamism (Golding R; 2008) to lead innovation. Lord Dear, a former Chief Constable and Inspector of Constabulary lamented when addressing a recent conference how in the early 1990s those responsible for police leadership development decreed that future chief officers were to be managers not leaders. Ironically political leaders are now calling on the service to be innovative, to do that it needs dynamic leaders, not managers. Those calls should provide the authority for police leaders to deliver, but such an approach will, for many, be counter culture. Former Chief Constable Peter Neyroud has been commissioned by the government to carry out a 'fundamental review of the current approach to police leadership and training'. His most recent comments suggest that he intends to address those cultural issues. He also stresses 'on the whole, police leadership compares quite favourably with leadership in

other sectors' but he recognises the need to 'prepare policing for a much more complex and flexible future'. That complex future will no doubt require police leaders to deliver Community Policing by playing an active part in the 'Big Society', facilitating more partnership working, and addressing increased demand with reduced resources.

Delivery in austerity

The election of a new Conservative government in 2010 brought with it a need to deliver enormous cuts in public spending. The police are required to make savings of 25% over the next 3 years. The Home Secretary has stated that 'good management and leadership' will be key to success in difficult times. Leadership should 'rise to the challenge'. 'Savings can and must be made in areas like procurement, operational support and back office'. Little reference has been made to Community Policing *per se* but by implication political commentary suggests it will be a priority. In a recent open letter the Police Minister has stated 'We know how important successful local partnerships are to prevent crime and reduce re-offending.... we want to give officers more space to make decisions ....restoring professional discretion'. The frontline should be the last place you look to make savings, not the first'. This appears to conflict with one of the most senior Chief Constable's in the country who stated 'It will be difficult to hold on to front line services .....we would probably not be able to be as customer focused.....Single agency measures are one of the biggest barriers to partnership working and integrated delivery at the neighbourhood level'.

For many police forces Police Community Support Officers have become a core part of their Community Policing strategy. There are indications that some chief officers feel they are a luxury that they can no longer afford. Their demise would challenge the ability of the service to deliver Community Policing. Contemporary alternatives are emerging. 'Police and Communities Together online forums are proving increasingly popular'. The government is promoting the increased use of volunteers such as sworn Special Constables with police powers and unsworn community wardens without police powers. The challenge for police leaders will be to assess what might be most effective for their particular area.

The Comprehensive Spending Review was delivered on 20th October 2010 and is still being digested by police leaders. Quite how they will

deliver the savings required is unclear but there is no doubt that Chief Constables will be required to take responsibility for their decisions. Their conundrum will be balancing the local demand for Community Policing against the wider demands of responding to emergencies and addressing strategic issues such as terrorism.

Governance

Governance and oversight of policing in England and Wales is provided by locally based Police Authorities. They are soon to be abolished as the government does not consider them to be particularly effective but it is interesting to note the strategic leadership they have provided for Neighbourhood Policing in the better performing areas. This information is drawn from the 2008 HMIC report *Serving Neighbourhoods and Individuals.* The Authority in Lancashire was found 'to have a close but challenging relationship with the constabulary, being involved in all key areas of business. Police authority representatives meet fortnightly with the Chief Constable and are represented on relevant policing boards and scrutiny panels. Police authority members had one-to-one contacts with specialist areas of interest. Through national work and interaction with colleagues, police authority members believe that they are among the best informed in the country, allowing them to carry out their role in relation to scrutiny more effectively and to ask difficult questions with confidence'. Authority members fulfil a similar role in Leicestershire but also take an active role in Local Policing Unit inspections. In London members of the Metropolitan Police Authority were found to be high profile advocates of Neighbourhood Policing.

HMIC also commented that :

"A dedicated and established Association of Chief Police Officers (national) lead, supported by a strategic board with engaged police authority representation, is key to the effective delivery of Neighbourhood Policing. Corporate governance with central support delivers a consistent approach while still enabling creativity in engagement and problem solving locally".

Measurement

Perhaps one of the greatest inhibitors to the delivery of Community Policing has been the advent of new managerialism and various government directives that almost everything should be the subject of

quantitative measurement. Community Policing is a soft science to which it is almost impossible to apply simple quantitative measures. Whilst government has lately recognised this, their softening of compliance with targets is now counter culture for the police. In the 2008 review HMIC found that:

21 (out of 43) forces had recognised the shift towards qualitative measures, fully integrating satisfaction and confidence into divisional and force performance management processes. This shift, however, was not as embedded and understood by staff at all levels in all forces. The performance framework in many forces remains focused on quantitative measures and quality considerations are not systematic and consistent. All too often, for example, response officers have performance development objectives that are solely quantity based rather than considering the quality of service delivery. More account must be taken of confidence and satisfaction reported by users to shape the style of service provided. Rapid turnover of senior staff at borough level made it hard to ensure sufficient continuity to provide effective leadership.

Partnership

From the time of Alderson through to the present day partnership working has been critical to the delivery of Community Policing but it has never been easy to deliver. Politically some leaders of partner agencies felt that police intrusion into their domains was part of a larger political initiative to control society as a whole. In the 1970s in the UK partnership working in the community safety arena meant almost exclusively the police working with the local authority/council. Over time that has evolved to the current situation where it embraces health, the fire service, the police authority, the probation service and the voluntary and not for profit sectors and increasingly the commercial sector. The advent of new managerialism brought with it a challenging set of problems for partnership working. The targets set tended to focus the leaders of each agency on their own business area. So for example evidence showed that low level acquisitive crime was being driven by the need to get money to fund drug habits. The definitive partnership approach should have been for the police or the courts to divert the offender into rehabilitation run by the health service who would link up with the department for work and pensions to get the offender into work and out of a cycle of crime, engage the local authority to provide residential accommodation and the probation service to provide personal

support. Whilst there were a few examples of this happening they tended to be the exception. In most cases leaders found it difficult to find measurable outputs directly attributable to their individual agency from the partnership approach. Similarly outcomes, such as a reduction in crime, were deemed to be too intangible. The consequence was that most leaders looked for every opportunity to retreat from partnership working. Even when the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 mandated partnership working few leaders, other than the police, actively engaged. Many police leaders found the concept too soft or too slow. Many UK police leaders have a very 'can do' approach and lead very 'can do' organisations. They become frustrated and disengage when partner agencies are slower to react and deliver.

The consequences of poor partnership engagement were clearly illustrated in 2004 when various reviews of police performance identified that poor police performance invariably reflected poor partnership working. Interestingly in some of those areas service delivery staff had developed their own cross agency ways of working. Often executive teams fully accepted the value of the partnership concept but delivery was inhibited by the distraction of other priorities and the challenge of getting cross agency senior management teams to work together. These problems reflected the fact that even at governmental level there was very little evidence of overt cross ministry working. Despite this, senior managers in the various agencies, almost without exception, expressed a willingness to make partnership working work. In most cases all that was needed was the opportunity for them to communicate with their peers in other agencies to identify areas of commonality and how they could help one another to achieve their various targets. In many cases that opportunity to communicate was delivered through external facilitation of crime and disorder partnership board meetings attended by local police chiefs and their equivalents from the other agencies. Facilitation enabled the articulation of frustrations, needs and desires of the various agencies and brought about a group understanding of the key issues to be addressed to improve quality of life within the community whilst still delivering on individual agency targets.

Today partnership working in the UK faces an even greater challenge as the government's austerity measures of a 25% to 40% cut in public sector spending begin to bite. There is some evidence of the various partnership agencies focusing on their core business and retreating from

partnership activity. But there is also evidence of agencies collaborating to deliver more cost effective service. The latter model reflects the desire of government, albeit this government has moved away from the prescriptive centralist approach of the previous administration, so they are unlikely to dictate to local partnerships. Professor John Bennington refers to the Conservative's 'loose tight' model of government where central government provides a small core of prescriptive policy but allows local interpretation on the understanding that local leaders are accountable for their decisions and actions. Initial evidence suggests that the centralist governance of the last 3 decades had deprived the public sector in general and the police in particular of the dynamic leadership needed to fully exploit the opportunities that the new administration is offering (Newburn, 2008). Quite how this will manifest itself is yet to be seen.

Problem solving

Community Policing, partnership working and problem solving could be described as the delivery triangle of community safety. They are all interconnected. Problem oriented policing and Community Policing are often bracketed together, the end purpose being to address police related community problems (Newburn, 2008). For ease of reference problem solving might best be described as long term partnership solutions to recurring community safety problems. What is of interest here is the way in which problem solving can be facilitated or inhibited by leaders.

A challenge for Community Policing in the UK is that problem solving is not fully embedded in partnership working. The principal problem being that delivery of tangible outcomes from problem solving takes time. In a target driven environment many leaders, particularly in the police, see it as too slow. In addition there are constantly new priorities emerging which invariably cause leaders and managers to disrupt longer term initiatives to address the demands of 'here and now'. In addition in many areas of the UK the management of problem solving does not function as a cohesive system from strategic leadership to service delivery. This can be largely attributed to the fact that many leaders working at partnership board level only have a high level overview of the problem solving concept but do not understand what it can deliver if effectively strategically managed. In addition many managers responsible for managing problem solving lack the necessary

experience and do not get the strategic direction and support needed to ensure effective delivery. Leadership at the national level is also confused with various government agencies driving problem solving initiatives but with little cohesion; a consequence being that a Community Policing team and/or its partners might receive very similar problem solving support from three or more different agencies.

Much problem solving relies on the tacit locality and subject matter knowledge of those delivering it. That knowledge is difficult to codify and share but the type of problems addressed tend to be replicated around the country. Leaders, managers and service delivery staff could benefit from a cohesive easily searched database illustrating what works, what it costs and what might be delivered.

The risks illustrated

Through developing a system of comparative performance Home Secretary David Blunkett and his successors were able to assess performance of policing areas against those in their 'most similar family'. This flagged an area with a strong focus on Community Policing, Humberside, as being one of the poorest performing in the country. In September 2001, the Force had introduced the concept of local policing teams (LPTs) of which there were 39 across the Force area. The LPT approach to service delivery was designed to enhance 'quality of life' policing by giving a team of officers an identifiable community or area for which they had responsibility 24 hours a day. Specialist CID officers, roads policing officers and dog patrols worked alongside uniform colleagues under the command of the LPT inspector to address community needs in their local area. The Chief Constable devolved responsibility to the extent that each LPT drew up its own plan to address local need. HMIC inspections within the force in 2003, 2004 and 2006 revealed significant flaws in the way the structure and its systems were working. Service delivery across the force was fragmented and the achievement of organisational targets was challenging to the point of being almost impossible. The distribution of staff with little central co-ordination resulted in LPT officers being almost totally demand driven with very little time to adopt a proactive Community Policing approach or problem solve. In those areas where Community Policing had been 'ring fenced' to protect it, volume crime such as dwelling burglary was not being effectively addressed. There was a lack of consistency across

the force in terms of policy and procedures in key business areas such as crime, duty management, operations and training. The force had invested heavily in the construction of community based police stations with public counters, raising public expectation that they would be staffed. Limited resources and high response demand meant that they were often not staffed so the public saw this as a poor quality of service. Arguably the structure was only sustained through the use of Police Community Support Officers and Special Constables (volunteers). The outcome was that under pressure from the Home Secretary on this and other matters the Chief Constable resigned.

On reflection one has to ask if the model and its execution were defective or was it illustrating the conflict between two policing philosophies.

Evaluation

It would be wrong to say that Community Policing has not been evaluated. It has, over and over and over again. The problem is that the police environment is not conducive to long term evaluation as it constantly changes, driven by both internal and external pressures. Community Policing requires time to deliver outcomes but projects and initiatives rarely remain undisturbed for their duration. Similarly the way effective Community Policing is assessed does not necessarily reflect what the community wants. Waddington (Waddington, 2009) asserts that 'Community Policing has failed wherever it has been adopted, because failure was evaluated in terms of reducing crime and disorder. Community Policing is popular *not* because it increases the capacity of the police to deal more effectively with crime and disorder. It is popular because the community police officer is not a threat, since he lacks the capacity to threaten. The second half of the 20th century in the UK reversed that image and depicted the police as formidable — the 'long arm of the law' that criminals should fear, the 'strong arm of the law' capable of defeating the most violent threat. We should recognise that it has failed'.

Where Community Policing has been evaluated by academics much of their work has not been well received by practitioners and police leaders, primarily because all too often there has been a heavy focus on methodology and insufficient evidence of 'what works'. In addition as Brookes and Grint note 'various reform programmes are being

implemented in silos and, to date research is predominantly focused within similar disciplinary silos' (Brookes.S. and Grint.K.; 2010). Evaluation of Community Policing requires the boundaries of those silos to be broken down.

Where community or Neighbourhood Policing has been assessed by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary or one of the government's other auditing agencies the primary focus has been on whether prescribed outputs have been delivered or policies complied with. Whilst valuable recommendations have been made, those assessments rarely reflect a true analysis of the outcomes delivered, not least because those outcomes tend to be intangible or difficult to identify.

Going forward there will be a need to evaluate Community Policing to assess its effectiveness and value for money. Police leaders will have to ensure that evaluation is built into projects or initiatives from the beginning. Perhaps there is an opportunity for HMIC and the academic world to work together, the former to provide the professional perspective, the latter to provide academic rigour and together providing the guidance the service needs to develop its Community Policing.

A recent innovation for the UK police service has been the application of peer review. Whilst not evaluation in the traditional sense it is a relatively low cost solution where subject matter experts from one area review service provision in another area. It is an effective way of sharing information across geographic boundaries but may not elicit the level of challenge or stimulate innovation in the way that objective external analysis might. Leaders of Community Policing will need fresh stimulus as they strive to deal with austerity measures. Peer review might not provide that.

Effective evaluation should identify effective practice to be shared. Whilst the recent implementation of Neighbourhood Policing across England and Wales has indicated that it is possible for such sharing to happen, the service has a history of not sharing and not learning from others. This is partly due to protectionism created by a divisive target culture which has inhibited sharing and partly due to the 'not invented here syndrome' where leaders are reluctant to use the ideas of others. Perhaps a wider issue is that it is difficult to codify the tacit knowledge applied in the effective delivery of Community Policing; a problem exacerbated by the fact that that knowledge often sits across agency

boundaries and to a growing extent across sectors. As Brookes and Grint point out 'The issue of leadership is more important than management in encouraging the sharing of learning across non-traditional sector institutions'.

Conclusion

Perhaps the strongest message that comes through here is that in its rawest form policing is a demand driven service that has a duty to exercise its coercive power on behalf of society and will work in that capacity by default. Community Policing, despite being the oldest and arguably the most desirable form of policing, can no longer be delivered by default. It requires robust and sustained leadership. Whilst the model and methods developed and delivered by Alderson in the 1970s probably represent the ideal, it is an expensive and resource intensive ideal which requires time to embed and deliver. For most of the past 30 years political leaders have put police leaders under pressure to deliver short term quantifiable output based results when Community Policing is based on the delivery of longer term sustainable outcomes. That conflict has caused confusion. It has also resulted in the police, in many cases, failing to deliver the type of community based service that the public want. During those years police leaders have taken Community Policing through various iterations but it is interesting to note that Alderson's overall approach along with the type of innovation and use of discretion that he promoted, is clearly articulated by the political leaders in the relatively new Conservative administration. The austerity measures imposed by that administration are going to challenge police leaders in a way that they have never been challenged before. No doubt they will deliver as they always have in the past and in doing so will prove that in the context of Community Policing in particular, leadership does matter.

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COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE NETHERLANDS:
A CONTINUOUSLY CHANGING CONSTANT

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Introduction

Since 1977 the Dutch police have followed the course that was set by 'A Changing Police'. This strategy document that was published in 1977 is generally considered a milestone in the development of Dutch policing (see for example Cachet et al. 1998) and the starting point for Dutch Community Policing (COP). In this report, innovation in policing was considered necessary to close the growing gap between police and society. By introducing community policing the police could become more integrated into society.

In 2005, the Dutch Board of Chief Commissioners published a new strategy document titled 'The Police in Evolution' (PIE) with a vision on the future of Dutch policing. PIE intended to point the way for future developments in the police profession. After nearly three decades the Dutch police was in need again of a new, broadly shared philosophy, as a foundation for their mandate. The focus on the local community and the focus on policing for communities are two important strategic targets

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in PIE. Above all, the police want to work in close proximity to citizens. According to PIE, COP will continue to be a cornerstone of Dutch policing.

Community policing (COP) has proven to be an important and constant feature of Dutch policing since the 1970s, although it has changed its shape several times.

In this paper we will explore the adventures of COP in the Netherlands. Our central research question is: 'Which phases can be distinguished in the long term development of Dutch COP, what factors explain the shifts that have occurred in the appearance of Dutch Community Policing, and what will be the prospects of COP in the Netherlands?'

The remaining part of this paper will consist of four sections. In the first Section we will analyze the long term development of Dutch COP. In Section 2 we will go into the current state of affairs of COP in the Netherlands. In Section 3 we will offer explanations for the shifts that have occurred in the development of Dutch COP. In Section (4) we will discuss the future prospects for COP. In the final Section (5) we will present our conclusions

1. Phases of Dutch COP

The Dutch concept of COP is neither strictly defined nor static. However, following Terpstra (2010, 217) we assume there are five central ambitions of Dutch COP: reducing the distance between the police and citizens, orientation towards a broad range of problems in the neighbourhood, a preventive approach and a proactive work style in addition to a reactive one, cooperation with other agencies, and encouragement of citizen involvement. In the course of time the Dutch police have learned to combine 'hard' and 'soft' elements in their philosophy and practice (Punch, 2002, 64).

We distinguish five successive phases in the evolution of Dutch COP, based on the manifestations of COP and its relation with other perspectives on policing:

1.   Fighting for existence (1970s and early 1980s)

2.   COP as the new orthodoxy (late 1980s and early 1990s)

3. Competing perspectives on policing (1990s and early 21st century)

4. COP as area bound policing (after the 1993 Police Act)

5. New realism, pragmatism in policing (2005 …)

Phase 1: Fighting for existence (1970s and early 1980s)

The first major shift in Dutch policing after the Second World War took place in the 1970s, when the traditional model of policing was viciously attacked for its incompetence to deal with more complex and dynamic problems and with the kind of societal protest during the 1960s.The traditional model was **characterized by management and communication** through hierarchical channels, routinization and standardization of police work as well as a high amount of planning and control. Decisions were taken at the organisational top and were communicated downwards along the hierarchical, organizational lines by means of directives and detailed **guidelines. Management** was aimed at controlling the 'rank and file'. Police officers were expected to enforce the law and to make arrests. Police discretion was neither acknowledged nor accepted. Police tasks were simplified by standard operation procedures. Specialised units w**ere created to handle more complicated problems.** In this model citizens are seen as mere recipients of professional police services (van Sluis, 2002).

After the 1960s the Dutch police were left with a gigantic loss of legitimacy. The rigid and repressive style of policing student and juvenile protests had resulted in broad and bitter criticism of the police. Following inspiring examples from the USA, the Dutch police adopted community policing in an effort to integrate into society and to regain the support and trust of the citizens that had gone lost during the previous period.

From the 1970s onwards, Dutch police experimented with COP. The first community police officer was a beat constable with the broadly defined task to keep the neighbourhood safe and quiet and to restore the contact with citizens (Punch et al., 2002). He worked only in his own area. However, the beat officers met with a lot of criticism; from colleagues for not being real police men and from the public for being too soft and always alone and lacking any authority. This kind of criticism resulted in the creation of neighbourhood teams that aimed for both external integration between the police and the public and integral

integration between departments of the organization. Besides, each police officer would share in all kinds of daily police work.

Phase 2: COP as the new orthodoxy (late 1980s and early 1990s)

However, in the early 1980s most police forces failed to implement neighbourhood teams. For example, the municipal police of Delft, a medium-sized force and one of the COP pioneers, started a pilot in 1980 that was ended prematurely because both the detectives and the uniformed officers felt threatened and opposed the intended changes. Besides, the chief of police showed ambivalence in his support of the pilot and the public prosecutor openly expressed his doubts about the quality of crime control if COP would be implemented (van Os, unpublished paper).

Only the municipal police of Haarlem successfully adopted and implemented neighbourhood teams in three areas. This had a substantial impact on the image of policing. And once the municipal police of Amsterdam, the leading police force in the Netherlands, adopted COP, soon many other police were to follow. By the beginning of the 1990s, nearly all forces had adopted teams based on COP, drawing on 'A Changing Police'. COP had become the standard way of delivering basic policing and became the new orthodoxy of policing (Punch et al., 2007).

Phase 3: Competing perspectives on policing (1990s and early 21st century)

From the 1990s on, COP gradually lost its status as the dominant policing model and as a remedy for all diseases. In the late 1980s new developments took place in the field of public order. The squatter movement grew significantly and challenged the police. Crime took another turn. The petty crime increased tremendously. Later on, the Netherlands experienced the emergence of more professional, more organized and more international forms of crime. These new developments undermined the predominance of COP. It became clear that even a COP perspective had to do justice to the police as the strong arm of government, at least to a certain extent, and that crime control deserved much more attention

In practice COP, though still the dominant policing philosophy, had already been modified by adding and integrating innovations like zero tolerance that had become a feature of Dutch policing in the big cities.

Also broken windows policing and hotspot policing became part of the repertoire of the Dutch police. This was a result of 'policy transfer' from abroad, in particular from the United States and the United Kingdom to the Netherlands. Some elements like the Compstat model and the accent on 'fixing broken windows' were widely adopted and easily absorbed because they reinforced existing patterns of policing (Punch, 2006, 91). They were not simply copied from abroad but were fitted in the existing Dutch police paradigm and mixed with existing police practices at the local level (Punch, 2006).

Phase 4: COP as area bound policing (after the 1993 Police Act)

COP unexpectedly revived after 1993, when a new Police Act came into being and the 148 municipal police forces and the 11 districts of the state police were merged into 25 regional police forces. This regionalization and the up scaling of the police were aimed at improving police performance, especially in crime control.

Shortly after the regionalization area-bound policing was introduced in almost all regions (Beumer, 1997).During this period, COP can be characterized as an attempt to restore the balance on regional level between centralizing tendencies (especially a drastic increase in scale of the police forces) and decentralizing tendencies (especially strengthening bonds with local communities).

Contrary to the beat constables who were ordinary cops the new community officers were held responsible for organizing security in their area in a much wider and more permanent sense. They were called area managers or neighborhood directors and they were supported by their colleagues in specialized departments. They were formally obliged to help (Punch et. al, 2007).

The shape of COP in the 1990s reflects important shifts in local safety policy in the Netherlands and the changing role of the police, yet another important innovation. From the early 1990s on, central government had put a lot of effort in stimulating local authorities to develop their own local safety policies. In recent years, the role of central government has become more predominant in determining local priorities, by publishing national safety plans like 'The Security Program: Towards a Safer Society' from the first Balkenende cabinet. More and more, police policy became an integral part of this broader safety policy, locally as well as nationally.

As a consequence, the police had to take up a new position to take part in these integrated plans and felt obliged to rethink their core tasks and their role in the chain of collaboration with other parties (De Kimpe and Cachet, 2008). Gradually, the role of the police in local safety programs evolved from an initially overpowering one into a more modest one. The rise of independent local safety plans gave the police an opportunity to dispose of certain police tasks they considered improper as well.

Phase 5: New realism, pragmatism in policing (2005 …)

From the early 21st century on, COP is being addressed in a more pragmatic manner. The new vision on COP stems from the strategy document 'Police in Evolution'. Above all, the community officer is a police officer who acts as the strong arm of government, a clearly visible and robust police officer in the streets, not a social worker, who engages in criminal investigations, order maintenance and law enforcement. He is a generalist who performs all policing tasks, except the ones that require specialist expertise. He provides reliable information and support initiatives that are initiated and directed by the local government, based on a programmatic approach.

This new image of the community officers fits a new model of policing that gained importance, the so-called reform model of policing (Van der Vijver, 2004). This model presupposes a limitation of the police tasks only to law enforcement, no other service to the public, and no crime prevention. It accentuates a shift towards a more repressive police with a focus on maintaining public order and crime fighting. This model also presupposes that other organizations take over the less repressive work the police are not doing anymore. For Dutch COP, the tendency towards a more assertive and firm enforcement led to a stronger involvement in crime fighting and in 'hard policing', in order to close the gap between community policing and crime investigation.

2. The current state of affairs: Dutch COP in practice

According to Straver et al. (2009) the Dutch police are reasonably well integrated in neighborhoods, professional networks and local government. A fair amount of local integration also contributed to a satisfactory level of police legitimacy. Apparently, nowadays these basic goals of COP have been met rather well. However, the overall picture that arises from recent research is more ambivalent. In practice Dutch

COP has many difficulties meeting the expectations. In the following sections we will discuss some of the discrepancies between the ambitions and the Dutch practice of COP, based on a review of recent literature (Stol, 2004, 2010; Terpstra, 2008, 2010; van der Torre, 2008; van der Torre et al, 2009; Bervoets et al., 2008, Bron et al., 2010; Straver et al., 2009; Vlek and van der Torre, 2010).

Cop as the leading principle

Nowadays, COP is being applied as a guiding principle for day-to-day police work by all the 25 regional police forces in the Netherlands, However, there are major differences between and even within the forces with regard to the organization of COP and the way COP is being practiced, differences that go beyond the need for tailor made solutions. In most forces, community officers are part of the basic unit, in other forces they operate as rather isolated individual officers, sometimes as part of a neighbourhood team. In some forces they only perform specific community policing tasks, whilst in other forces their job includes also criminal investigations and emergency assistance (Terpstra, 2008).

Each force has its own denomination for community officers. More important, there are significant differences in the working styles of community officers, depending on individual preferences, but also on the place community officers have in their force and the neighbourhood they are working in (Terpstra, 2008; Straver, et al., 2009).

Balancing uniformity and variety

The Dutch board of police chiefs aims to end this proliferation of diversity and has developed a national programme for the further development of area bound policing, the Dutch version of COP. The board has opted for the further development of COP 'as concept', as the basic concept for the organization and practices of the whole police force, with relatively small-scale teams that constitute the core of the organization and that support the community officers. Such a team is responsible for public safety and the integral exercise of the police function in its area. The board has rejected the idea of COP as a separate functionality besides or complementary to the basic police services, crime investigation and other specialized services that are organized at the district level, in which the community officer is seen as a specialist.

The national programme contains a referential framework for COP

including nine facets that make up the standard for COP. These facets refer to: the breadth of police services, the scale of the basic units, the position of the community officer, the management, the process-oriented practice, planning & control, information, integral public safety, and leadership style (van Os, 2010). These nine facets are seen as interrelated. Together, they can strengthen or weaken COP 'as concept', depending on their implementation. Each year, audits are being conducted to determine the degree to which police forces meet the criteria. The results are discussed in the board of police chiefs (van Os, 2010).

This strategy fits the ambition of the chiefs of police to unify the Dutch police into one concern by enhancing professional competence through national standards for specific policing domains, backed up by additional educational programmes at the Dutch Police Academy (Vlek & van der Torre, 2010). All forces are increasing the number of community officers with the financial support from the Minister of Internal Affairs and Kingdom relations, in order to realize in all areas the desired ratio of one community officer per 5000 inhabitants. However, until now, no police force has yet been able to implement COP 'as concept' in conformance with the nine facets in the referential frame for COP.

Changing views on COP

The referential framework mirrors how views on COP in the Netherlands have changed. Nowadays, community officers are above all seen as police officers, not as social workers. They have to contribute to enforcement and investigation. The community officer has to take on criminal investigations, enforcement, emergency services as well as prevention and problem solving. Additionally, he has to participate in networks of citizens and professional agencies such as schools and municipalities.

In his empirical research on policing the streets Stol (2004) observed that community officers perform not only soft policing tasks, they take action in a more repressive way as well. Their soft image does not fit the way they actually do their job nowadays. They frequently deal with social disorder caused by groups of youth, nuisance, road safety, and petty crime. Terpstra observed that rule enforcement has become an important part of their work (2008).

Intelligence led policing' has also reached the community officers. According to 'Police in Evolution' community officers not only have to act as sources of information for criminal investigations, they are also allotted an important 'signal and advice' function to administrative authorities through warnings and information about societal trends, emerging problems and risks, especially in receiving and sharing early signs of terrorism and radicalization. Such a role suits community officers because they are the first link in the safety chain and they have ample access to community intelligence.

Role conflicts

However, the new role of community officers in intelligence led policing sometimes comes into conflict with their ambition to cooperate with representatives of the community in order to solve problems (Bervoets et al., 2009). Now they are obliged to pass privileged and sensitive information to other police departments for other purposes than it was given to them (Kool, 2009). In their experience, this harms the relations they have developed based on mutual trust. These findings suggest that community officers have yet to learn to accept the consequences of being primarily law enforcement officers.

Sometimes community officers also experience difficulties with the new repressive demands that are made upon them, for example, writing tickets in order to meet performance targets without there being a relation with neighborhood problems.

Finding the balance between community policing and crime investigations

One of the lasting problems for police forces is finding balance between community policing on the one hand and emergency response and criminal investigations on the other.

In 'A Changing Police', the starting point of Dutch COP, all members of a community policing team cover the whole spectrum of police work. However, in practice the investigation of crimes became neglected by the neighborhood teams, because they lacked the necessary expertise and competences and did not feed the detectives with local knowledge about perpetrators. In the 1990s, crime control was rediscovered as a core task of the police and new specialisms appeared on the stage and old ones, like the juvenile cop and the vice squad were reinstated, in

order to increase the level of professional competence in crime control. These developments in their turn created new dividing lines. Crime investigations were withdrawn from 'the blue'.

However, modernizing the crime investigation process alone proved not to be sufficient. Many criminal cases (in some estimates: 160.000) were not pursued by the police. Instead, they were shelved, even when case screening showed that there were enough indications for a follow up. 'Blue' had to participate in criminal investigations in one way or another, in order to close the gap. The quest for a sensible balance between both disciplines has taken years with experiments, like co-locating different units in the same building, the functional integration of detectives in neighborhood teams or community officers working temporarily in investigative units (Zoomer, 2006).

Nowadays, in order to improve the collaboration and the exchange of information between specialists and community officers, crime investigation units have been created in most police districts to deal with all kinds of petty crime,. This way, criminal investigations are made part of community policing. As a rule, neighborhood teams only deal with criminal offenses that don't require imprisonment (so called 'six hour cases'). Community officers spend time participating in criminal investigations as experts in community affairs. However, until now only a disappointing 12 percent of their time is spent on criminal investigations. This is far less than would be expected given the so-called crisis in crime investigations (van Os and Gooren, 2010).

Finding the balance between community policing and emergency response

Since they were already in the streets emergency response should be integrated in the work of community officers, according to 'A Changing Police'. However, this has proven to be an illusion, because community officers did not spend much of their time in the streets. Besides, emergency response is a police discipline in itself, aimed at immediate problem solving. It requires another predisposition than dealing with structural problems in community.

In the original concept of community policing the work of the community officer in the neighborhood would be the leading discipline because of its integrating nature. Community officers could call upon

other officers in both emergency response and criminal investigations for support and backup. However, in practice community officers lack sufficient power and authority for such a role (van der Torre, 2007). Besides, police management sees emergency response often as more crucial for gaining the trust of the public than community policing and prioritizes it accordingly.

Nowadays, in most police forces the emergency response is organized in separate units, outside of the neighborhood teams, and is directed out of a central (integrated) control room. A dispatcher prioritizes the requests for assistance from the public and he directs the available surveillance cars accordingly. Priorities are based on written policy. Reports with a lower priority are left to the neighborhood team to deal with. This way the demand from the public for police assistance is regulated. However, until now it is not yet common practice that calls for assistance are directly passed on to the community officers when he is working in the streets (van Os and Gooren, 2010). In stead, they are brought in to fill up the gaps in the duty rosters of the emergency response.

Time spent in the neighborhood

Despite the ambition in the referential framework COP stating community officers should spend about 80% of their time on community policing, these officers are often obliged to take on emergency response duties and other non-COP police work.

Bron et al. (2010) observed that community officers spend about 65% of their working hours on neighborhood related activities. The major part of their non- neighborhood related actions (32%) consists of emergency response, surveillance and order maintenance outside of their neighborhood as well as administrative tasks like working on a PC, maintaining contact through email, or writing a weblog to keep in contact with their neighborhood. About 3% of the remaining time is spent on attending briefings.

Professional autonomy and the management of COP

Self steering by autonomous, professional community officers was an important element in the original conception of community policing. The full implementation of community oriented policing and problem solving (COPPS) required another, post-bureaucratic way of managing a police organisation, as an organisation of professionals. For that

purpose, the traditional hierarchy and structure of responsibility had to be turned around (van Sluis, 2002).

However, in recent research professional autonomy for community officers is rather disregarded. Instead, researchers observe that community officers have too much elbowroom to do things their own way and internal instructions lack precisions and detail resulting in shortcomings in the way community policing is being executed (for example Bervoets et al., 2008; van der Torre, 2007). At the same time, community officers often feel overruled by their managers in the way they carry out their job and the way they select their priorities. In their view, this explains why they can't spend more time on their core tasks in their neighborhood (Bron et al, 2010).

The impact of the traditional police culture

The preoccupation with the management of COP has its roots in the perceived lack of professional competence of community officers. In fact, after all these years community policing as a profession is still in its infancy. The traditional police occupational culture is still dominant. Community officers remain reactive and incident-focused. Systematic problem solving as an indispensable tool for community policing officers has gained not much attention and is not a common practice (van Sluis, 2002). Terpstra (2010, ..) states that: ' Community policing is, despite its ambitions, largely reactive and ad hoc. The analyses of local problems of crime and disorder made by community officers are often rather unsystematic and lack explicitness. To a large degree they are based on quite tacit, practical, knowledge'.

Community officers favour direct immediate action and rely more on information they receive in personal contacts with citizens ('street knowledge') than on information gained by research and science. Their own information and personal experience in the police practice are seen as superior to knowledge from neighbourhood scans or information from information systems. Usually, they analyse problems in their neighbourhood not thoroughly but only superficially. Their actions are primarily practice based, not evidence based (Terpstra, 2008). 'Neither a more or less focussed collection of information nor a systematic approach to series of problems of crime and disorder are adequately achieved in practice' (Terpstra, 2010,). Community officers distrust

standardized instruments that have been developed, like the area scan Crime and Disturbance that is currently being implemented.

Only recently the Dutch Police Academy has developed one standard program to educate community officers. Before, each police force had its own course at the Police Academy. The newly developed program aims at delivering community officers at two levels, the highest at a bachelor level ('inspecteur').

Cooperation with other agencies, though little attention for citizen participation

Another feature of current Dutch COP is the cooperation with other agencies in local security networks, many of whom were initiated by community officers. However, most community officers have difficulties appreciating and supporting initiatives taken by citizens, except when citizens act as a source of information, as eyes and ears for the police (Terpstra, 2008). Despite all efforts to comply with the 'official' police policy to consider safety as a joint effort in which the police are but one of the partners, community officers are still rather 'police centered' in their orientation, (van Os, 2010).

Integration into the local community?

Integration in the local community, one of the central ambitions of Dutch COP, seems to be subjected to erosion. Police forces have tried to bring back more 'blue' to the local level by means of area bound policing, despite of the fact that many cities have installed enforcers of their own: non-police personnel with limited responsibilities and tasks but steered and controlled exclusively by local government. This trend was furthered by the retreat of the police to their core tasks and by a tremendous growth in the use of local administrative sanctions for nuisances and minor offences (Van der Vijver, 2004; Sackers, 2010). The rather chaotic proliferation of guards, watchmen, wardens, stewards and others has led to debate in the Netherlands about reinstating a kind of local police.

A recent survey among members of local councils showed that a majority (55%) was in favor of the return of a local police force, despite their overall satisfaction with the work of the regional police forces (van der Torre et al. 2009). Councilors are pessimistic about their influence on police policies. They fear that an increase in central, national

steering of the police will be detrimental for locally differentiated police work. A local police force could both strengthen the local influence on policing as well as putting a stop to the chaotic proliferation of non-police enforcement and surveillance.

3   Analysis: shifts explained

What factors explain the shifts that Dutch COP has undergone and hence contribute to its current shape? We would like to point to the following factors that have had an impact on Dutch COP in various phases of its existence.

The Dutch aversion against centralized state power

The Dutch attitude towards the police and the power of the state has always been ambiguous. This ambiguity is reflected in the state structure (the Netherlands are a decentralized unitary state), in which there is no room for a strong, centrally managed, police apparatus. Aversion to a strong, centralized police apparatus is fueled by the French domination - long ago - and the German occupation during the Second World War. The current decentralized police system reflects the broadly shared view that the police should primarily be oriented at delivering services to the public and to a lesser degree should serve as the strong arm of central government. This proved to be a fertile ground for COP to become a constant in Dutch policing, although a constantly changing one.

Overcoming the shortcomings of the traditional model of policing

The origins of COP in the Netherlands are quite clear. Dutch COP developed in response to the professional police model in the sixties and seventies: a distant, highly centralized and strongly technocratic form of policing, a model that matched a society in which there was much confidence in technology, social engineering and progress. However, this model denied the real nature of much police work in which law enforcement is only a small part. According to 'A Changing Police' police work should be done by well educated, generally oriented policemen, individually and in teamwork, within the framework of a horizontal, decentralised organisation.

The impact of managerialism

Generally speaking, Dutch COP has been stripped of the more radical elements of COP, for example of the requirement to turn over the

traditional police organization and to empower senior rank-and-file officers, and to involve rank-and-file officers in developing strategic police policy. This 'revolutionary' potential of COP was successfully neutralized by an increase in top-down steering in the police organization.

Nowadays, police managers are inclined to see rank-and-file officers again primarily as implementers of top-down formulated policies that can be controlled with standard operation procedures and with numbers, like in Compstat. Management. Interpretations of output and more steering on desired performance lead to less space at the decentralized level and less professional autonomy for community officers (Van Os 2010, 267). The rise of this kind of 'new' managerialism was primarily caused by a lack of police performance, especially in the fight against crime.

Above all, this shift meant a kind of comeback of the professional model of policing that was dominant in the 1960s and early 1970s that has discouraged police forces to develop post-bureaucratic ways of organizing.

Changes in the political and social climate

The growing popularity of the reform model amongst Dutch policy makers and police managers reflected not only a shift in COP practices but also a major shift in Dutch safety policy the last fifteen years towards a harsher, stricter policy with an extensive use of penal sanctions and other harsh strategies (Terpstra and van der Vijver, 2006). There was a broadly shared feeling the traditional Dutch tolerance had gone too far and police had to focus on catching criminals again (Das et al., 2002; Punch et al., 2005). Ideas and plans about community safety in the Netherlands have changed accordingly. 'The penal rationale has permeated virtually all measures of crime prevention. "Prevention" now mainly means proactive intervention on the basis of risk profiles. The focus is primarily on street crime' (van Swaaningen, 2005, 303). This shift implied a changed balance between soft and hard policing.

Moving to and fro between hard and soft policing

Hard policing is catching crooks; soft refers to the broader social tasks within the community. Thins distinction between hard versus soft policing refers to the police philosophy of 'force' or as 'service', or crime control modus versus community involvement modus (Punch et

al., 2007, 60-62). These two distinctively different perspectives reflect the broad span of the police function and shifts between them have occurred frequently. As a rule, COP has difficulties to survive when there is 'regression to the mean' of hard-line enforcement (Punch, 2010, 201).

From the 1990s on, strong pressures were exerted on the police to be more effective in the fight against crime, instead of delivering services to the public. It has also led to the emergence of alternative models besides COP, such as zero tolerance. As a result, the police became more visible on the streets and were more assertive. This fostered signs of a new élan (Punch, 2006).

The impact of police system reforms

Since the Police Act 1993 came into force, regional police forces have become large and complex organisations. The reorganization of 1993 was inspired by discontent with police performance and was a more fundamental break with the COP philosophy and a partial return to the professional model of policing (centralization, larger police forces, more distance between the police and the public). But in retrospect, this shift has proven to be a temporary one, because COP was reintroduced as area-bound policing. Area bound officers and area bound teams provide a counterbalance against detachment and centralization. In this way the professional model and the COP model were balanced (Cachet et al., 1998).

Innovation dynamics within the police

Innovations in Dutch policing often have a high turnover rate (Hoogenboom, 2006). New ideas and concepts alternate quickly, but primarily amongst police managers. Real shifts in the way police officers think and actually act take much more time.

The variety of new police models that have surfaced at the managerial level have not resonated much in the day-to-day activities (Terpstra 2010, 228). For example, some elements of zero-tolerance or reassurance policing have crept into the day-to-day activities. Hence they had some impact, but all these models and other conceptual innovations have had their own rather slow speed in development, implementation and integration into the work of the community officers. COP has remained the guiding principle over the years, though it has changed over the

years by an almost invisible incorporation of other conceptual innovations that appeared and seemingly disappeared. This change process has been rather complex, reflecting more than one change pattern within varying time frames (compare Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009).

Unifying tendencies within the Dutch police

Generally speaking, the term 'community policing' has suffered from being seen as too abstract by practitioners. This has hampered a shared interpretation and implementation of community policing. However, in recent years, the further development of COP has been made part of a systematic program ran by the Board of Chiefs of Police and backed up by an educational program at the Dutch Police Academy and supported by a national referential framework for COP. These are important requisites for a uniform and recognizable structure of community officers in all police regions. Now there is less risk of COP remaining an abstract concept that can be interpreted in many different ways.

4. The future prospects for Dutch COP

Assertions about the future prospects for COP are in their nature speculative. Nevertheless, certain current trends can be explored and extrapolated and some important challenges and threats can be identified. Some of the future challenges will remain the same as in the past period, such as incorporating the active participation of citizens into COP, balancing COP, emergency response and crime control, and reconciling the many claims that are made upon community officers. Contrary to the past, the board of police chiefs has now formulated a vision on policing (in which COP has been clearly marked out) that can guide this process. An extra challenge in the nearby feature will be the serious cut backs in the police budget that have been announced and that will put pressures on the further development of COP.

A strategy for diffusion and adoption of COP

At present, community policing is still not fully developed as a profession, though important progress has been made. National standards for organizing and performing community policing and for education have been established. These developments illustrate the growing unity of the Dutch police.

Innovations like COP are better regarded as seeds for planting than as plants for potting. The referential frame for COP and the support

given by the program manager can really function as a concrete tool that gives practitioners a general sense of reference and guidance in how to make the concept operational, without it being a blunt blue print. Such a strategy will enable the diffusion and adoption of COP in a way that facilitates learning and the development and dissemination of good practices that will put an end to the current freedom of obligation in following documented good practices. A positive side effect will be that the sometimes heavily debated 'professional autonomy' will be guided by professional norms and standards (Van Os, 2010), analogous to the development the criminal investigations process has gone through in the Netherlands. Of, course there will always be room for tailor-made solutions based on information and experience, though within a framework and deviations from evidence-base practices have to be motivated.

At this moment, this is all 'work in progress'. It will take at least another five to ten years to fully implement such changes.

Increasing quality and professionalism

An increase in the number of community officers alone will not increase the amount of time devoted to neighborhood related activities. Dealing with time schedule difficulties in other basic parts of the basic police care, creating adequate, administrative support for area bound policing and increasing the level of professionalism of community officers are necessary to increase the quality of community policing.

Problem oriented policing (POP) is falling behind till now and has to catch up. In an ideal future situation, systematic POP has become an integral part of the repertoire of the professional community officer. However, this may be too optimistic (compare Braga and Weisburd, 2006). At least the problem solving skills of community officers should be improved. Basic problem solving can become a tool for positioning the community officer more firmly within a broad and integrated and programmatic approach of local safety directed by the local government.

The necessary tools like the area scan Crime and Disturbance are already there. However, in addition two shifts seem to be required: first, a shift from a primarily practice-based work style towards a primarily evidence-based one, and second, a shift from a police centered approach towards one in which the police play primarily a supportive role and act as last resort (Straten, van Sluis, Thaens and Bekkers, 2010). The

participation of citizens will be even more indispensable for successful community policing in the future than it is at present (see Tops et al. 2010). Besides, the community officer has to improve his professional skills in crime investigations.

In part, these changes imply going back to the original inspiration from 'A Changing Police' and its plea for using the knowledge, the creativity and the problem solving capacity of rank-and file-officers, whose core business is professional problem solving, in co-operation with a variety of internal and external strategic partners. Such a strategy would also imply leadership styles and management performance systems that recognize and reward problem oriented policing.

'Information led cops'

Information and information processing will become more and more crucial in the work of community officers as part of COP. The principles of Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) will be applied to their work as well.

More than in the past, community officers have to have a clear image of the concrete results they want to achieve and to perform their job accordingly, in order to prevent unrealistic expectations and demands from their partners and the public. A possible side effect could be to gain the necessary trust from their strategic partners and from citizens in the networks they are operating in.

Fine tuning police strategies

In the future, COP and other related recent policing models and strategies like reassurance policing, 'fixing broken windows' policing and POP, has to be geared to one another, more explicitly than has happened in the past. COP needs also fine tuning to other seemingly incomparable but widespread models like Compstat in such a way that they reinforce ach other, rather than oppose each other (see for example Willis et al., 2010).

COP in a centralized Dutch police system

The Dutch police as a whole have become subject to more direct political control by the Minister of the Interior. Recently, there is an unmistakably strong trend towards an even more centrally and nationally organized police force. A central question in the near future will be whether Dutch COP will prove to be robust and resilient enough to

counter strong managerially inspired central tendencies within the Dutch police system. Will there be enough room to safeguard local tailor-made policing conform COP and guarantees for the mobilization of sufficient capacity for the integration of the police into the local government and the local community? In a more centralized system of policing the balance between central national police tasks and the more local and regional tasks will be under much more pressure.

5. Conclusions

COP has proven to be a constant in Dutch policing. However, because of its broad nature and its long term implementation path, COP has been receptive to varying interpretations and has been redefined several times. The organization and implementation of COP has proven to be quite difficult and has taken many years. For a large part even today COP still is 'work in progress'.

COP also has been shaped and reshaped by developments in Dutch policing and has been colored by developments in Dutch society. COP has been mixed with elements from many other older as well as more recent models of policing. In a sense COP has been functioning as the most enduring integrative platform for elements from many other fashionable but short lasting trends in the modeling of police work.

We have no doubt that COP is here to stay. It has proven to be a true and lasting innovation in Dutch policing. However, we expect the COP concept to be flexible and adaptive in the near future like it has been in the past decades.

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PREDATORY LEADERSHIP AS A FOIL TO COMMUNITY POLICING PARTNERSHIPS:
A WEST AFRICAN CASE STUDY

Stephen B. Perrott

Abstract

Community-based policing (CBP) programs introduced across the developing world have consistently proven disappointing. If CBP is to live up to its promise, police policy makers and scholars need move beyond rhetoric and polemics to the identification of various roadblocks as reported from the field; one such obstacle is the marked resistance of key government power brokers to the formation of healthy, inclusive partnerships with arrangements for power-sharing. This paper focuses on how the failure to develop or maintain such partnerships, both within and outside of government circles, compromised outcomes across the six-year life of CBP program in The Gambia, West Africa. Four common factors underlying the breakdown are proposed that, taken together, underlie a type of predatory leadership common across sub-Saharan Africa. Future attempts to introduce CBP to the African sub-continent need be prefaced by a realistic a priori appraisal of the extent to which this leadership style is likely to affect partnership building.

Predatory Leadership as a Foil to Community Policing Partnerships: A West African Case Study

Police reform initiatives in the developing world, especially those

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with a community-based, inclusive, focus, face numerous obstacles and likely to produce results falling far short of expectations (Davis, Henderson, & Merrick, 2003). Certain of these roadblocks are fundamental and relatively obvious such as the inherent problem in introducing democratically-based programs where there is little history of such practices or support for change from government power brokers (see Perrott, accepted for publication). Others are less obvious and remain "under the radar"; these more subterranean problems, however, may prove just as injurious to positive outcomes insofar as they remain untreated while their deleterious effects build cumulatively.

This review of a failed community-based policing (CBP) project focuses on one of the myriad of dysfunctional government problems observed in developing nations, especially across sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Baker, 2010; Calderisi, 2006). The "under-the-radar" focus in this analysis is the resistance of government departments to work collaboratively or transparently with one another or with agencies outside of government (see Tapscott, 2000). As civil services in Western nations are also known for bureaucratic inefficiency and "turf" protection, problems reported here differ not so much in kind as in quantity. But, oh, such a difference in quantity!

Community-Based Policing in The Gambia was a development project I directed in the tiny West African nation of The Gambia from 2004-2010 (for background information see Perrott, 2009; accepted for publication). The lead partner was Mount Saint Vincent University, located in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada and the program was funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and administered by the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC). Although interdepartmental and interagency cooperation is desirable to any development initiative, it was absolutely imperative to this initiative given that partnership building is a central tenet of CBP. In this paper I provide a number of anecdotes to demonstrate how the failure to cooperate manifested before identifying four factors to which I believe much of the phenomenon may be attributed. I conclude by proposing a single unifying framework by which to explain all of the problems encountered.

The Partners

The primary Gambian partners were the Gambia Police Force (GPF),

project lead, and Gambia College. Gambia College provided needed credibility from a post-secondary institution, the input and skills important to developing and delivering the pedagogical materials necessary to launch and maintain the "field" (i.e., street level) training, and the institutional home for a proposed certificate program in CBP. The lead government department, under which the police force functioned, was the Department of State for The Interior. Also essential, given Gambia College's role, was The Department of State for Higher Education, Research and Technology. Cooperation with two additional departments was important: The Department of State for Basic and Secondary Education (our access point to the nation's school children) and The Department of State for Justice (responsible for the judiciary and the nation's bar). In addition to a number of core Canadian partners (e.g., Halifax Regional Police, Province of Nova Scotia Restorative Justice Program), we sought additional partners as the project evolved; for example, the Youth Crime Watch of The Gambia proved to be an important partner in community, and especially school, outreach. The Nova Scotia Gambia Association (NSGA), a Gambian–based, Canadian-sponsored NGO lent their long standing infrastructure and trained staff to the project.

Sociopolitical Context

The Gambia, a former British colony, was an exemplar of African democracy prior to the 1994 bloodless coup when current President, His Excellency Sheik Professor Alhaji Dr. Yahya A. J. J. Jammeh seized power (see Jawara, 2010; Saine, 2008). Supposedly, one of the "soldiers with a difference" (Ceesay, 2006, p. 90), then Lieutenant Jammeh returned the country to nominal civilian rule two years after the coup and periodically showed signs that democracy might grow. Further movement towards real democracy was the optimistic premise on which funding for this project was sought, even while we recognized a larger milieu of repression, corruption, extra-legal measures to maintain control, and the president's growing eccentricity. Unfortunately, Jammeh became increasingly unpredictable and bizarre (he claims to cure HIV/AIDS with his own herbal remedy), narcissistic (note his title), and repressive over the six years of the project. Ratings of civil and political freedom continued to drop and although The Gambia claims, and is nominally granted, democratic status, it is in reality a dictatorship (see analyses by Ceesay, 2006 and Saine, 2008, 2009; also see www.freedomhouse.com).

The way this lack of democracy blocked a more optimal outcome is taken up under separate cover (see Perrott, accepted for publication); here, I take up how Gambia's "Culture of Fear," engendered by the Jammeh government, contributed to thwarting the growth of the necessary partnerships in this project.

Like most sub-Saharan African police forces (see Baker, 2010), the GPF has fully earned its reputation as corrupt and otherwise inept. If the force serves any purpose whatsoever, it is as an agent of "regime protection" (see Alemika, 2009). The pomp, circumstance and groveling deference to rank, grossly exaggerated remnants from the British colonizers, stand in caricatured contrast to what is, in truth, an institution devoid of any real discipline. The status of the GPF, historically low in Gambian society, and the relative amount of government support provided this institution, also historically low, has further deteriorated under Jammeh's rule in favour of the national army. Morale has been further depleted by the president's growing tendency to parachute members of his own ethnic group into high ranking positions without regard to merit.

Lost or Never Achieved Partnerships

Department of State for Justice and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Program

A main adjunct to the central CBP thrust was the introduction of restorative justice (RJ) techniques. We situated the police as central actors in the proposed RJ protocol and envisioned officers working hand-in-hand with others already using community based conciliation and restorative techniques at the village level (in bodies known as "Circles of Elders"). We sought to take pressure off a crowded, corrupt, ineffective, and adversarial court system while being more culturally consistent with traditional West African means of conflict resolution.

Early on we learned that an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Program was being introduced to the nation's judiciary and bar. Although ADR and RJ are far from synonymous, they overlap sufficiently in philosophy and practice that some level of program partnership would serve to 1) create a level of shared understanding throughout the entire justice system, and 2) allow for some pooling of scarce resources. The Gambian project lead and I worked hard to link-up with our counterparts in the ADR program, receiving numerous assurances from ranking

government officials that this was indeed a good idea. Belying this expressed sentiment were repeated demands for letters of introduction and for the fulfillment of various other unnecessary bureaucratic tasks. Whenever we got close to an actual meeting, the rendezvous would be postponed, usually to a time when the Canadian partners had already departed for home.

It initially seemed that we were simply encountering the excessive bureaucratic roadblocks that habitually tie up government functions in The Gambia. Ultimately, however, it became clear that, despite assurances to the contrary, power brokers from one or both of the overseeing government departments did not want this partnership to form, though we never actually learned why. Ironically, the American scholar who spearheaded the ADR initiative serendipitously learned about our project activities and accessed my contact information online just before project closure. The two of us formed an academic partnership based on our shared interests in The Gambia, agreeing that it was highly unfortunate that we had been unable form a more practical partnership in The Gambia to advance the RJ and ADR initiatives.

Disjointed Efforts from Donor Nations

The encouraging, hospitable, even effusive, welcome that I and members of the Canadian team initially received from GPF senior brass was heartening but almost too good to be true. As it turns out, it was. It now appears that GPF managers had learned to play the "project game" whereby Western partners are encouraged to pursue and secure funding (this also being the case with other Gambian government departments). Once secured, further hospitality and enthusiasm extends only to the point that ensures the Western partner leaves various material resources that benefit the GPF or, more particularly, the senior officers personally. However, even at this point it was clear that the attention of GPF managers had shifted to the next potential partner proposing to pursue funding for another project (see section below dealing with "one-off" initiatives).

During the life of the project a number of other donor countries and their police forces offered various training initiatives to The GPF (see, for example, Author Unknown, 2008; Mascarenhas, 2010; Sallah, 2009). Although I and my colleagues would have welcomed the opportunity to work with teams from Sweden, Great Britain, or Gibraltar, GPF managers

had little interest in such collaborations. Rather, there appeared to be some effort to ensure that the various Western teams not become aware of the presence of the others. One can but speculate that bringing Western partners together was not how they saw the project game best played, perhaps because they viewed the consolidation of resources as a potential loss of immediately accessible resources. One also suspects there was concern that Western partners would come to "share notes." Such was the case when I encountered an African Union, UN-backed team visiting in order to select certain Gambian police officers for a deployment to Sudan. I serendipitously met this team, which included a retired Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer, at the hotel at which I was staying. The Canadian officer and I certainly did share notes.

Faltering Partnerships with NGOs and Community Groups

Our partnership with the NSGA, a well-regarded NGO founded and directed by a retired Canadian school principal, proved invaluable over the initial three years of the project. We rented office space from them, and their premises and staff, who consulted to the project, provided a physical presence for continuity particularly when the other Canadians and I were not in-country. The NSGA drama troupe was particularly important for community and school outreach, and assumed a significant role by dramatizing sensitive issues such as spousal abuse, police corruption, gender equity and so on.

The value of the drama troupe was as a vehicle for presenting ideas that would otherwise cause offense coming from young people (who typically have little voice) in a non-offensive, humorous and, most importantly, effective manner (such troupes have been similarly used in other sub-Saharan countries; e.g., Mitchell, Nakamanya, Kamali, & Whitworth, 2001). Although the GPF had no history of transparency, and police officers first observing the troupe's activities were initially apprehensive about exposing "dirty laundry," it quickly became clear that these outreach sessions (involving open periods of dialogue between police and citizens) actually enhanced the perception of the police in the public eye. It was, after all, hardly a secret that the police shook down motorists for bribes; that they would acknowledge this and other problems only promoted the belief that there was a real commitment to change.

Despite the positive reviews being garnered by the drama troupe, top GPF brass, who could not be bothered to attend sessions, remained suspicious of the activities. Although purportedly buying into the notion of partnerships, transparency, and dialogue, they wanted nothing to do with acknowledging police misconduct and certainly did not want to cede any control to the young people in the drama troupe (this, despite the fact that the messages were more about reconciliation and empathy than about criticism and despite my constant reassurances that the drama troupe was not, in any case, representing the GPF). Increasingly, dictates flowed from Inspector General of Police Ousman Sonko (now Secretary of State for the Interior) that the drama troupe was not to deploy without police supervision while he repeatedly found "more pressing" issues to justify the last-minute redeployment of officers scheduled to attend public forums. As a result, drama troupe activities were essentially immobilized by the fourth year of the project (as were, more generally, all community outreach activities).

In the first few years of the project, we worked hard to involve community members and groups in our outreach and began a process whereby citizens broadly representative of various constituencies were able to act as real stakeholders whose views would be respected and acted on in partnership with the GPF. However, this inclusive, participatory approach annoyed senior GPF managers who thought involved citizens should be politically-connected supporters of the ruling party. Additionally, and as was the case with the drama troupe, senior officers were uncomfortable exhibiting any transparency to those they supposedly served and did not want to share any decision-making power with the public.

GPF and Gambia College Breakdown

With two years left in the planned tenure of the project, growing partnership failures had resulted in CBP field activities being almost stopped and those remaining deviating significantly from the philosophy and practice of true community policing (see Perrott, accepted for publication). It was decided that the remaining two years of the project would be solely focused on launching the certificate program at Gambia College. GPF managers immediately saw the enhanced role of Gambia College as a threat and as evidence that I, as Director, had capriciously and arbitrarily stolen the project for the

college, despite documents demonstrating that this had been the plan from the outset. (The cadre of senior managers had changed many times since project inception due to President Jammeh's Electric Broom policy— see below. The new leaders never perceived any compulsion to live up to the commitments of their predecessors nor, for that matter, to even review archival documentation.)

Against this backdrop, repeated failures of the GPF to sign a Memorandum of Agreement with Gambia College, more than once when the GPF pulled out of the signing ceremony at the last moment, were not entirely surprising. An agreement to have been formalized in a matter of weeks following my last journey to The Gambia in May, 2009, dragged on for months until hitherto patient representatives of the funding agency advised that the project would be terminated if an agreement was not soon reached. I provided both institutions a "final" deadline by which the memorandum had to be signed and when this date passed I sought, and received, yet another extension from the funder. Senior GPF managers continued to attribute the failure to a lack of cooperation by Gambia College, and indeed leaders from Gambia College, in an apparent bid to get as much as possible from the arrangement, did contribute to the breakdown of the partnership. The preponderance of blame, however, is appropriately attributed to the senior managers of the GPF and Secretary of State Ousman Sonko who were clearly intent on finding excuses to not proceed while continuing to profess their commitment to the project. Finally, the regrettable decision to cease funding was taken and the project terminated early in 2010, less than a year before its scheduled end.

Factors Underlying Partnership Failure

Some half century since most of sub-Saharan Africa achieved independence from colonial powers, huge amounts of foreign aid monies have been sunk into developing the sub-continent, most of which has been to little avail. There is considerable evidence that the situation, on balance, has actually deteriorated (Calderisi, 2006) and a plausible argument that foreign aid and the Bonos of the world actually harm Africa (Moyo, 2009). The usual explanations for this failure are well known and include endemic corruption, greedy, authoritarian leaders, poor infrastructure, dysfunctional governance, and a culture of dependency. Although it is beyond debate that these factors remain

central to why "fifty years after the beginning of the independence movement, Africa's prospects are bleaker than ever before" (Meredith, 2005, p.681), they are too generic to be helpful for policy makers interested in the failure of specific initiatives. Below, I offer four factors to which I attribute most of the difficulties encountered in this West African policing initiative, proffered in a more psychological framework than seen through more typical political science or sociological analyses.

The Historic One-Off Nature of Development Initiatives

Aid initiatives are often of a "one off" nature (focusing on projects rather than on systemic programs) typically encompassing short time periods in which Western partners are quickly in and out of the developing nation. During the life of this project, police forces from a variety of European nations (e.g., United Kingdom, Sweden) came to The Gambia to deliver a two or three week training initiative while depositing certain material resources (e.g., police equipment, uniforms, computers). These "in-and-out" forays would inevitably result in fawning attention to the Europeans by senior GPF officers, highly favorable press coverage, and seemingly enthusiastic commitments about how the GPF would continue to expand on the "important" training received.

Ultimately, GPF managers had only worked to extract whatever material goods they could from the visitors, the visitors went home with the "feel-good" but erroneous belief that they have effected positive change, and whatever human capacity development that might have occurred was thrown to The Gambian sand. This scenario is typically true of many aid projects in The Gambia, where "one-offs, typically in the form of workshops where participants are rewarded with coveted per diems, serve as a revenue generating machine for the country's elite while doing little for the supposed real beneficiaries.

This six-year community-policing project was, therefore, an anomaly for the GPF insofar as it allowed for the workshops and professed commitments to bear developmental fruit through sustained effort and follow-through. Unfortunately, this is not part of the entrenched view of aid projects in The Gambia. Much time was wasted trying to convince the principal actors that we were not there on what is pejoratively known as "project tourism" junkets but rather that we really intended to promote sustainable change through capacity building.

However, even were we able to sustain forward activity throughout the entire life of the project, 6.5 years is a relatively brief window in which to achieve lasting change as the "failure to win hearts and minds" in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last decade is now proving. In the view of Canadian Senator and retired Lieutenant General, Roméo Dallaire, leader of the ill-fated UNIMAR mission in Rwanda, a more realistic period for achieving sustainable change is forty years (personal communication to the author and others in a small group setting in 1995). Despite occasionally posturing to the contrary, Western donor nations remain unwilling to commit to such long-term efforts.

Men Do Not Share Well: Challenging the Patriarchy

That the best route out of Sub-Saharan Africa's current predicament starts with female leadership is a frequently cited maxim. Indeed, the election of Liberia's Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first ever female leader of an African nation, is viewed as hugely significant in this regard (Bauer, 2009). A wide-swath of literature on gender-based differences worldwide suggests that women generally, and female leaders in particular, are more inclined toward the collective and value teamwork and group-based outcomes more than do men. Women are, therefore, more culturally inclined towards partnerships than are men, a finding that holds in both the industrialized West and collectivist South (Cheung & Halpert, 2010).

Although Gambian society is obviously a collectivist one overall, it was my repeated observation that men and women there had very different views about partnerships and sharing. Whereas Gambian men had a relative focus on individual achievement (albeit within a collectivist framework and a clear desire to provide for extended family) Gambian women struck as being more concerned about equality within relationships and collective advancement extending outside of kinship circles. I watched, in frustration, as this dynamic played out over a year with two civilian project employees leading the community outreach team. The leader was a man who did little to advance the project (other than to lend his maleness for credibility) but much to promote his personal position; his assistant was a young woman who, although paid much less, worked hard and effectively in the background to move the project forward. Any notion of fairness, and any consideration of merit, would have seen their positions transposed. However, it is very difficult to

advance women to positions of leadership in such a patriarchal society, where men have become comfortable with the notion that although women do most of the work they, as men, remain entitled to the fruit of those efforts (see Schroder, 1999).

Realistic Conflict and Zero Sum Politics

Given the real dearth of resources in The Gambian specifically, and sub-Saharan Africa more generally, it is not surprising members of the GPF (and other Gambian partners) would see themselves in competition for the limited material resources available in this project. Tensions were inevitably automatically evoked between partners following any significant purchase and the primary beneficiary or resource holder was identified (despite constant reinforcement that all project resources were for the benefit of all partners). So, for example, the purchase of an LCD projector to be held and maintained by Gambia College resulted in significant disgruntlement by the police even though: 1. nominal control of the projector by Gambia College was clearly of the greatest benefit to the project overall, and 2. the GPF (appropriately) received more material benefits than all other partners combined. (In order to be clear about the pervasiveness of the problem, Gambia College administrators showed an equal lack of concern about the "greater good" when it came to the disbursement of resources. For example, a computer, printer, and internet hook-up purchased for the College's female project lead quickly ended up in the possession of the higher ranking, male, principal who fulfilled a more peripheral project role.)

Muzafer Sherif's Realistic Conflict Theory allows for the competition and conflict that faces groups competing for scarce resources and for the perception (accurately held or not) that there need be winners and losers in the acquisition of resources (see Jackson, 1993; Taylor & Moghaddam, 2004). Despite entreaties and actions to disabuse partners of this erroneous notion in regard to their efforts in this project, adherence to the belief that one's gain, was another's loss, always smoldered just below the surface. The reality of sufficient resources to achieve all project goals was lost to a very real history of poverty and deprivation, further fueled by a sub-Saharan African zero-sum political mindset (Kirschke, 2000); the attendant distrust and tension resulting from this mindset proved highly damaging to the formation of productive partnerships.

The Social Darwinism of African Dictatorships

In a pattern identified some time ago (see Ihonvbere, 1996) President Jammeh quickly developed into an African "strongman," in part by embracing the terminology and mechanisms of democracy to subvert democracy (see also Meredith, 2005, for an extended discussion of the post-independence history of African "big men"). At the same time, any remnants of a pro-democratic opposition movement twists and turns against itself. As Saine (2008) aptly points out, Jammeh's ascendance to, and grip on, power, "lies in the emergence of a junior officer class, which disingenuously appropriated the language of the IMF and World Bank to promise Gambians "real democracy," "human rights," "probity," "accountability," and "transparency in government" (p. 469).

Most of The Gambia's current political and economic instability arises from a ruling class that has achieved power through nepotism and is otherwise simply incompetent. However, much instability is certainly purposely maintained by Jammeh as a means to keep others who might aspire to power from forming havens of psychological safety and confidence. His Electric Broom policies, where he incessantly promotes surprise candidates to positions of power and then just as quickly fires them (often dispatching them to the country's infamous Mile 2 prison- see PNMBAI, 2007; Sankereh, 2007), leaves even his elite fearful that they will at any moment be visited by the dreaded National Intelligence Agency (similar strategies have long been used by other "big men" across Sub-Saharan Africa; see Meredith, 2005). In The Gambia, there exists a nation-wide atmosphere in which people self-censor their views from even close friends and family members lest an informer feed information back to the government (ironically, this atmosphere undoubtedly further fuels Jammeh's own legendary paranoia).

This Social Darwinism impacted the ability to foster partnerships in two ways:

1. powerful actors in the project were fearful to reach out to others lest they be seen as being disloyal and ceding influence to those outside their "house," and, 2. living in authoritarian fear diminishes any sort of vision for long-term planning that might involve the greater good in lieu of a "here and now" focus on getting what one can when one can. This pattern is, of course, hardly unique to The Gambia and President

Jammeh (see, Adeleke, 1997, for a particularly astute analysis outlined within a neo-colonial framework).

Predatory Leadership and a Sober Glance to the Future

The project failures reviewed here and the four proposed underlying factors can be explained by a predatory leadership style that is, unfortunately, the rule rather than the exception across sub-Saharan Africa. In his review of why predatory leadership dominates the sub-continent, Goldsmith (2004) points to post-colonial dynamics, systems, and cultural beliefs that have taken hold since the heady days of independence a half century ago (see also Meredith, 2005). An inevitable corollary of this leadership style is the pervasive, systemic corruption that envelopes the sub-continent. In The Gambia, as in many other African nations, secondary corruption occurs in the absence of good governance, is normative throughout society, and can be conducted largely in the absence of sanction or perceptions of shame (see Werlin, 2005).

As an example of one of Guest's (2004) so called "vampire states," attempts in this project to have senior Gambian government and police officials engage in transparent team play was tantamount to asking them "to give up the very powers that enable them to feed on their fellow citizens" (p. 49). Furthermore, the systemic cultural backdrop on which the mindset of these power brokers rests is such that they cannot perceive anything but a zero-sum game were they to sacrifice any personal gain for the common good. Rather, they are stuck in an ongoing dynamic where governance ''is more a matter of seamanship and less one of navigation—that is, staying afloat rather than going somewhere'' (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982, p.18).

The failure to develop the necessary partnerships in this project is but a single symptom of predatory leadership. It is, however, a symptom that, if present, should be seen by police reformers as almost certain to sink any proposed CBP program. As our experience shows, reformers should not be fooled by superficially professed enthusiasm for forming partnerships during the planning stages; indeed, if our experience in The Gambia experience is indicative, partners in developing nations will be cognizant of the need to express a commitment to collaboration (and indeed, all the democratically-based commitments for which Western donors are known to press) as necessary to playing the "project

game." Rather, police reformers should, from the outset, look for concrete manifestations that partnerships are truly being embraced by the actions of the targeted police institution, backed up unambiguous documentation that demarcates the roles, responsibilities, and reasonable expectations of all partners. It is wishful thinking, if not complete folly, for reformers to believe they can overcome resistance to forming the necessary core collaborations as the project evolves. Rather, this resistance should be seen as symptomatic of a broader and fundamental set of problems that will not be overcome.

CBP is essentially a bottom-up, grassroots, inclusive, and democratically-styled form of policing. When it works, it is because the rank-and-file has embraced the vision inherent in the philosophy. However, no amount of work and apparent success on the ground can truly transform a police force unless solid endorsement comes from the top. In this project, senior GPF managers failed to embrace CBP not only because of the greed and corruption generated within their ranks but also because of the predatory leadership style with which President Jammeh controls The Gambia. As argued here, trouble forming healthy partnerships not only signals an illness in one of CBP's basic pillars, but is likely symptomatic of the larger problem of predatory leadership. Given such an indicator, police reformers should consider the ultimate futility of any initiative, and search for a setting where government is truly committed to change.

RED ALERT :

THE WAY AHEAD FOR EFFECTIVELY TACKLING THE NAXAL MENACE[1]

T K Vinod Kumar

The problem of Naxalite menace is one of the gravest dangers facing modern India. While modern post independent India has proved to be greatly different from other colonized nations in achieving a stable state, insurgencies have been a constant problem that India has faced. The problems in Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Assam, Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir, are examples of people's discontentment, protests and insurgent movements. However the response to the problems in these areas have been marked by a great degree of success, as is evident in the resolving of the Mizo problem and Sikh extremism in Punjab, localization of the problems in Assam, and the earnest efforts at negotiations and containing of problems in Nagaland. This is evidence of robust efforts at political negotiations, and the successful role of the state in maintaining rule of law in these areas.

In this context the problem of the Naxal menace poses a threat of unique dimensions to the Indian state. These distinctive dimensions are reflected in the geographical spread, the demographic aspects of the Naxalite movement in India, and the levels of fatalities caused by the movement over the last two decades. The combined impact of these factors makes it one of the most dangerous challenges that the Indian State has faced in its recent history. For mapping an effective response, there is a need to properly understand the issues involved, identify the

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1 This Essay won the third Prize in the Prime Minister's Essay contest in 2011.

underlying causal factors, the immediate challenges, and thereafter suggest long and short term solutions. This essay attempts to do this and to identify a way ahead in responding to the challenge of Naxalism.

An important aspect of the issue is the 'root cause' of the problem or the social political dimension of the matter- which many policy makers tend to avoid or underplay ostensibly due to its long term nature, but possibly due to larger underlying sociopolitical reasons. What are the social circumstances that allow the growth of such movements, and what is their main constituency? One of the recent phenomena of the Maoist movement is the projection of the movement as a tribal movement and its expansion in the tribal regions of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, AP, Jharkhand, and West Bengal. The claim that the Naxal movement is a tribal movement is played up by the Naxal leadership, while it is denied by the government. Both the claims have truth, half truths and motives behind it. The Naxalite movement has moved from being an agrarian movement with its origins in Naxalbari in West Bengal, ostensibly fighting for land for the tiller and justice for the landless, to a movement with its base among the tribals essentially resisting their marginalization, and to a limited extent aggrieved about matters related to tribal land and rights. This metamorphosis exposes Naxalism as a movement searching for a rationale, and this is primarily to obtain political power by whatever means available. This argument is supported by the fact that the present leadership of the Naxal movement is formed largely by non-tribals, even people from outside the tribal belt[2]. This fact while exposing the hypocritical ways of the Maoist, in no way takes away the problems of the tribals and the marginalized sections of society in modern India. While armed insurgencies and use of violence can never be justified, the marginalization of the downtrodden and the insensitivities of the political economic structure of modern India can only be ignored at the peril of the state.

Exploiting these rationale Naxalism has over the years increased its footprint across the subcontinent, greatly impacting the states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, West Bengal, and Bihar, having substantial activities in Maharashtra and Karnataka, and presence

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2 The arrest of persons like Khobad Gandhi, the active role played by Kishanji or Mallojula Koteshwar Rao, and Muppala Lakshmana Rao alias Ganapati proves the case.

in other states. The pan national nature of the movement differentiates it from the earlier problems faced in the Northeast, Punjab and J&K. This aspect of the problem poses a challenge to the nation because of its federal structure, traditional distribution of work and responsibilities between the center and state on the basis of the seventh scheduled of the constitution, and the routines developed over the years in the government administration process. This poses an impediment to innovative response across district and state boundaries. This has been amply exploited by the Naxals, and there is an urgent need to recognize this and reformulate the nation's response.

Associated with its pan national spread is the geopolitical aspect of the problem and its possible international implications. The limited success of the Maoist movement in Nepal provides a continuum to the 'red corridor' outside the Indian territorial boundaries to Nepal, a country which has witnessed a successful taking over of power through insurgency. The movement in Nepal has given the Naxal movement in India, political, moral, and possibly even material support. This matter forms a great threat keeping in view the contiguity of China with Nepal and India, and the association and political affiliation of the Maoist movement with China. These factors are woven into the geopolitical and historical adversarial relations between China and India which gives China more than necessary reasons to support the Maoist movement for the sole purpose of destabilizing India.[3] This provides the naxal problem with an international dimension that must be accounted for in the response to the problem.

While the Naxal problem has many dimensions, the above three aspects are the most important. This essay will focus on these three important aspects. It is argued that in view of the socio economic factors, geographic spread of the Naxal menace, and geopolitical imperatives there is a need to review and revise the policies, and reorient the response of the government and administration. The remaining part of the essay focuses on analyzing these aspects and in prescribing a way ahead for effectively tackling the problem.

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3 These intentions are revealed in an article that appeared on an website of a Chinese think-tank 'China International Strategy Net' regarding a possible option for China to dismember India. Though these motives were denied by China, these intentions are reflected in Chinese activities in POK, and the denial of Visas to military officers who had served in J&K.

The strength of the Indian state is derived from the Constitution of India, a glorious document drafted by the combined sagacity of the leaders who led India's freedom struggle. It shrewdly combined the wisdom of the Western social political views developed in the age of enlightenment, with the wisdom of the ancient Indian civilization. It benefitted from the sagacious wisdom of Gandhi, Nehru, Ambedkar, and Patel. It needs to be examined whether the government and administration in post independence period have scrupulously followed the ideals of the constitution or have diverted from it for so called 'national advancement'. This advancement itself has alienated large sections of the population which is reflected in the often used cliché of dichotomy between India and Bharat, or the 'real India', and the 'shining India'

The bypassing of certain sections of the population of the benefits of advancement of the state would not have caused so much resentment but for the perception of aggressive marginalization and oppression in the national discourse. This is manifested in diverse forms such as economic underdevelopment, poor human indices, and cultural marginalization. The World Bank estimates that 41% of India remains under the global poverty line of $1.25 per day[4]. The levels of inequality in India, is also reflected by the Gini Coefficient of .325, which compares poorly against developed nations with greater social equality, with Gini coefficient as low as 0.25. But these figures only reveal the partial truth. The full truth is revealed by examining the levels of accumulation of wealth by some in the country and contrasting it with the grim realities in backward districts such as Bastar, Dantewada, Malkangiri, and Kalahandi.

Forbes estimates that in 2009, the number of billionaires in India increased to 52, with a net asset of $ 276 billion, which is just below a quarter of India's GDP[5]. India ranks second, after USA, in the number of billionaires a country has. This is in stark contrast with the 134th position India has in the Human Development Index, below countries like Thailand and Botswana[6]. The levels of misery and difficulties in Naxal affected districts can only be revealed by field level qualitative observations, as mere numbers and quantitative indices will fail to convey the disparity. However to some extent it is reflected in the health and education indices of the tribal children. Mitra et al (2006)[7], sampled the nutrition levels of 309 Kamar tribal children in Chhattisgarh, and found

that more than 90% of Kamar children of the age group were underweight, and 80% of these children were affected by stunting and wasting. Sujata (2004)[8], reports that the disparity in education between tribals and non tribals is very high, and the learner achievement levels among tribal student is much lower compared to non tribals. The subhuman existence of tribals and others in these areas make it fertile grounds for naxalites to propagate their ideology of violence.

Along with this economic alienation, there is also a cultural alienation among some sections of the poor in the country. The culture and language of these demographic groups have scarcely been recognized and cultivated by the state. The marginalization and systemic stifling of languages such as the Mundari, Chhattisgarhi, Santhali, Sadri, and Ho demonstrate this phenomenon. This systemic alienation is even reflected in the national language policy, and the consideration given to the eighteen languages provided in the eighth scheduled of the constitution, while taking no strong legal-administrative measures to protect, preserve and encourage the diverse tribal languages. Similar trends are seen in the marginalization of art forms and culture of these groups. It can be argued that in the national social and cultural discourse and popular media, what is tribal is considered as inferior and the other compared to the 'mainstream' and modern art forms. Whatever the argument that may be given in defense of such policies, there is no doubt that it does create a sense of alienation among these population, and gives credence to charges of hegemony by the state.

This marginalization has been compounded by the high rate of advancement in the upper and middle classes, and the urban areas, and the exposure of the tribal youth to this disparity during their visits to urban areas, and through visual media. This gives rise to the Mertonian

4 Chen, S. & Ravallion, M. (2008). The developing world is poorer than we thought, but no less successful in the fight against poverty. World Bank: Development Research Group. Washington.

5 IMF estimates that India's GDP for 2009 is $1235. 975 Billion (World Economic Outlook Database, 2010). The Economic Survey of India 2009-10, estimates the GDP at Rs 6164178 Crores.

6 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2009.

7 Mitra, M., Kumar, P.V., Chakrabarty, S., &Bharati, P. (2007). Nutritional status of Kamar tribal children in Chhattisgarh. Indian Journal of Pediatrics, 74: 381- 384.

8 Sujatha, K (2002) Education among Scheduled Tribes. India Education Report: 87- 94.

social strain[9], which leads to adaption of rebellion in which the individual rejects the existing goals and means prescribed by society, and substitutes it with new goals which may be in conflict with the existing mores. Such adaptation proves conducive for the growth of the Naxals, and in their channelizing this discontentment for their purposes of power grabbing.

These aspects of stark poverty, disparity and discontentment are compounded by governmental decisions that are perceived to be threatening to the marginalized. Construction of large dams submerging extensive tracts of tribal land, providing of mining rights and land to private companies in socially sensitive backward areas, and setting of factories by private companies forcibly acquiring land from the farmers with state help[10], are examples of heartless policies that lead to displacement, exploitation and alienation of people. The post liberalized era and race for development has resulted in greater encouragement for private sectors to invest and exploit national resources. Does this not result in greater imbalance in distribution of wealth? Is this not against the Directive Principles of State Policy[11]? Does democracy intend this form of allocation of resources of the people to a few? If the state cannot protect the interest of the poorest who will? These are questions that government and administration must address to remove the rationale for violence and rebellion.

These facts underline that there is a need to reformulate government policy to reflect the aspirations of the framers of the constitution. The fundamental rights and directive principles of state policy needs to be brought center stage, to make them the central tenets of policy making and administration. The nation should revitalize its legitimacy to govern, by drawing on the values cherished in the constitution. It must be recognized that among certain sections of the population there is a perceived moral crisis of governance and a problem of legitimacy. This legitimacy would give it strength to not only use moral force but also physical force in the case of necessity. There is an urgent need for a benevolent state.

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9   Merton, R.K. (1938). Social structure and anomie. American Sociological Review. 3 (5), 672-682.

10 The events associated with the Narmada dam construction, the violence in Singrur and Nandigram gives credence to this charges.

11 Refer to Articles 38, 39, 46 and 47 of the Constitution of India.

The benevolent state must address the problems of inequity and alienation enumerated above. In backward areas there is a case to return to the Nehuruvian model, and make more astute use of public sector for development of natural resources. The success of Bhilai and Bokaro steel plants, and Hindustan Copper Mines in Ghatsila in the tribal heartlands, are striking examples of inclusive growth that we must readopt. Creation and widening of linguistic and ethnic cleavages are detrimental to the unity of the country, and fractures that could divide the country. There must be a conscious action to provide the marginalized their rightful place in the national discourse. Through economic policies, especially regarding allocation of resources and taxation measures, we must ensure equitable development and a sense of belonging. India must not forget its Gandhian legacy of aiding the *daridranarayan*.

The second aspect of the problem is the geographical spread of the Naxals, which is a new challenge to the country which has seldom witnessed violent insurgent movements spread over more than one state. The earlier problems could be contained within state boundaries, and the constitutional arrangement of public order and policing being a state subject[12], and center stepping into assist states in times of extreme difficulties worked well. This model has been severely tested by the Maoist problem. The Naxals are themselves aware of these weaknesses and have strategically ignored State and district boundaries of India, and have created their own geographical structures, such as the guerrilla zones and resistance areas, within which they conduct their operations[13]. This provides the Naxals with anonymity and tactical advantage which impedes monitoring of their activities across borders and in bringing them to justice. There is a need for a number of administrative measures that could neutralize the advantages that the Naxals gather from this geographical strategy.

This problem can be responded through two broad measures- firstly more precise and planned response within states, and secondly greater interstate and inter regional coordination and cooperation. Though these prescriptions seem simple, they are not; on the contrary they are complex and have multiple legal administrative impediments.

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12 *Provided in the Seventh scheduled of the Constitution of India.*
13 *The success of the Dandakaranya or DK region, spread over, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh regions is a good example of the impact of such a strategy.*

This problem is all the more difficult keeping in view that the rural, and especially the tribal communities in Naxal impacted areas are greatly alienated from the administrative system, and are not dependent on the administrative system for their day to day life, justice, and conflict resolution. This alienation has not been due to the lack of want of these services, but due to apathy on the part of the administration, lack of empathy and outreach, and a consequent lack of interest on the part of the community to access the services that government can provide. These failures on the part of the administration to establish its benevolent presence, and aid and assist a population in need, creates a disconnect between the people and the government, and attracts them to the alternate power center of the Naxals. This challenge of reestablishing a meaningful administration in the Naxal affected districts is a real and primary challenge that needs to be addressed on a war footing. This is a first step necessary before any fruitful remedial measure can be taken at the field level. The police in Naxal affected states have to re-establish themselves in the community through honest and innovative methods. They must not be seen as an alien force, bereft of legitimacy, depending on coercion rather than cooperation. This problem can be overcome by innovative use of the idea of service oriented and community policing.

The Naxal's on their part will take all steps to ensure that the police cannot operate in the community by attacking the force while in the field, and in police stations and camps. The police will be made inoperative, fearful, and forced to commit actions that can be interpreted as atrocities against the people. The police will therefore have to defend themselves against the naxal so that they can operate in the community. This can be achieved by ensuring that the defense systems of the police force is impregnable, and to a large extent this can be achieved by making the police stations unassailable, and the field operations of the police secure. The defense of the police station can be improved by strengthening of the construction of the station building, constructing watch towers, relocating station buildings to vantage points, and developing correct deployment pattern of station sentries and guards. The field operation of the police can be made secure by intensive training in field strategies and tactics, like road opening, room intervention, night operations, and map reading. This would make the police secure, reduce police causalities, improve morale of the police and help them extend their services among the people. This would also put the police in a

position to conduct targeted operations against naxal groups in the area, and reverse the dominance of the Maoist in the area.

Once the police are in a position to conduct operations in each district successfully, the operations of the naxals in the region needs to be addressed. The Naxals have adopted the ingenious strategy of committing operations in one area and then moving into the neighboring district and states. Their conduct of operations in Dantewada and then moving into neighboring Orissa or Andhra Pradesh is a case in point. These trends are also seen in the decline in overt operations by Naxals in Andhra Pradesh once the police achieved a high degree of success, and the simultaneous increase of operations in Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Similarly the use of other states by the Naxal leadership to hide from law enforcement authorities, and for rest and recuperation is also a strategic use of the disconnect between the law enforcement agencies in different states and districts. This problem needs to be addressed by greater coordination at these levels. As a first step, there is a necessity for an institutional mechanism for coordination for law enforcement between the states, especially among those states that are greatly impacted by the problem. This system should go beyond the existing mechanisms of periodic border meetings to continuing mechanisms of operational and intelligence coordination. There could be use of common wireless frequencies for instant sharing of information across state and district borders so that law enforcement agencies can work in complementary and supplementary manner. There is also a need for real time sharing of intelligence between different agencies. This would require a change in work culture of different agencies, as well as development of trust between them. Such organizational changes can only be fostered through sustained and long term efforts. This process can be aided by use of modern technology such as use of Geographical Information Systems, and sharing of information using commonly accessible digital platforms.

The third aspect of the geopolitical facet of the problem must be addressed by diplomatic and military strategies. This is important as once the pressures on the Naxal leadership increases in India, like other insurgent groups, they will seek refuge in neighboring countries. This will lead to a drawn out conflict which is not in the interest of the country and its people. Similarly there is a possibility of material support for the Naxals by countries that are inimical to India. This may be in the form of moral and materials support, especially weapons.

India being a large and strong nation in the subcontinent, it must convey its concerns of security to its neighbors. India must inform its neighbors that their territory must not be used for launching attacks against India by Naxals or any other group. Diplomacy must be interwoven with trade and assistance, so that countries in the subcontinent become partners against forces against democracy. These goals have been achieved with countries like Bhutan and Bangladesh. However there is a need for effective diplomacy and sanitizing the region against such violent activities and movements. With countries like Pakistan and China with which India have had longstanding discordant relationship, diplomacy must be coupled with deterrent military strength.

The three factors are important dimensions of this problem facing the nation. Patriotism should not blind us from seeing the injustices done by our system, at the same time, democracy should not weaken our response against lawbreakers and people committing crime against the state. The state and its response to the problem should not be hard hearted and soft headed, but soft hearted and hard headed. The way forward to address this problem with wisdom and care involves three measures of reversing social injustices, enhancing state capacity to effectively deal with armed Naxals, and ensuring that such groups do not get international support from neighboring nations in the subcontinent.

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CHANGES IN SERVICE QUALITY OF POLICE - A STUDY BASED ON COMMUNITY POLICING INITIATIVES IN KERALA

B Sandhya

Abstract

The key to ensuring good service quality is meeting or exceeding what customers expect from the service. Results achieved by Police in controlling crime are rarely good enough to satisfy the civil society. Public trust and cooperation are essential if crime is to be controlled effectively in a democracy. The JSP(Janamaithri Suraksha Project), a Community Policing initiative of Kerala Police, is a landmark step towards better service delivery by the Kerala Police. The Project revolves around the peoples' committee constituted which represents all major social segments and stakeholders, and the Beat Officers, carefully selected and trained to patrol a Beat area of around 1000 households. The Beat Officers are able to instill confidence among the people over a period of time. The public feel comfortable in bringing to the notice of the Beat Officer any policing issue. The respondents rated the behaviour of the Beat Officers as excellent or very good. Sex-wise, females were more positive than the males in reporting the impact of JSP in minimizing sexual harassment at public places. Respondents felt that Police is very helpful in protecting the lives and property. Majority rated the performance of Police as 'Best', followed by very good. The faith and trust expressed by the community members, especially women in Beat Officers can be taken as an indication that when trained personnel are reaching out to the community to find solutions to their security needs,

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people feel more confident to approach the Police. Police personnel also get more oriented towards Quality Service Delivery.

1. INTRODUCTION

Service Quality

Zeithaml, et al. (1990) mentions that in a "quality society", honesty, excellence, and the principle of giving full value for what we receive would become the rule of conduct in both business and personal relationships. What began as an effort to improve quality could end up in a revolutionary improvement in the overall quality of life. Specifically, service-quality perceptions stem from how well a provider performs vis-a-vis customer's expectations about how the provider should perform.

Definition of Service Quality

The key to ensuring good service quality is meeting or exceeding what customers expect from the service. Judgments of high and low service quality depend on how customers perceive the actual service performance in the context of what they expected. Therefore service quality, as perceived by customers, can be defined as "the extent of discrepancy between customers' expectation or desires and their perceptions". In assessing service quality, ten general criteria or dimensions may be identified. These are tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, competence, courtesy, credibility, security, access, communication, and understanding the customer.

The Criminal Justice System

Howard C Daudistel (1979) says that the purpose of the Criminal Justice System is to process those who have been accused of criminal activities. At the outset, the Police are responsible for gathering evidence and arresting suspected law violators. Next, the prosecutor is responsible for evaluating the evidence the Police have gathered and deciding whether it is sufficient to warrant filing charges against alleged violators. Meanwhile, defense attorneys, whether privately retained or provided by the state, are responsible for defending the accused. At trial, the judge is an arbitrator in court who ensures that the defense and prosecution adhere to the legal requirements of introducing evidence and examining and cross-examining witnesses. The problem with treating the criminal justice agencies as a system, however, is that there are very few system-like features among these agencies. Ideally, a system is

expected to have interrelated goals, but when we look at the goals of the various agencies (which are called part of the "Criminal Justice System") oftentimes we find that not only are the goals not interrelated but they are also often contradictory. Even though they are all supposed to be working together to achieve a single overall goal, a system-like process and organization remains an ideal instead of a reality. The Police is the first window in to the Criminal Justice System. Any changes in Service Quality to citizens approaching the Criminal Justice System primarily depend upon the quality of Police Service.

History and Evolution of Policing in India

Any meaningful study into the quality of a Police Service should begin after surveying the history of that Police Oraganisation.

According to R K Raghavan (1989), a semblance of the Police System as we know it today existed even in ancient India. Almost from the beginning of our recorded history, we are able to identify officials vested with Police functions. Even the Laws of Manu carry some vague references to the Police. These Laws bestowed on the king the duty to combat violence and impose penalties on evil-doers. The king was to despatch patrols, maintain fixed Police posts as also send out spies who were called upon to help him in criminal administration. In Kautilya's *Arthasastra* (300 B.C.) also we find an account of the role of spies in the Maurya administration. These were mainly to keep track of common criminals, although there is reason to believe that even kings, ministers and army commanders had to be watched.

A major characteristic of the system, which was essentially village-based, was that policing was linked to land tenure. Major land-holders were called upon to apprehend those who committed breach of peace and to restore stolen goods to their lawful owners. Subordinate land-holders also were answerable in varying degrees. In addition, the village headman, assisted by a few watchmen, had the responsibility for village security and the prevention and detection of crime. It was incumbent on each watchman to keep an eye on the arrival of strangers within the village boundaries and to help in the detection of crimes.

After the Mauryas, for many centuries, there is a woeful lack of information on the Police. The presumption from sketchy accounts available in different sources is that the village Police System that one saw under the Mauryas survived with some minor changes. The picture

becomes a little clearer with the arrival of the Mughals.

The first Muslim rulers were those who entered the sub-continent via Sind in the 8th century. The successive invaders, Arabs, Turks, Persians and Afghans, displayed little penchant for administration and their rule was, therefore, shaky and unstable. The end of the 15th century saw the arrival of a mixed race (constituted of Persian, Turkish and Mughal elements) who contributed to the ushering in of the Mughal Empire.

A wealth of information is available on the nature of administration that the Mughals gave to India. Dismaying, how-ever, is that the documents on the period do not throw enough light on the Police. Perhaps the first known reference is to a *Muhtasib* of the 14th century who, apart from looking after Public Works, had additional charge of Police duties. He was able to delegate his Police duties, at least in the urban areas, to the *Kotwal.* The latter kept track of arrivals and departures of strangers and maintained a register of inhabitants within his limits. *Ain-i-Akbari* forming part of the *Akbarnama* compiled by Abul Fazl *Allami,* one of Akbar's counsellors, embodies a broad account of Police Administration. There was a *Fouzdar* for each division who was accountable for external defence and action against rebels. There were also the *Qazi* and the *Mir A'dl* who were charged with tasks of investigation and administra-tion of justice. The *Kotwal* continued to perform Police functions in the towns. Following the death of Akbar in 1605, the Jagirdars, who were revenue farmers became answerable for the maintenance of law and order. The decline in the authority of local officials that had set in worked in favour of powerful individual citizens asserting themselves beyond measure.

The British who came to India, first as traders, around early 1600; gradually filled the void caused by the disintegration of the Mughal Empire. They were equally confounded by the problem of dove-tailing the twin functions of maintaining law and order and collecting revenue.

Concluding that the East India Company could no longer ignore the "crime, brigandage and unrest" witnessed in its three Presidency Provinces of Bengal, Bombay and Madras, Lord Cornwallis, the Governor-General, divested *Zamindars* of their Police powers and, in their place, set up a Police force answerable to the Company. A Police official known as the *Daroga* was placed in charge of each part of a

district to super-vise village headmen. He was made accountable to the District Judge. In the towns, the office of *Kotwal* continued. This arrangement did not come up to the expectations of the Company, chiefly because of the *Daroga's* inability to super-vise the village Police. Inadequate manpower and non-coopera-tion of the village population were other factors. The system was, therefore, given up in 1814 and the traditional method of village policing was reintroduced.

The advent of the 19th century marked the beginning of serious attempts by the British executive in India to introduce a homogenous system of policing in the extensive territories controlled by them. Because of the concentration of the Military Police in putting down the rebellions, prevention and detection of crime had been badly neglected, and the growing violent crimes had become matters of grave concern.

The first attempts to organise the Police into the evolving system can be linked to the land revenue reforms. Lord Cornwallis, the Governor General of Bengal, was responsible for effecting extensive reforms in the revenue and judicial system of the areas controlled by the Company throughout India. In pursuance to his reforms, in Madras Presidency, instructions were issued for appointment of Magistrates under the control of the Company. These magistrates were given absolute control over the village watchmen, who were crucial to preservation of peace and revenue collection in the company controlled districts.

The most important feature of the 1816 regulations was the transfer of magisterial powers from the Zillah Judges to the Collectors. The District Collectors, in addition to revenue functions, also became Magistrates and Police chiefs. The functions of Revenue and Police were, consequently, merged at the lower level. The Collector-Magistrate combination proved to be an unsuccessful experiment. The additional work of supervision over the Police given to the Magistrates resulted in inadequate attention to the basic policing functions. Police enquiries and investigations were relegated as secondary pre-occupations of officers whose primary duty was revenue collection.

The state of affairs became so unsatisfactory that, in 1854, an Inquiry was ordered into the allegations of torture of public by the Revenue servants. A Torture Commission was appointed by the Governor comprising E.R Elliot, H. Stokes and J.B. Norton. The report of the Commission was submitted to the Governor on 16 April 1855. The

inquiry revealed that unchecked methods of repression and cruelty were being used everywhere by the revenue officials and the Police in order to collect revenues as also bribes.

The Commission identified the main cause of such malpractices to be ineffective supervision over the Police. The Commission recommended substantial strengthening of European Agency into the Civil Administration of the Districts and recommended setting up a separate, well paid, organised Police Force under the charge of a European Superintendent, who should be responsible for maintenance of peace.

The recommendations of the Torture Commission coincided with the realisation that the existing system was grossly inadequate to control violent crimes. In the mid fifties, a long drawn drought resulted in soaring rate of Violent Crime. in 1854, as many as 1724 gang robberies and 831 highway robberies were reported in Madras Presidency. In 1855, the trend continued, with 1675 gang robberies and 831 highway robberies reported during the year. This trend of violence affected every strata of society. The climax came when the Collector of Malabar, H.V. Connolly, who had firmly suppressed the *Moplah* outrages in Malabar, was assassinated in September 1855, at his residence in Calicut by four *Moplah* fugitives. Widespread uncontrolled violent crimes including assassination of a Collector, and a corrupt and inefficient administration demanded immediate remedial measures.

The London Metropolitan Police model was formulated by Sir Robert Peel, the Home Secretary, in 1829, who promulgated the 'Metropolitan Police Act', which established the principles that govern modern English policing even now. London's Police were the responsibility of a single authority, under the direction of the Home Secretary, with headquarters at Scotland Yard. The command and control were to be maintained through a structure organised along military lines. The authority of the English constable derived from three official sources-the crown, the law, and the consent and co-operation of the citizenry. As per the Act, the prevention of crime was the foremost objective of the Police force. The primary means of policing was conspicuous patrolling by uniformed Police officers. The Police were expected to be patient, impersonal, and professional. Crime prevention was not the only business of the new Police force. They inherited many functions of the watchmen such as

lighting lamplights, calling out the time, watching for fires and providing other public services. The Police personnel were called 'Peelers' or Bobbies, a name prevalent till today.

The second model was that of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), a strictly disciplined, armed Police. The Irish Constabulary Act of 1822 was the beginning of the Irish Constabulary. The Act established a force in each barony with chief constables and Inspectors General under the control of the Civil Administration at Dublin Castle. The force had been rationalised and reorganised in a 1836 Act and the first constabulary code of regulations was published in 1837. The RIC was instrumental in organizing practically all the Police forces in the British Colonies. Initially, this armed force was used mainly to quell rioting and disturbances, but from the 1850's the administration gradually assigned numerous civil responsibilities to the constabulary, including the collection of agricultural and other statistics, census taking, escorting prisoners, weights and measures inspection, maintaining order at election polls, and preventing wakes for people who had died of infectious diseases.

The third model was Napier's Police Organization. Sir Charles James Napier, the Governor of Sind, had created an Irish-type Police in the province of Sind in the 1840s, and a similar system was later adopted in Punjab. The force was armed and organized on a military basis. Napier had decided to run his new administration not through civil servants but military officers or 'soldier civilians'. Following the para-military Irish Constabulary model, he placed the Police of the entire province under the command of a captain of Police. The constabulary consisted of infantry aimed with carbines and mounted armed Police.

Eventually, Lord Harris, the Governor of Madras, and Sir William Robinson recommended a model for the Police, which was a diluted version of the Irish and Sind models. In this scheme, where the majority of constables utilised for local policing work were to be unarmed, while in each district, a section of Police force could be kept as an Armed Reserve. The recommendations were accepted by the Company's Board of Directors in 1856. In 1857 the recommendations were approved by the Court and in 1857 the new system was sanctioned.

At the initial period difficulty was experienced in the recruitment of Constables since their pay was low and hours of duty long. The discipline

was severe and punishments were common. As a result only certain social groups, who were traditionally discharging the duties of watch and ward, and those who came from a military background were predominant in the force.

The First National Police Commission, 1860, and the Indian Police Act, 1861

The modern system of policing throughout the country was brought about by the British in a centralised manner by organising the Police force through All India legislation. For the first time, the Police force was given the responsibility to uphold the 'Rule of Law'.

An All India Police Commission was appointed in August 1860 with the objective of making a comprehensive enquiry into the existing system of Police establishments throughout India and providing suggestions for improvements and economy of the Police force.

The Commission recommended that:

- The military should be relieved of all civil duties. Law and order and preservation of peace should be the exclusive domain of the civil administration; A Civil Police Force should be raised and trained to perform Police functions such-as prevention of crime, maintenance of order and suppression of local disturbances.

- The District Police would work under the Collector, also the Chief Magistrate of the District

- Police constables would be paid on par with unskilled labour

- The Police would be supplied and prescribed uniforms by the Provincial Government; they would be armed only with light weapons; but should ordinarily carry only a *lathi*

One of the important recommendations of the Commission was to adopt a common legislation for the Police in India, A draft bill was submitted by the Commission which, after some modifications, was passed as the Police Act - V of 1861. This Act continues to regulate the organisation, recruitment and discipline of the Police forces in India even now.

The Police Act has 47 sections which deal with organisation, control and powers of the Police. The Act provided a framework to the Provincial

Governments which they could adopt while formulating their own Police Acts.

Codification of Criminal Jurisprudence

Soon after the passing of the Indian Police Act of 1861, pieces of legislation on matters relating to the Criminal Justice System were formulated and promulgated, bringing about uniformity in the Criminal Justice System throughout the country.

The All India Penal legislation was called the Indian Penal Code (IPC), promulgated in 1860, which is in force to this day. 'Code of Criminal Procedure' (CrPC) came into existence in 1898 and continued as such till the better part of the 20th Century. Major amendments to this Act were brought about only in 1973 Codification of rules of evidence was done through The Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872), which standardised the rules of evidence in Criminal Investigations and Trials. The Act continues to be in force. In 1878, another All India Legislation, the 'Arms Act' was promulgated.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the die of the modern Criminal Justice System, of which the Police was a prominent component, had been cast. The foundations and the structure have not changed till now. The changing circumstances over the course of the 20th Century have only extended and modified the existing model.

The gazetted officers of the Police, were borrowed from the Army almost till the end of the 19th century. Army Captains were posted as District Superintendent of Police and the departure from this practice came only after the institution of imperial Indian Police towards the end of the 19th Century. The dress code for the senior officers, and their badges of rank, remained similar to that of the Army and the tradition continues.

Policing in Democratic India

For a democratic and pluralistic society like India, the object of policing should be: To minimize the gap between Policemen and citizens to such an extent that the Policemen become an integrated part of the community they serve and they earn the acceptance and trust of the community, leading to spontaneous cooperation from people in crime prevention and security in the local area, and resulting in a lasting partnership between the Police and the community"

Policing in a democracy can be defined by the term Community Policing.Community Policing redefines the relationship between the Police and the community. In a democratic society, citizens are supposed to have a say in how they are governed. Police is required to be responsive as well as accountable. Restructuring of policing priorities according to public expectations is an important component. This means opening of channels of communication with all law-abiding members of the society and not merely the 'community leaders', and using their goodwill and help in preventing crime and disorder.

The job of the Police is seen as enhancing neighbourhood security, resolving conflicts, facilitating victim assistance, reducing fear of crime, and addressing localized community concerns like neighbourhood decay etc. The Police are expected to actively intercede in respect of such broad functions as traffic safety (Education and awareness), drug abuse, problems of children from school, domestic violence, rehabilitation of victims of crime, security of women and maintenance of order in public places and streets.

This envisages long term, strategic planning to address underlying conditions that cause community problems, rise in crime and disorder. The accent is on crime prevention. This is seen to be the greater part of an Officer's job- The general approach to crime prevention is to tailor special preventive measures to suit the needs of a particular community or geographical locale; and to remove or resolve the causes, which are at the root of crime and disorder. This is akin to treating the disease rather than its symptoms.

Customer Orientation in Police Service

Jawaharlal Nehru the first Prime Minister of India said about Police, "The duties that the Police have to perform are of great importance. Even more important is the measure of fact, which they use in performing them. Normally, a country can well be judged by the quality of it's Police force. The Police come naturally into very intimate contact with the people in their daily work; therefore the question of the relationship between the Police and the public is a very important one. The Policeman is as much a citizen as anyone else and he has to function as a citizen, with the rights and obligations of citizenship. He has also a particular duty, which is difficult. He is among the many connecting links, which the administration has with the mass of the people of the country. That

link must be a good one; otherwise there is misunderstanding and mistrust. It is essential that this contact should be one of mutual trust and co-operation. No Policemen can do his work adequately without the co-operation of the public. Thus the relationship between the Police and the public is a very important one". (Quoted by U N Biswas 1986)

The National Police Commission (1977-80) observed, "The process of the Police accountability to the people has suffered considerable distortion in the recent past. Various pressure and elite groups have come to develop in society having infinite expectations from Police and seeking generous to the exclusion of legality and fair play. There are members of the State and Central Legislations, the local bodies, important functionaries of the political parties, particularly ruling ones, and representatives of the local yellow press, other important personalities of the locality and government servants who have tended to divert the Police accountability from the people themselves. Police functionaries therefore have tended to divert the Police accountability from the people to these pressure groups. This has had obvious effect on the attitude of the common people who feel that the Police Service is meant to serve the elitist groups and in case they wish to avail of any public service, they have to purchase it through illegal gratification or secure it through exercise of pressures from power- wielding section of the society".

A.C. Agarwal & H.C. Balwaria (2001) point out that 51% of the respondents from the weaker sections of the society felt that Police do not take timely preventive action to assist them and 56% perceive that Police act unexpeditiously and unfairly in such cases. 57% felt that the case is put up in the court without any undue delay. Victims of kidnapping (70%) feel that the Police try to put them off. After release, the kidnapee does not seek Police security (80%). 50% of the NGO representatives view that the treatment of Police with victimized women and children is improper.

A.K. Saxena (1995) points out that adherence to Police code of conduct ensures better professionalism and attempt should be made to communicate the code of conduct.

Saxena also quotes from Kelley that 20% of the success of an organization only is contributed by leaders. The followers are critical to the remaining 80%. Developing a feeling in Policemen that they are the servants of people, not the masters of people will help them channelize

their competence, motivation level and power to serve the people.

R.K.Raghavan (1983) recommends that, as the Police recruitment methods are almost mechanical, they are not oriented to the need to choose the most suitable. It is because of this that one very often comes across the phenomenon of 'misfits' who are a danger not only to the Force, but to the community as well. The Army and private industry have nearly perfected the techniques of psychology and aptitude tests. A few Police forces in the west have successfully employed these. It is time that India makes a beginning so that temperamentally ill-equipped individuals are not selected.

A.K. Sinha et al. (1996) mention that customer satisfaction is of the person who uses the service. Everything that anyone does at work is for a customer inside or outside the organisation. They quote Sir John Woodcock, former Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary, "Each member of every Police force, has to be imbued with a passion for the customer of his or her services, as an individual, the abusing husband, the belligerent squatters are customers, different but equally as much customers as the victims of crime, the frightened child, the tourist asking the time". The U.K Police in its operational strategy and policy statement mentions that public reassurance is one of the key responsibilities and will be explicitly addressed in all policies. Particular attention will be paid to the needs of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. It also mentions that treating people fairly in an organization is key to effective service. The requirements have been identified as establishing equal opportunities and fair treatment system, maintaining a grievance procedure for all staff and combating sexual or racial harassment or any other unfair treatment of colleagues.

In the research study conducted by Subhash Joshi and A.K. Saxena (1999), SHOs themselves identified that they were lacking in applying the following values in the discharge of their duties: -

➢ Kindness

➢ Sympathy

➢ Compassion

➢ Openness to ideas

➢ Spirit of inquiry

➢ Responsiveness

➢ Inquisitiveness

Professionalism consists of two "Es", Efficiency and Ethics. Skills management, interpersonal skills, stress management and listening skills also should be improved in the SHOs, besides efficiency and ethics.

Brunetto Yvonne, and Rod Farr-Wharton (2003) mention that a number of Police services have undertaken changes in management practices, although change has been slow because of significant resistance and new management practices are most often discussed and measured in terms of their impact on organizational processes-most specifically in relation to outcomes. According to them, in addition to policy-led reform, changes in the expectations, values and beliefs of western societies have also encouraged changes in Police management and accountability practices, Police officers' workplace behaviour and their rewards. As a result, most Police services in Western democracies now have established protocols documenting how each policing task should be undertaken and how clients should be treated. Hence not only has the organisational context within which policing takes place changed, but also the work practices of Police officers have changed.

Research undertaken by Metcalfe and Dick (2000, p403) suggests that Police commitment is significantly affected by "an individual's identification and in turn commitment to an organization's value", including the extent to which Police officers are prepared to improve their performance. Hence they argue that management systems and practices affect organizational identification and in turn, the desire of Police officers to closely identify themselves with the Police service's goals and values. This then impacts on the organizational commitment of the Police Officers. Their findings suggest that job commitment is enhanced when Police officers are involved in decision-making, feel supported by superiors and receive adequate levels of feedback about their job performance and job expectations. Hence, the commitment of Police officer is probably strongly affected by management practices.

Informal and formal communication processes are vital for new employees. The process of socializing new employees involves a duel process of unlearning and relearning. (Louis 1980, Mills & Murgatroyd 1991). Recent reform has attempted to improve the efficiency and

effectiveness of organisations by changing accountability, management and communication process. (Ferlie et al.1996). Past research suggests that the commitment of Police officers is probably strongly affected by management practices because they in turn determine the level of support offered, and the type of appraisal/promotion procedures Police officers are likely to face. Similarly, management effectiveness depends predominantly on the communication processes and practices used by management to inform, clarify and provide feed back to subordinates within the Police Service generally and the individual Police Stations specifically.

Davis Edward. M. (1978) dealt with some necessary qualities of a good leader. According to him, policing, of all profession and occupation, by its very nature tends to make other people ill at times. Because of his authority to arrest, and other people's knowledge of that authority, every Policeman carries real power. Every person who commits some violation, perhaps only a failure to stop at a signal, is apprehensive of authority. In a view of this fact, if the Police are to gain the optimum amount of public co-operation, it is extremely important that a Police agency be the most courteous agency of local government. Instead, by the very nature of the job and the harshness of the world that Policemen rub up against, the Police tend to become rather sour and cynical and cryptic in the way they talk to people.

Need for Customer Orientation in Police

G.V.Rao (1982) quotes Mahatma Gandhi's views about Police force: "My idea of Police force is that, the Police of my conception will, however, be a wholly different pattern from the present-day force. They will be servants, not masters, of the people. The people will instinctively render them all help, and through mutual co-operation they will easily deal with the ever-increasing disturbances. Their Police work will be confined primarily to robbers and dacoits. The people have every right to ventilate their grievances against corrupt members of the services".

The National Police Commission Report (1980) mentions that there is no palpable incentive for Policemen to make an effort to carry the people with them. At the field level of the district the placement and promotion of Police officers from Constable to Superintendent of Police are not really related to what the people of the district think of them. A Station House Officer can continue to function in a particular Police

Station even if his conduct towards a large number of people within the jurisdiction of that Police Station is harsh and even oppressive, provided he can align himself with those who matter and can generally ingratiate himself with the people in power, these being the local politicians, and his seniors in Police.

Another organizational constraint is the relative irrelevance of what is called the Police leadership to the operative levels of Police. Management policies urging desired changes, particularly to attitude and behaviour, do not get adequately implemented at the operative level. First, the Station House Officer, for the exercise of his powers and the discharge of his duties, is not beholden to any senior officers. The senior Police officers can enquire into the complaint and can, perhaps, even punish the erring Policemen but they seldom can take effective corrective action in regard to the case itself. Generally, supervision takes place after the event. The operating forces of political interference and dual control in the district also diminish the effectiveness of Police leadership.

Police performs a core function of Government - maintenance of peace and order in the Society. This requires effective control of crime and maintenance of law and order. Over a period of time, occurrence of crime has increased many folds. Newer forms of crime have emerged with the advancement of technology. Crimes with implications for internal security are also on the increase.

Results achieved by Police in controlling crime are rarely good enough to satisfy the civil society. Public invariably wants better performance, whatever be the level already achieved. Even when cases are detected and offenders are arrested, the success rate in securing conviction against the offenders is low. This is partly due to the fact that the general public does not come forward enthusiastically to co-operate with the Police or with the prosecution, which results in either the crime remaining undetected or it not getting convicted in a court of law. Mistrust in Police leads to non-reporting of crimes as well as to lack of willingness to be witnesses in a trial. This results in further deterioration of performance by Police in tackling crime, leading to greater public dissatisfaction. This is indeed a vicious circle. Public trust and cooperation are essential if crime is to be controlled effectively in a democracy.

Today Community Policing has emerged as one such creative

response to transform Police into an instrument of public service, in tune with the legitimate aspirations of citizens in a Democracy.

2. COMMUNITY POLICING IN KERALA

Until recently the Kerala Police functioned based on the Kerala Police Act(1960), on the lines of the Indian Police Act(1861). However this most literate state of India with high level of political consciousness had many informal civil society oversight mechanisms.

At the time of independence the legacy inherited by the Police system in the state contained many undesirable characteristics. The basic sub-cultural approach of Police towards society had elements of hostile and anti-people tendencies. With passage of time, as a result of the processes of democratization of the society, traditional ways and methods of Police came under growing criticism. Now and then a critical incident such as a custodial death or a critical law and order incident brought to focus all that was wrong with traditional Police attitudes and methodology. On such occasions Police and political leadership were compelled to respond. Many internal initiatives were such responses. But such initiatives usually lacked systematic structural institutionalisation. Therefore they could not be sustained, despite the initial enthusiasm.

In the meantime, individual Police officers attempted co-operating with social organisations and NGOs in a limited way to promote police-public relations. This occurred mainly in traffic related matters. Such initiatives also depended largely upon the attitude of the Superintendents of Police/Commissioners of Police as well as that of the office bearers of the organisations concerned. Very rarely such initiatives led to lasting and sustained improvement.

Growing urbanization created new problems to be tackled by Police. Gradually Residents' Associations started to emerge in cities like Kochi, Thiruvananthapuram, Kozhikode and in big towns. Residents' Associations which have remained largely non-political in character were keen to co-operate with Police in the Cities for solving the problems faced by them. This phenomenon started taking root in the late 1990's particularly in big cities/towns. Police and citizens collaborated in many joint initiatives in the urban areas. Such co-operation extended to a range of activities from traffic-related problems to crime control including security of senior citizens. This period coincided with the

popularity of the principles of Community Policing as a panacea to all the ills of Policing. There were also individual initiatives in experimenting with different models of Community Policing in some parts of the state in urban and rural areas by different Officers.

The initiatives in Kerala in which both civil society groups and local Police leadership have played their part contributed to the creation of a favorable environment in initiating even more significant endeavors. The new initiatives in Police – public collaboration gained wide publicity and evoked keen interest in the society. Often Media played a crucial role in highlighting such initiatives. However, it needs to be mentioned here that not all stakeholders were equally enthusiastic about these new initiatives. There were many skeptics to all these efforts within the Police Organization and among the civil society.

Introduction of Community Policing in an institutionalised manner with the support of the Government marks a giant stride towards reforming the policing system in Kerala. It is pertinent to note that a Committee to review the working of Police headed by Justice K.T.Thomas, former Judge of the Supreme Court of India had also recommended introduction of Community Policing.

This decisive step was taken with firm conviction and clarity about the philosophy of Community Policing. For achieving the basic objectives of policing in a democratic society, co-operation between the law abiding public and the law enforcement agency is unavoidable. In a Democracy, by definition, laws are created by the people, for the people. It follows that Police being the chief law enforcement agency, ordinarily, there is no logical justification for conflict between the public and Police. On the other hand there is every justification, if not compulsion, for active co-operation and collaboration between the Police and public by promoting Police public partnership in achieving the most fundamental objectives of policing. The whole society stands to gain by this. Perhaps the only possible losers are those individuals who break the law and those policemen who have malafide motives.

Though there was clarity about the philosophy and principles of Community Policing, the road map to translate the philosophy and principles into reality in the field had to be clearly charted out. The possibility of perceiving the new initiatives by attributing partisan motives on one hand and by an overdose of cynicism on the other had to

be reckoned with. A favorable and receptive climate had to be created for introducing this initiative.

With this end in view a State Level Consultative Workshop was conducted in Thiruvananthapuram, the capital city of Kerala on 18th September 2007. This workshop was attended by the representatives of all the Political parties of Kerala, many Chiefs of Municipalities/ Corporations, Public Intellectuals, Academics, Journalists, Judicial Officers, Bureaucrats, Police Officers, Office bearers of Residents Association, Office bearers of many NGOs including those representing women and children, etc. besides the State Home Minister and the Leader of Opposition. At this State Level Consultation on Community Policing, presentations were made by Police Officers from various states on Community Policing schemes implemented by them. There were thorough discussions by the participants on the various steps to be taken for evolving and implementing the Community Policing program for Kerala. In this workshop, cutting across all political and social ideologies, the concept was widely welcomed by one and all. However, many cautioned that the manner in which the program is implemented in the field has to be planned and executed with great caution.

A draft Community Policing Plan was prepared for the state, by incorporating thoughts and ideas generated in the State Level Workshop. Following this, the District Level Consultative meetings were held throughout the State. These meetings also served to explore the conceptual as well as the practical aspects of Community Policing further.

Preparing the Police Department for implementing the program required extensive training and non training interventions. The State Level Community Policing plan was discussed thoroughly in a conference of senior Police Officers. Many practical ideas for implementation were also evolved in this meeting. Extensive training programs were conducted at the Police Training College and Kerala Police Academy in which all Police personnel involved in the implementation of Community Policing participated. All Police Officers from Police Constable to Sub Divisional Police Officers took part in this training program, prior to the pilot implementation in 20 Police Stations in the State in March 2008.

The JSP was introduced in 20 Police Stations in the year 2008. It is now functioning in 148 Police Stations in Kerala.

Janamaithri Suraksha Project(JSP): Methodology of Implementation

Transforming the philosophy of Community Policing into practice involves active consultation with the community for identification of policing problems in the area and participation of local people in addressing the roots of crime and disorder. The approach has to involve the lower ranks of Police in strategizing priorities. In the conventional approach, priorities are dictated by higher echelons and are mechanically carried out by the subordinates at the field level.

An important step towards introduction and implementation of Community Policing project in the jurisdiction of a Police Station is the formation of a People's Committee which represents all major social segments and stakeholders. This committee is constituted after careful scrutiny and selection. Special care is taken to ensure that the local administration such as Municipality/ Panchayath, Residents' Associations, NGOs, Senior Citizens, Weaker/ Vulnerable sections, Educationists, Socio Cultural Organisations are all represented. The main consideration in the selection is that the person should be known for responsible citizenship and social commitment besides being able to devote adequate time for this work. Obviously nobody with any taint of involvement in a criminal offence is inducted. Nobody is either included or excluded merely on the basis of political affiliation. The selection is approved by the District Police Chief on the basis of recommendation by the Station House Officer and scrutiny by Supervisory, Officers. The committee will ordinarily have about 25 members.

When the committee meets, one of the members presides over the meeting on the basis of consensus, while the Circle Inspector of Police serves as the Convener and the Station House Officer as the Secretary. An Assistant Sub Inspector designated as Community Relations Officer plays a key role in assisting the Station House Officer in implementing the project. Ordinarily the committee is to be reconstituted once in two years.

This committee is expected to meet once in a month at a public place within the Beat area. General Public belonging to the Beat are also expected to be present and take part in the deliberations. One of the indicators of success of the Community Policing program is the extent of participation of local people in the meetings. The minutes of the

meeting are accurately recorded by the Station House Officer and copy forwarded to Officers up to the District Superintendent of Police. The Sub Divisional Police Officer should attend this meeting at least once in a quarter and the Superintendent of Police once in a year.

In the working of the committee, it is expected that decisions are arrived at in an atmosphere of consensus and cordiality. Ordinarily, decisions are taken either unanimously or with the support of overwhelming majority. Where there is opposition from more than 20% of the members, such decisions are either avoided or deferred for evolving better consensus.

In the social, cultural and political context of Kerala, constitution of such committees for implementation of Community Policing and meetings of the committee in which members of the public can also attend, can be an effective mechanism for consultation with the people for identifying the policing issues and for jointly exploring solutions. The high level of literacy and better political and social awareness of the people, are conditions which are favourable for meaningful participation of members of the community in the meetings. The Police Officers present in the meetings with the community are specially trained on the principles and practices of Community Policing. They are expected to encourage the people to come out freely with their concerns and ideas pertaining to promotion of peace and order in the neighborhood. All the stakeholders get adequate opportunity for projecting their problems and also their expectations from Police.

The Community Policing committee (Janamaithri Suraksha Samithi or JSP Committee) in its public meetings can identify the policing issues of the area, priorities these problems and identify solutions. It may identify many projects for implementation in the community. Depending on the specific features of crime and disorder in each locality, some of the programs which may be evolved are as follows:-

a. Joint patrolling along with local members of the community, particularly during night.

b. Programs for identification of strangers and new residents.

c. Programs for ensuring safety of Senior Citizens.

d. Programs for establishing counseling centers for dealing with family problems, alcoholism, etc

e. Programs for enhancing road safety by associating NGOs.

f. Schemes for creating a safe and healthy environment in and around schools and other educational institutions.

g. Programs for creating awareness among vulnerable groups, such as women, weaker sections, etc on their constitutional and legal rights and mechanisms for enforcements.

After identifying specific programs for the community, sub committees can be constituted for implementation of the same.

Thus through these public meetings as part of the program for implementing Community Policing held regularly under the initiative of the Station House Officer, an effective forum is created where socially conscious and responsible citizens and Police Officers who are positively motivated and oriented towards serving the society are brought together. The synergy arising out of this police-public partnership itself acts as an effective deterrent against anti social and criminal elements. Thus, it is expected that when the committee for implementation of the Community Policing project works effectively, the impact created by it is far greater than the sum total of the output generated by the specific programs evolved and implemented separately.

Beat patrolling

Beat Patrolling is the most crucial activity in the implementation of the Community Policing Project in Kerala, If Beat patrolling activity fails, then every other activity for implementing the project is bound to fail. Most other activities towards implementation are either directly or indirectly connected with the activities of the Beat Officer. The professional competence, dedication and commitment of the Beat Officer have to be very high.

Selection of the Beat Officer is undertaken by exercising a very high degree of care and caution. Police personnel with any record of involvement in any crime or serious official misconduct are completely excluded. Those personnel with known tendencies towards undesirable traits of highhanded behavior, corrupt practices, drinking habits while on duty, etc are also kept out. Police personnel who are generally enthusiastic in helping the people in need, good in communicating with people, good in professional competence, having required knowledge of law and procedure, crime and criminals, etc are selected. Beat Officers

are imparted intensive training on various aspects of Community Policing including professional skills and behavioral competencies.

Geographic area of a Police Station, selected for implementation of the project is divided into convenient number of beats. The major criterion adopted for this division is to limit the number of houses in one Beat area to be approximately 1000, The number of houses may increase, in densely populated areas.

An Officer of the rank of Assistant Sub Inspector or Head Constable will be in charge of a Beat He will be assisted by another Officer. Women Police Officers are also deployed for this purpose. The Beat Officers are expected to move around the Beat area and familiarize with the jurisdiction thoroughly. He should maintain a diary in which all essential details of the Beat including major junctions, establishments, etc, are all recorded. The Beat Officer is expected to meet the residents in their houses and familiarize with them. Particular care and caution should be exercised during house visits, especially in the initial stages, to ensure that the visits are not perceived as unwanted intrusion into the privacy of the inmates. He may also identify a public place within the Beat area where he can meet the people, receive their complaints and suggestions on matters of relevance.

The Beat Officers should maintain a Beat register in which details of daily activity are accurately recorded. The Beat Officers are expected to meet the people in uniform. While vehicles can be used for covering relatively long distances in an area, as far as possible the Beat Officer should move around the Beat area on foot and in uniform. The Beat Officer in uniform should conduct himself as a model citizen constantly at the service of the people in the area.

The Beat Officers must be able to inspire confidence among the people over a period of time. The public should be comfortable in bringing to the notice of the Beat Officer any policing issue. The Beat Officer should be able to respond quickly and effectively. This requires the cooperation and support of the Station House Officer and other Police Officers. Experience shows that people tend to bring to the notice of the Beat Officer even those issues which are not directly the responsibility of Police. Even in such instances, the Police response has to be positive and helpful in solving the problem for the community, to the extent possible.

As a competent Police Officer, the Beat Officer must be able to work with the people, constantly keeping in mind the requirements of preventing crime and promoting peace and order in the neighbourhood. He has an important role in ensuring that the public meetings held in the Beat area by the committee on Community Policing is well attended and actively participated by the people. He should also have the ability to identify policing problems, the problems of particularly vulnerable groups, etc. The Beat Officer should also be able to interact with the public on problem solving and on ways and means of collaborative action programs in which Police and public have roles to play.

Monitoring the implementation

While implementing the Community Policing Project, most of the initiatives/strategies towards crime prevention and maintenance of public order are evolved at the field level. The Police personnel working at the cutting edge level make valuable contributions to this process. The local initiatives and programs are encouraged and supported by the Police Organisation at every level. Constraints in implementing the project are often brought to the notice at higher levels by the field level functionaries. Effective intervention is made by the senior officers for resolving the difficulties experienced. A state level Nodal Officer of the rank of Inspector General of Police plays an important role in coordination of various activities.

Role of the senior officers in the hierarchy is to monitor the progress of implementation and to create a favourable organizational climate which promotes and encourages the Police personnel actively engaged in the implementation at the field level. Review meetings are regularly held at various levels. Even State level review is undertaken at least once in Six months. Care is taken to ensure that such monitoring and intervention do not lead to micro management of field level problems, which are entirely left to local initiatives.

3. IMPACT STUDY ON JSP

A number of studies were conducted in 2009, 2010 and 2011 on the influence of JSP on communities. The studies show that the communities have very positively responded towards the project. The capacity building in Police personnel who work as Beat Officers and Community Relations Officers is another extremely positive change felt after the project took off.

Impact studies done in 2011, in 10 of the Janamaithri Police Stations by Rajagiri College of Social Sciences, Kalamasseri shows that female population is showing more trust in the Police and they have a better perception about the working of the Police. Generally all communities and more specifically women feel that they can approach Police for help.

The research findings from Adoor Police Station study, done by the Rajagiri College of Social Science in 2011 are discussed below. The project was introduced in Adoor Municipality in Pathanamthitta District, in the year 2008.

Geographical Area

Adoor Municipality of the Pathanamthitta revenue district of the state of Kerala formed the Geographical area of the study.

The project in Adoor municipality constituted 8 janamaithri beats for the 36 municipal wards and each beat was looked after by one Beat Officer and one Assistant Beat Officer (woman)

Profile of the area

Pathanamthitta district having an area of 2642 Sq.kms, was formed on 1st November 1982 vide GO (MS) 1026/82/RD. For administrative convenience this district is divided into two revenue Sub divisions – Thiruvalla and Adoor . Adoor is a town and a municipality near Pandalam in Pathanamthitta district, Kerala state, India. The town is located midway between Thiruvananthapuram and Ernakulam. It is among one of the three municipalities in Pathanamthitta district.

Adoor Municipality was formed in the year 1990. The Municipality has a geographic area of 20.42 sq. kms and is divided into 36 electoral wards. Adoor is the headquarters of Adoor Taluk.

As of 2001 India census, Adoor had a population of 28,943. Males constitute 48% of the population and females 52%. Adoor has an average literacy rate of 85%, higher than the national average of 59.5%; with 49% of the males and 51% of females literate. 10% of the population is under 6 years of age.

Universe

Universe of the study comprised the whole population of 8 beats of Adoor Municipality.

Sampling

250 respondents were randomly selected from the 8 beats of Adoor Municipality and from different locations viz. households, road, business establishments, educational institutions and Government offices

Effectiveness/Impact of the JSP

JSP initiated in 2008 had made a slow and gradual growth over the years. Accordingly, it would be improper to judge the project in general and the effectiveness in particular in its fullest measure at this juncture. Yet, an attempt has been made here to analyze the effectiveness/influence of the JSP to evaluate the changes in Service Quality of Police Personnel . The effectiveness hence was analyzed in terms of; the extent of overall reach, the effectiveness of the activities in relation to the minimization of social problems and the change in attitude of community members towards the Police and their activities. The perceptions of the community members regarding their sense of security, their accessibility to Police services, the behaviour of individual Police Officers are taken as indicators of Quality of Service Delivery. Attitude of community members, especially the weaker sections of the society like women are considered as indicators of changes in Service Quality, apart from community members' perception about the helpfulness and performance of Police.

a. *Extent of Reach of the Project*

The extent of penetration to the different strata of the society is very critical in making any social projects successful. Accordingly, extent of reach is an important variable to be considered while evaluating the project functioning.

Almost every respondent knew about the project. The JSP has captured the minds of majority of the people as they have reported of a fairly good knowledge/awareness about the project. The wide publicity through a variety of mediums along with the Beat Officers' efforts especially through house visits has helped in popularizing the project.

b. Beat Officers' Behaviour

According to the norms of the project, a Beat Officer should be a role model to any citizen as far as his manners, etiquette and character are concerned and he should gain the confidence of the public in his

area in such a manner that any common citizen would feel free to approach him in a fearless and comfortable manner. In this regard, the present study sought the perception of the respondents in relation to the behaviour of Beat Officers. The variables considered in this regard were behavior of the Beat Officers, rating on the behavior, satisfaction at the interaction of Beat Officers and the rating of interaction.

Behaviour of the Beat Officers and Rating on the Behaviour

It can be seen from the data that almost all (99.6%) of the respondents reported of the cordial behavior of their Beat Officers.

When asked to rate the behaviour of the Beat Officers, majority (72.2%) rated it as 'excellent' followed by 'very good' with 27.3%.

Table 3.1 Behaviour of the Beat Officers

Cordial behavior	Frequency	Percent
Yes	244	99.6
No	1	0
Total	245	100

c. Effectiveness in Relation to the Minimization of the Social Problems

One of the aims of JSP was to build up people-Police partnership for maintaining the law and order situation of the area effectively and making a feeling of safety and security among the people in the community. The present study aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of this partnership at Adoor Police Station limits in minimizing the social problems and bringing about a feeling of safety and security among the people especially the women folk. Accordingly, here a probe was carried out on the matters related to change in family atmosphere, improvement in safety/security of women, change in presence of Police, feeling of safety / security, and reporting of sexual harassment at public places.

Table 3.2 : Safety / Security of People

Safety / Security of People					
	Increased	No Change	Decreased	Don't know	Total
Male	110	6	3	0	119
	92.4%	5.0%	2.5%	0.0%	100%
Female	121	9	1	0	131
	92.4%	6.9%	0.8%	0.0%	100%
Total	231	15	4	0	250
	92.4%	6.0%	1.6%	0.0%	100%

Majority of respondents felt that safety and security of the people increased after the introduction of JSP. Frequent visit of Beat Officers to households and sharing of their phone numbers for emergency calls has enhanced the sense of security of the people to a great extent. Police is no more a hand of the Government sitting in a Police Station, a highly unapproachable office. Rather, they have become a friend next door, always available in times of need.

d. Topics / Subjects of Discussion/Conversation

The JSP designed a number of activities in the community to be selected according to the needs of the area. During their visits to the concerned beats, the Beat Officers made the people aware about the activities they are planning to do in the community as part of the project. Accordingly, the respondents were asked to mention the topics discussed by the Beat Officers during their visits.

The analysis of the empirical data in this regard revealed that in the 8 beats of Adoor Police Station limits, the Beat Officers have discussed a wide range of topics varied from personal discussion to family and ward level meetings. However, it can be seen from the table 3.3 that majority (71.8%) reported about the topic as personal discussions followed by ward level meetings with 43.7%. Further, more than 25% each stated about the discussions on matters related to joint night patrolling, traffic awareness, health awareness and awareness on sanitation.

Seminars and family meetings, campaigns against use of drug, tobacco and illicit liquor, camps for blood donation, blood group determination and eye donation and safety and security information like; disaster management, awareness on security, collecting information about strangers and domestic workers and providing complaint through complaint box etc. were the other topics discussed by Beat Officers during their visits.

Table No.3.3

Topics / Subjects of Discussion / Conversation		
Topics discussed	Frequency	Percent
On personal matters	176	71.8
Ward level meetings	107	43.7
Seminars	59	24.1
Blood group determination	42	17.1
Blood donation camps	45	18.4
Eye donation camps	29	11.8
Night patrolling	91	37.1
Traffic awareness	63	25.7
Sanitation awarencess	66	26.9
Security awareness	28	11.4
Health awareness	71	29.0
Disaster management	22	9.0
Campaign against Drugs	53	21.6
Campaign against tobacco	25	10.2
Compaints through complaint box	36	14.7
Collecting information on strangers and domestic workers	39	15.9
Family meetings	53	21.6
Others	10	4.1

e. Sexual Harassment at Public Places

Sexual harassment at public places is a major problem for women going out of their houses on various accounts. The present study examined the impact of JSP in confronting this problem. The data in this regard revealed that only 10 respondents out of 250 reported about direct knowledge regarding the occurrence of sexual harassment at public places in their area during the last 6 months.

Further, with respect to the change in the occurrence of sexual harassment at public places, 45.2% reported of a decrease in the same during the period. However, 53.6% were ignorant about it. Sex-wise, females (48.9%) were more positive than the males (41.2%) in reporting the impact of JSP in minimizing sexual harassment at public places. The very fact that 48.9% of women respondents felt that occurrence of sexual harassment at public places decreased due to effective and frequent beat patrolling is a very encouraging finding.

Table 3.4

Sexual harassment at Public Places					
Sex	Increded	No Change	Decreased	Dont know	Total
Male	1	-	49	69	119
	0.8%	-	41.2%	58.00%	100%
Female	1	1	64	65	131
	0.8%	0.8%	48.9%	49.6%	100%
Total	2	1	113	134	250
	0.8%	0.4%	45.2%	53.6%	100%

Other antisocial activities like robbery/snatiching, goonda menace and illicit liquor also, the respondents felts to be on the decline, due to the presence of Beat Officers in the community.

f. Reluctance in Approaching the Police Station

The general perception among the common public is that going to a Police Station should be avoided, if possible. We wanted to survey whether this perception has changed or not. It is pertinent to note that 89.3% of the female population answered that they do not have any

reluctance in approaching the Police Station, if needed. Thus in general, we may conclude that the Janamaithri Police Station has become an approachable office, for the common citizen.

Table 3.5

Relutance in Approaching the Police Station			
Sex			
	Yes	No	Total
Male	14	105	119
	11.88%	88.2%	100%
Female	14	117	131
	10.7%	89.3%	100%
Total	28	222	250
	11.2%	88.8%	100%

g. Change in Attitude towards Police

There was a negative notion prevailing among the public about the Police and their activities. The prime objective of JSP is to change this attitude of the people and seek their co-operation in fighting against the anti-socials. Accordingly, the project imparts necessary trainings to the Beat Officers for improving their communication and behavioral skills so that they could easily interact with the people and maintain a cordial relationship. Therefore, the present study examined the impact of the interactions made by the Beat Officers in changing the attitude of the people towards the Police.

The data in this regard showed that out of the 247 respondents who reported of their knowledge about the JSP, 97.6% confirmed about the change that has occurred in their attitude towards Police due to the interactions with the Beat Officers.

As most of the respondents reported about change in their attitude towards Police due to their frequent interactions with Police, we can conclude that JSP, is an effective tool in bringing about positive changes in the public regarding their attitude towards the Police.

Table 3.6

Change in attitude towards Police				
Sex	Change in attitude			
	Yes	No	Don't know	Total
Male	114	2	-	116
	98.3%	1.7%		100.0%
Female	127	4	-	131
	96.9%	3.1%	-	100.0%
Total	241	6	-	247
	97.6%	2.4%	-	100.0%

h. Extent of change in Attitude towards Police

When asked to rate the extent of change in their attitude on a 7 point scale, most (75.7%) rated it as 'extremely positive' followed by 'very positive' with 19.4%. Sex - wise, there were not much variation across the sexes in rating the change in attitude as 'extremely positive'. Before the Beat Officers started visiting their houses, generally community members had a negative attitude towards Police due to the public image of the Police as seen in movies, media etc. But once they got an opportunity to interact with the Beat Officers, they came to know about the actual role of Police in the society and their attitude tremendously changed positively.

i. Activities Carried out by the Beat Officers

Under the leadership of Beat Officers, different projects/activities, chosen as per need of the area, may be implemented after the discussions and decisions in the Janamaithri Samithi meetings. These activities are mainly related to the improvement in safety and security as well as health and hygiene of the people. The activities for the women and children are also envisioned by the project.

The present study has made an attempt to examine the various activities in relation to traffic, hygiene, communication with children and joint night patrolling which were carried out by the Beat Officers in the Adoor Police Station limits.

Traffic Related Activities

As against the threats of growing accidents, the JSP aims an improvement in the traffic system. Accordingly, the JSP team at Adoor has designed various programmes like; awareness campaigns among the people and the students, traffic warden system, strict enforcement of traffic rules etc.

A probe in this regard showed that 41.7% of the respondents confirmed about the conduct of traffic related activities in their beats by the Beat Officers. However, 38.9% were ignorant on the matter and the rest (19.1%) negated the same.

Hygiene Related Projects

A strong community needs healthy people for its development. The various practices that help in maintaining good health are called hygiene. Hygiene practices are employed as preventive measures to reduce the incidence and spreading of diseases. The project has a special focus on the improvement of hygienic conditions of the people and the area.

The empirical data revealed that a good number (48.2%) of respondents mentioned about the hygiene related activities carried out by the Beat Officers and their team. 33.2% expressed their unawareness on the matter and the rest (18.6%) reported of the absence of these activities in their locality.

The major activities carried out for the improvement of hygiene conditions of Adoor Police Station limits were; 'one week cleanliness drive programme'- cleaning of canals, road sides and other public places - which was carried out with the co-operation of residents associations and other groups / individuals, providing more waste bins and appointing people for collecting waste, mosquito eradication activities and conducting of awareness campaigns.

Communication / Interaction with Children

The data in this regard depicted that most (64.8%) of the respondents reported about the interaction by the Beat Officers with the children. However, the rest were ignorant (29.1%) or reported negative (6.1%) on the matter.

Age-wise, comparatively higher numbers (73.8% and 75.4% respectively) from the age groups of 22-35yrs and 35-45yrs stated about the interaction made by the Beat Officers with children.

The communications/interactions were mainly on; alerting of traffic rules, road safety and disadvantages of smoking, friendly discussions about JSP and matters related to education.

Night Patrolling Programmes

Joint night patrolling is one of the highlights of the JSP in ensuring the safety and security of the people.

The data in this regard portrayed that majority (57.1%) stated about the efforts taken by the Beat Officers for participation of the people in the joint night patrolling. But, another good number (32.8%) were ignorant about the matter and a few (10.1%) negated the conduct of those activities in the area.

Sex - wise, comparatively a higher number of males (65.5%) reported positively on the same than their counter parts (49.6%).

The main activities carried out in this regard were; Participatory patrols involving the Residents Associations and local people, arranging night squads, formation of jagratha samithis(vigilance squads) etc.

j. Perception about the Helpfulness of Police

To protect the lives and property of the people is the major Police responsibility. Though the Police provide assistance to the public through various means and maintain the law and order situation in the community, only those who directly come into contact with Police and benefit out of it may find their service as helpful. Accordingly, a probe was carried out to understand the perceptions of the people with in Adoor Municipality limits about the helpfulness of Police.

The figures depicted that 96.8% of the respondents felt very positive about the helpfulness of Police.

Sex-wise, almost an equal number of respondents reported in the affirmative.

Table 3.7

Perception about the Helpfulness of Police				
Sex				
	Yes	No	Don't know	Total
Male	115	1	3	119
	96.6%	0.8%	2.5%	100%
Female	127	2	2	131
	96.9%	1.5%	1.5%	100%
Total	242	3	5	250
	96.8%	1.2%	2.0%	100%

k. Perception about the Performance of the Police

Performance of Police has an important role in maintaining the law and order situation of the state. In this regard, the perception of people within Adoor Municipality limits was examined by asking them to rate the performance of the Police on a seven point scale of worst, very poor, poor, average, good, very good and best.

Out of the 250 respondents, majority (65.6%) rated the performance of Police as "Best" followed by "Very Good" with 23.6%. The remaining 10.4% rated it as good, average or worst.

Sex-wise, the data showed that females (96.2%) exceeded the males (93.3%) with a slight variation of 2.9% in rating the performance as either good, very good or best.

The faith and trust expressed by the community members, especially women in Beat Officers can be taken as an indication that when trained personnel are reaching out to the Community to find solutions for their security needs, people feel more confident to approach the Police. Police personnel also get more oriented towards Quality Service Delivery.

l. Weaknesses / Limitations of the JSP

The preceding sections dealt widely on the various aspects of the

project and the perceptions and views of the people on each of these aspects. According to the overall data it was found that the people in the area are much impressed by the implementation of JSP. As every programme / project may have some drawbacks especially in the beginning phases, the JSP also has some weaknesses in its implementation. The project would be more appealing, if it can pick out and overcome these stumbling blocks. Hence, the present study sought the perceptions of the respondents on the weaknesses/limitations of JSP.

The responses in this regard showed that only a few 39 (15.8%) reported of the weaknesses / limitations of the project. 84.2% stated about the absence of the same. Although, they may not have gone very deep into the various aspects of the project, it should be noticed that on the whole, most of the people had experienced a very positive impact due to the implementation of the project. The major draw backs pointed out were;

Loss of fear on Police and Law

Few of the respondents reported that the friendly interactions by the janamaithri Police may create a fearless attitude among the criminals which may inspire them to indulge in various sorts of crimes.

Lack of Sufficient number of Beat Officers

A few reported about the insufficient number of Beat Officers in their beats. This might be due to the multifarious activities entrusted with the Beat Officers in their beats/Police Station.

Lack of sufficient House visits

House visits play a vital role in bridging the gap between the people and the Police. In addition to creating a healthy relationship with the people, house visits help the Police to have a clear understanding about the area. Through house visits the people get the opportunity to share their problems freely with the Police.

The empirical data showed that some of the respondents reported about the lack of sufficient number of house visits by the Beat Officers due to one or the other reasons.

Lack of Involvement of more People

The success of JSP mainly depends on the participation of the

maximum number of people in the project activities. According to a few, the involvement of people in the various activities is found to be less in the project area.

Although it was found from the overall data that the project in Adoor is a great success, the drawbacks pointed out by the respondents despite their low number have to be considered seriously.

Overall Findings

The overall findings related to the Effectiveness/Impact of the JSP (JSP) highlighted that its implementation in Adoor Police Station limits has resulted in creating a community with an increased presence of Police, enhanced feeling of safety/security, improved family atmosphere and a positive attitude towards the Police and their activities. Moreover, the JSP has played a vital role in minimizing the social problems like; sexual harassment at public places, robbery/snatching, goonda menace and illicit liquor in the project area.

Conclusion

Over a period of three years the JSP has effectively penetrated into the communities where the project has been implemented. The journey of JSP with the intent of creating ripples in the ocean of police-people partnership has now reached a commandable distance. The momentum needs to be maintained with continuous activities and monitoring, and increased participation of community members.

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EXORCISING THE COLONIAL GENIE- REFLECTIONS ON POLICING THE INDIAN DEMOCRACY

Anup Kuruvilla John

"The past is never dead. It's not even past."
-William Faulkner, *Requiem for a Nun,* Act I, Scene III

Abstract

While India prides itself in a progressive constitutional and legal framework, characterised by an abiding commitment to fundamental and human rights, the framework rests on archaic laws and institutions, which was designed to serve the ends of a repressive colonial regime. Indian Police faces the daunting challenge of reconciling and readjusting the inherited colonial architecture with the demands of a vibrant democracy with its commitment to rule of law and fundamental rights.

Setting the Context- Indian Police Act, 1861

The Indian Police Act, 1861 enacted in the backdrop of the 1857 Revolt for Independence, in the context of the requirement for a reorganised Police force, equal to the task of flying the Union Jack across the Indian subcontinent, could neither boast of democratic underpinnings, nor particularly sound professional precepts. The sixty nine objective propositions on the basis of which this legislation was premised, displays a distinct inclination towards maintenance of order (Fourth Proposition, Police Commission Report, 1860), dual control of Police(Proposition

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27-33, S.4 of the Act), and regimental and authoritarian control(Proposition 36-48). Worst, the logic for the creation of the Indian civil Police, as clear from correspondence between the Military Finance Department to the President Police Committee (Dated 20th Aug, 1860) was financial expediency, following the experience in Madras Presidency where a princely sum of Rs 50 lakh per annum was saved from disbanding the military Police.

The whole gamut of criminal law legislation framed contemporaneously, only further supported this colonial/ regressive endeavour. S.25 of the Indian Evidence Act, which makes confession to a police officer inadmissible, and S.27 which makes such confession supported by the discovery of a material fact admissible, reaffirmed judicial (read European) distrust in the native Police, and encouraged resort to brutal/ illegal acts to create evidence respectively. S.162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides for unsigned witness statements provides scope for both the objectives.

All of this, was in a context, where to meet the inordinate level of crime in the city of London, the London Metropolitan Act, 1829 was framed on the basis of the enlightened Peel's Principles. Thirty years post-Peel, the Imperial Government chose to construct the Indian Police in the model of the Irish Constabulary, where the paramilitary style of policing was prevalent in order to quell the civil uprising and Irish separatism (Kalhan, 2006). This 'successful' model was then taken and transplanted to many colonies.

Unfortunately, federally we still follow the 1860 legislation, and the newly enacted post Independence state Police legislations only followed the general pattern of the same.

Down the Trodden Path- Six Decades of a 'Free' Police

"*plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose*"
-Jean Baptiste Alphonse Karr, Les Guepes (1849)

Six decades down the road of Independence, the Indian Police is aeons away from being just, fair, equal, efficient and professional. In 1902-03, the Indian Police Commission, outlining the general image of the Indian Police remarked:

"The Commission has the strongest evidence that the police force is, as a whole, regarded as far from efficient and is stigmatized as corrupt

and oppressive. ……..There can be no doubt that the police force throughout the country is in a most unsatisfactory condition, that abuses are common everywhere, that this involves great injury to the people and discredit to the Government, and that radical reforms are urgently necessary. These reforms will cost much; because the department has hitherto been starved; but they must be effected."

The same sentiment was sadly echoed almost eight decades later by the National Police Commission (NPC). Also called the Dharam Vira Commission, the Government of India appointed the NPC on November 15, 1977. The Commission consisted of Mr. Dharam Vira (retired Governor) as Chairman, Mr. N.K. Reddy (retired Judge, Madras High Court), Mr. K.F. Rustamjee (ex Director General of the Border Security Force and Special Secretary, Home Ministry), Mr. N.S. Saxena (ex Director General of the CRPF and Member UPSC), Mr. M.S Gore (Professor, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay) as members, and Mr C.V Narasimhan (Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation) as Member Secretary. The Commission was asked to make a comprehensive review at the national level of the police system, in the context of the far-reaching changes that had taken place in the country after the enactment of the Indian Police Act 1861, the report of the last Police Commission of 1902, and particularly those which had taken place since Independence. The NPC had fairly wide and comprehensive terms of reference, involving a fresh examination of the role and performance of the police, both as a law enforcement agency and as an institution to protect the rights of the citizens enshrined in the Constitution. One of its most important terms of reference required it to recommend measures and institutional arrangements to "prevent misuse of powers by the police" and "misuse of police by administrative or executive instructions, political or other pressure, or oral orders of any type, which are contrary to law". The NPC produced eight reports between February 1979 and May 1981.

Subsequently the Julio Rebeiro, Padmanabiah, Soli Sorabjee and Malimath Committees, which went into policing proper or aspects associated with policing made similar noises. Various state level initiatives also resonate similarly. The Shah Commission, which probed the excesses during the Emergency period (1975-77), castigated the Police for its partisan attitude and said that "*employing the police to the advantage of any political party is a sure source of subverting the rule*

of law". Finally, the Supreme Court of India, in 2006 (*Prakash Singh* v. *Union of India*), incensed at the non-existent pace of police reform, laid out six guidelines for positive compliance.

The para-military character of Indian Police persists to its continuing detriment. While in 1943, paramilitary forces constituted 45% of the overall Police strength; in 2010, it was 44.37% (excluding district armed reserve). Specifically, out of a total police strength of 2,944,401 in India, the Civil Police Strength (including Armed Reserve) is only 1,638,045. (Data on Police Organisations, BPRD (2010). Worse, rough statistics indicate that merely 5 lakh (i.e 16.66%) policemen in the country work in Police Stations and are at cutting edge of service delivery. Sadly, the trend is towards increasing para-militarisation, despite the problems from the lack of basic policing being all too evident.

The allegation in 1902 of being "...*far from efficient and is stigmatized as corrupt and oppressive*" unfortunately still sticks. A study conducted by Transparency International in 2010 found the Police to be the most corrupt institution after politicians in India. 64% of respondents who came into contact with the Police reported that they had paid a bribe in the past 12 months. Further three fourths of those who had interacted with the Police department were not happy with the services. 88 percent perceived the department to be corrupt. In the year 2010 alone, 58438 complaints were received against police personnel, 10470 criminal cases registered, and 21563 internal disciplinary proceedings were initiated (Crime in India, NCRB, 2010).

The 1861 Act envisaged an organization, extremely lean and undemocratic at the top, making it impossible for the 'native' constabulary to ever aspire/ rise up to any higher level. The fourth Objective proposition on which the 1861 Act was based states:

"That a Civil protective force can be constituted in any part of India, starting from a Civil basis, after the model of the British and Irish Constabulary forces, and under the control of carefully selected European Officers, which may be adapted, by special attention to its departmental constitution, and physical composition, to the performance of every duty which can be required of such a body…."

The same continues to this day. The tooth to tail ratio in India (i.e the ratio of DG to ASI officers to constabulary), even today stands at 1:6.1. More specifically, the constabulary today constitutes 85% of the force,

junior ranking officers (14% of the workforce), and the supervisory structure merely 1% (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

Despite the Indian Police Service, with its high ideals, and its commitment to excellence; the Indian Police has remained extremely impervious to demands for accountability and transparency in functioning and procedures. It has also demanded compliance with directions without demur, both from within and without. It has promoted a culture of subservience, within the force and by the force to the political executive; making community/ local aspirations irrelevant in the process. To a certain degree, authoritarian, regimental, and an arrogant Police, evoking fear amongst the populace, remains the pre-dominant subculture, propagated and promoted in dominant discourse as the symbol of effective policing. This subservience is rooted in the assumption of a less evolved society and an incompetent, ill-educated constabulary, with traits of outdoor physical skills, and obedience, being given primacy over the ability to think and react. The Indian Police Commission noted this as far back as 1902.

"It is desirable that every constable should be able to read and write……... A due proportion should also be maintained between the importance attached to each of these qualifications. In some provinces the physical seem to have been greatly exalted over the educational; and, while nearly all the men are of fine physique, three fourths of them are illiterate."

The dual control of the Police, laid down in the 1860 Police Commission Report, as *".... it is at present inexpedient to deprive the Police and Public of the valuable aid and supervision of the District Officer in the general management of Police matters…",* continues to this day in Indian Police, and remains a stumbling block to its true and professional development. The judicial distrust which originated in European distrust of native officers continues to manifest itself institutionally, as well as in the legal framework.

Reaffirming Faith in Democracy- The Way Ahead.

"Acceptance of what has happened is the first step to overcoming the consequences of any misfortune" -William James, American Psychologist

It is imperative that any process forward must be tempered by the

understanding that our legal and institutional architecture is largely colonial and undemocratic by design. Many precepts, hitherto considered professional, must also be tested against the democratic sieve. Fresh attempts at redesigning police and criminal legislation, as well as police procedures, must necessarily keep this in mind.

The Indian Police with its erudite leadership pool has over time, taken, rightly so, the lead in bringing up this change. However, the same, as everybody would agree, has hardly been sufficient. The pace of internal change has been mostly tardy, and not in the least encouraging. Internally, the organisation must embrace virtues of accountability and transparency, including voluntary self disclosure. Hierarchical structures, based purely on rank and experience, must give way to more democratic structures encouraging freer thought, and expression. More effective performance appraisal methods, which in turn encourages merit based promotions must be encouraged. Systems and procedures, in conformity with the prevailing laws must be observed, and no recourse must be had to the prevailing '*parallel subculture*'. External and internal oversight mechanisms must be encouraged and brought in. The empowerment of the Constabulary, as well as strengthening of Police Stations, must occupy critical priority, as against the colonial baggage of 'upward concentration of power'.

Externally, the Indian Police must be willing to engage with its stakeholders. It must learn to set policing priorities in accordance with local concerns. It must be willing to benchmark its performance, in indisputably public concern areas, on the barometer of public approval. It must police in partnership with the public, and succeed in obtaining the willing partnership of the people in the voluntary observation of the law. Accountability to local communities in addition to the existing array of checks and balances must also be considered.

This, it must be clearly understood is not a choice that the Indian Police has, but a compulsion that it has necessarily to service. Large swathes of India, are today alien to the Indian Police, and are not necessarily the best advertisement for its effectiveness. Worse, the system is premised on 'fear of the Police', as opposed to the respect for the rule of law. Sadly, even a 'fear of the Police', does not mean fear of the legal consequences of Police action, but of the consequences of its arbitrary, extra-legal actions.

It is of course true that no system operates in vaccum. More so, in an organisation, so intrinsically intertwined with public life like the Police. The wisdom of undertaking sweeping changes without corresponding changes in other institutions is often touted as the most potent argument to stall any prospect of reform. History, however tells a different tale and reform brooks no delay. In India legislation- be it of the parliamentary or judicial type has always been ahead of the times, and has heralded change and growth. Attendant agencies, society and the public will follow suit. The Indian Police, is today in the throes of that opportunity.

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THE POLICE — POLITICIAN PARADIGM
THE EXECUTIVE - POLICE RELATIONSHIP

Navaz Kotwal

The Issue

By its very nature, policing is a highly controversial and very important aspect of governance, and its relation to politics is both close and complex. There is a commonly held misconception that any buffer between the police and the political executive (that is the bureaucracy and the people's representatives) will create an entirely independent and out of control police force.

This paper seeks to add clarity and enhance debate as to the relationship between the political executive and police, particularly how it can be delineated in statutes. Using international examples, it sets a conceptual framework for understanding how police agencies are held accountable in democracies, with a focus on the role of the political executive in police accountability.

In any democracy the ultimate responsibility for ensuring public safety and security lies with the people's representatives, specifically the Home Minister or his/her equivalent depending on the jurisdiction. The police are implementers. As such, the police and political executive are both bound together in the common endeavour of preventing and investigating crime, maintaining law and order and ensuring that the people have a well functioning essential service that protects life, property and liberty. However, for policing to work in an efficient, unbiased, responsive manner, the roles, powers and responsibilities of

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each entity involved has to be properly articulated. **A careful balance has to be struck between legitimate 'supervision' of the police by the political executive and illegitimate interference and influence. Conversely, the police must always remain accountable to elected politicians for enforcing the law and to perform its duties in accordance with the law.** The political executive must be able to craft policy and seek accountability for poor performance or wrongdoing by an essential public service paid for by taxpayer money.

The Problem

There is no dearth of literature, of all hues and from many quarters, of the extent of the problem of politicization of the police in India. In August 1979, the National Police Commission stated that transfer and suspension are two weapons frequently used by the politician to bend the police officers down to his will. The Supreme Court has observed that frequent and arbitrary transfers, besides "demoralizing the police force" and "politicizing the personnel" constitute a practice that is "alien to the envisaged constitutional machinery". As a result, 'political control' of policing has eroded internal chains of command, obstructed police functioning, and ensured that responsibility for wrongdoing is hard to pin on any one body or individual. The 'business' of policing in India today revolves around partisanship, currying political party favours and interests, and influence peddling, entirely overshadowing the real duties of the police. The powers to transfer, appoint, and promote police officers are being exploited as weapons and rewards for compliance or not, and have come to represent something entirely different from the original intent of basic administration and healthy career growth. The current debate has also been hampered by calls for 'ultimate control by the people' on the one hand and police 'independence/autonomy' on the other. The dysfunctional Police-Executive relationship has paradoxically resulted in substantial political manipulation of the police *and* a police force with very few limits on its power.

It is commonly argued that the terms 'superintendence' and 'control' have never been clearly explained in legislation such as the Police Act of 1861 or state Police Acts, and this legislative ambiguity is a significant factor in facilitating political manipulation. It is true that these crucial terms are not defined in the central and state legislation, but it is not accurate to say that important elements of 'superintendence' and 'control'

are not defined anywhere. Provisions in state Police Manuals fill the gaps left empty by central and state Police Acts. For instance, with regard to the power to transfer for instance, many state Police Manuals clearly stipulate *who* - whether the political executive or the designated senior officer within the police, can transfer officers, and even more, this power is classified according to officers' ranks.

Further, almost all Police Manuals contain provisions which set benchmarks for the duration of certain postings. Provisions in the state Police Manuals reveal the level of detail provided by the Manuals in terms of jurisdiction and general rules regarding transfers. The power and jurisdiction of the executive on one hand and of the police leadership on the other, relating to transfers are clearly delineated. Thereby, it is not accurate to argue that there is no legislative guidance, at least on this important aspect of 'superintendence'.

In this light, with the continuation of political manipulation of police transfers and postings at all levels of the police, it becomes clear that the political executive has taken all the power around transfers onto itself, in blatant violation of the rules laid down in Police Manuals.

The Solution

Countries continue to experiment with solutions, responding differently based on their level of political development and specific socio-political contexts. At a bare minimum, Stenning argues that in the last 20 years or so, "attempts have been made in many Commonwealth countries to clarify, and in some to codify, the essential principles that should govern the police/executive relationship in a democracy".

Scholars and academics explaining the Police/Executive balance in a modern democracy have stated the following:

Political Superintendence

- The general principle is that the police, no less than any other state employee, must be subject to democratic superintendence, control and accountability for their activities, through the usual political, judicial and administrative processes.

- Police, politicians and the public must understand that: (a) legitimately and democratically-elected governments serve as the principal guardian of the public interest; and (b) the exercise of

democratic governmental supervision, oversight and accountability of the police are an essential aspect of a free society, and these do not *prima facie* constitute "improper political interference".

- 'Independence' from normal governmental direction and control is an exception to the general principle, rather than the norm. These exceptions should be kept to a minimum.

Administrative Responsibilities

- The areas in which the police must be able to act independently relate to both law enforcement and administration.

- Regarding law enforcement, the police must be independent in their decision-making with respect to enforcing the law in individual cases. This includes important decisions about whom to investigate, search, question, detain, arrest and prosecute in a particular case.

- Governments are not precluded from advising police of their views with respect to police decisions that may have significant public policy or public interest implications (e.g. matters of national security, or matters that have repercussions for international relations). However, in all such cases the government:

  o Must not seek to exert undue pressure;

  o Should acknowledge that the ultimate decision in such cases rests with the police; and

  o Must keep a written record of any such intervention which must be made public and available for judicial review as early as possible.

- Regarding administration:

  o Communications from government must always be through the Home Minister to the DGP;

  o Governments must never be involved in decisions regarding the appointment, assignment, deployment or promotion of officers, other than the DGP. The DGP must have ultimate responsibility and accountability for such decisions; and

o The DGP must be given suitable protection against arbitrary removal (i.e. removal should not be permitted unless there is evidence of misconduct/incapacity or until after the expiration of a fixed term.

- The principle of police accountability for their actions (through standard political, legal, and administrative processes) applies in all cases, regardless of whether such actions are exclusively within the purview of the police.

How to clarify the Executive-Police relationship

The precise contours of the Police-Executive relationship merit clear delineation within legislation, particularly police legislation, so that both the police and the Home Minister have a clear understanding of the limits of their respective jurisdiction.

The distinction between *appropriate political direction* from a government to the police, and *inappropriate political interference* in operational policing matters is an immensely significant one, both in terms of the way it is expressed in law and policy, as well as in practice. One important step in establishing truly appropriate political direction to the police is to define, in law, the parameters of government's role in relation to the police. A key signal of lesser developed legislation is when government's legitimate role is not always fully articulated, or at all. A clear delineation of roles, responsibilities and relationships between the police and the executive that are laid down in law pinpoints accountability. It also minimises the possibility of unfettered interference seeping into policing matters and influencing its functioning. Importantly, executive control must be kept out of police operational matters to protect the police's operational autonomy, and the law must reflect this distinction. Requiring public participation in framing policy also inhibits partisan impositions on policing.

International Best Practice

In varying ways, depending on context, good international examples reflect constitutional and legal provisions which cement police independence from politics, but also provide a framework for broad control by the political executive and other branches of government.

Modern Police Acts frame a policy-directing role for government in a variety of interesting ways. In this context, policy for the police broadly

includes preparing policing plans, setting standards and performance measuring indicators, and establishing strong accountability mechanisms. Some modern Police Acts refer to the guiding or directional role of government in terms of the *.responsibilities of Ministers* and lay down (more or less clearly) how these responsibilities should be discharged.

United Kingdom

Among the most developed legislative formulations of government's role come from the United Kingdom. For example, the system of control and accountability that governs the 43 forces of England and Wales is often called the tripartite structure of police accountability which rests on a separation of power. This complex system, laid down in the *Police Reform Act 2002*, distributes governance and policy setting responsibilities over the police between the Home Office, the local police authority, and the chief constable of the force, precisely to create buffers between the police services and the state. It provides accountability to Parliament through the Home Secretary and to local communities through the local Police Authorities, which are local public bodies. In fact, Section 1 of the *Police Reform Act 2002* 2, entitled Powers of the Secretary of State, establishes the very specific responsibilities of the Home Secretary, and thereby the executive branch, in relation to the police. The law makes it the *duty* of the Home Secretary to frame a National Policing Plan every year - a policing policy plan in other words - by formalising centrally imposed key priorities - within a national plan. Using this device, the Home Secretary determines universal policing objectives, directs police authorities to establish performance targets, and determines cash grants for police authorities.

As defined by the Police Reform Act 2002, the powers of the Home Secretary include:

- The power to prepare a National Policing Plan (S1)

- The power to issue 'codes of practice' relating to the functions of 'chief officers' of any England & Wales police force, this can only be done in consultation with the Central Police Training and Development Authority, and any code of practice issued must be laid before Parliament (S2)

- The power to order an inspection by the inspectors of the

constabulary of any police force in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland (S3)

- The power to direct a police authority to take specified measures where the inspectors of constabulary reports that the force is not efficient or not effective (S4)

- The power to regulate equipment used by any police force (S6)

- The power to regulate police 'procedures and practices' in consultation with chief constables and the Central Police Training and Development Authority (S7)

Similarly, the *Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000* carefully apportions responsibility for policing between the Executive (through the Secretary of State), police leadership (represented by the Chief Constable) and the Policing Board (an independent public body). The law explicitly assigns the duty to develop long-term objectives and principles to the Secretary of State, for medium-term objectives and priorities to the Policing Board, and for shorter-term tactical and operational plans to the Chief Constable.

The Board is an independent public body made up of 19 members, whose broad objective is to secure for the people of Northern Ireland an effective, efficient and impartial police service. The Board has a comprehensive charter that monitors police performance not merely for ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization but also to see that the police do not violate human rights of citizens. By holding the head of police to account for his actions and those of his staff and by overseeing the working of the internal police complaints and discipline system, the Police Board performs a very active management and oversight role.

Importantly, and in addition the 2000 Act establishes key principles to shape the duty of the Secretary of State relating to policing, by stating in Section 69:

69 General duty of Secretary of State

1   The Secretary of State shall exercise his functions under the Police Acts in such manner and to such extent as appears to him to be best calculated to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of:

(a) the police;

(b) the police support staff; and

(c) traffic wardens.

2   In carrying out those functions, the Secretary of State shall have regard to the principle that the policing of Northern Ireland is to be conducted in an impartial manner.

South Africa

A few other examples include South Africa, where the Constitution makes it the political responsibility of the Cabinet Minister responsible for policing to *determine the national policing policy* after consulting the provincial governments and taking into account the policing needs and priorities of the provinces.

Uniquely, South Africa's Constitution is emphatic that the police and other security services should be politically impartial. Section 199(7) states:

"Neither the security services, nor any of their members, may, in the performance of their functions -

a   prejudice a political party interest that is legitimate in terms of the Constitution; or

b   further, in a partisan manner, any interest of a political party"

This is undoubtedly motivated by the decades of partisan policing perpetuated by apartheid, which was led by one political party.

In addition, the South African Police Services Act also states in Section 46(1) that members are forbidden to "publicly display or express support for or associate" themselves with or "hold any post or office in" or "wear any insignia or identification mark" with respect to any political party, organization, movement or body, or "in any other manner further or prejudice party political interests". Though it must be added here that the Act also contains a proviso that does not prohibit members from joining a political party, organization, movement or body of his or her choice, exercising their right to vote, or attending meetings of such groups, provided that they do not do so in uniform.

Nigeria

Nigeria's Police Service Commission is a unique hybrid oversight body having the potential of being one of the most powerful and autonomous civilian oversight institutions in the world, if strengthened and allowed to function as an independent organisation as laid down in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.

The Commission has been in existence since 1960, but was awarded wider powers with a broader membership in the 1999 Constitution of the Federation. The membership of the Commission includes representatives of the human rights community, the organised private sector, women and the media, as well as a retired justice of a superior court, and only one retired police officer.

According to the Constitution, the Commission has the power to appoint persons to offices (other than the office of the Inspector General of Police) in the Nigeria Police Force, (NPF) and to dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over persons holding police office. Section 6 of The Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act 2001 further charged the Commission with the responsibility of formulating the guidelines for the appointment, promotion, discipline and dismissal of officers of the NPF; for identifying factors inhibiting and undermining discipline in the NPF; for formulating and implementing policies aimed at efficiency and discipline within the NPF; for performing such other functions as, in the opinion of the Commission, are required to ensure optimal efficiency in the NPF; and carrying out such other functions as the President may from time to time direct.

The power to dismiss and discipline individual police officers, coupled with the statutory obligation to establish an investigative department, provides the Police Service Commission with the ability and legal powers necessary to receive complaints on police conduct, investigate these complaints, and enforce any disciplinary measures it deems fit. It also has the powers to develop and implement policy for the police force, making a significant contribution to setting higher standards in the force as a whole.

Members and Selection Process

According to the PSC Establishment Act 2001, the following are the members of the PSC:

- Chairman is the CEO of the Commission

- Retired Justice of the Supreme Court / Court of Appeal

- Retired police officer not below the rank of Commissioner of Police

- One representative of the following: women's interest, the Nigerian press, NGO, organised private sector (all these representatives are part time members)

- Secretary to the Commission

- Appointment of members:

  - Chairman and members of the Commission to be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Senate.

  - Must be persons of proven integrity and ability

Function/Mandate

According to the PSC Act 2001, the Commission has the following functions:

- Responsible for the appointment / promotion of persons to office (except for IGP) in the Nigeria Police Force.

- Dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over officers of the NPF (except IGP).

- Formulate policies and guidelines for the appointment, promotion, discipline, and dismissal of NPF officers.

- Identify factors inhibiting / undermining discipline in the NPF.

- Formulate and implement policies aimed at the efficiency and discipline to the NPF.

- Perform such other functions as required to ensure that the NPF operates at optimal efficiency.

- Carry out any other functions as the President may direct.

- The Commission is not subject to the direction, control, or supervision of any other authority / person except as prescribed by this Act.

Powers

- Can appoint, promote, discipline and dismiss all officers of the Nigeria Police Force, except for the Inspector General of Police (IGP).

- Powers of delegation

    o Commission may delegate any of its powers to any officer of the NPF;

    o To a committee as prescribed by the Commission.

Canada

An idea that has gained ground internationally during the last few decades is the idea that policing is too serious or important a business to be left to the policemen or politicians alone and that it is necessary to exercise some form of civilian control or oversight over the police.

This idea has led not only to the setting up of independent mechanisms to inquire into complaints against police personnel but also to the establishment of autonomous police commissions or boards. The Commission model serves two different purposes- one, to insulate the police from illegitimate influences of partisan politics by acting as a buffer between the police and elected governments; and, two, to involve community members in providing direction to the police and help improve police administration and management. The Board or Commission model of police governance exists widely in some developed countries, like Canada. Canada has police forces at the municipal, provincial and federal levels. The role that the Police Boards or Commissions play in governing the police forces, particularly at the municipal level, is very significant, as they involve community members in providing direction to the police. For example in British Columbia, every municipality with a population of 5000 or more has to provide for police service. Municipalities with their own police forces are required to set up police boards to act as civilian oversight bodies. The Municipal Police Board in British Columbia consists of the Mayor of the Council, one member appointed by the Council and not more than five persons appointed, after consultation with the director, by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. The municipal police board, in consultation with the chief constable, must determine the priorities, goals and objectives of the municipal police department.

Municipal police board

23 (1) Subject to the minister's approval, the council of a municipality required to provide policing and law enforcement under section 15 may provide policing and law enforcement by means of a municipal police department governed by a municipal police board consisting of:

> (a) the mayor of the council,
>
> (b) one person appointed by the council, and
>
> (c) not more than 5 persons appointed, after consultation with the director, by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.

(2) Subject to the approval of the minister, the councils of 2 or more municipalities may enter into an agreement to establish a joint municipal police board under subsection (1).

(3) An agreement under subsection (2) must contain terms respecting the establishment of the municipal police board, membership on the municipal police board and division of expenditures.

Membership of Municipal Police Board

24 (1) A person who is a councillor or is ineligible to be elected as a councillor must not be appointed to a municipal police board.

(2) A person appointed to a municipal police board under section 23

> (a) holds office for a term, not longer than 4 years, that the Lieutenant Governor in Council determines, and
>
> (b) may be reappointed, subject to subsection (3).

(3) A person is not eligible to hold office as an appointed member of a municipal police board for a period greater than 6 consecutive years.

Chair of Municipal Police Board

25 (1) The mayor of a council referred to in section 23 is the chair of the municipal police board.

(2) If the mayor is absent or unable to act, the municipal police board members present at a meeting of the municipal police

board must elect from among themselves a chair to preside at the meeting.

(3)　In case of a tie vote at a meeting of a municipal police board, the chair may cast the deciding vote.

Board to establish Municipal Police Department

26(4) In consultation with the chief constable the municipal police board must determine the priorities, goals, and objectives of the municipal police department.

(5)　the chief constable must report to the municipal police board each year on the implementation of the programs and strategies to achieve the priorities, goals and objectives.

New Zealand

In New Zealand, the Policing Act 2008 was passed only after a rigorous pre-legislative scrutiny, and widespread public consultation. The 2008 Act clearly delineates 1) the New Zealand Police's responsibilities to the political executive (through the Minister in charge) and also, importantly, 2) what duties and functions the police are *not* responsible to the executive to and which must be acted on independently by the police.

16 Responsibilities and independence of Commissioner

1　The Commissioner is responsible to the Minister for:

　a　carrying out the functions and duties of the Police; and

　b　the general conduct of the Police; and

　c　the effective, efficient, and economical management of the Police; and

　d　tendering advice to the Minister and other Ministers of the Crown; and

　e　giving effect to any lawful ministerial directions.

2　The Commissioner is not responsible to, and must act independently of, any Minister of the Crown (including any person acting on the instruction of a Minister of the Crown) regarding:

a   the maintenance of order in relation to any individual or group of individuals; and

b   the enforcement of the law in relation to any individual or group of individuals; and

c   the investigation and prosecution of offences; and

d   decisions about individual Police employees.

30 Command and control

4   No Police employee may, when exercising any power or carrying out any function or duty, act under the direction, command, or control of:

a   a Minister of the Crown; or

b   a person who is not authorised by or under this Act or any other enactment or rule of law to direct, command, or control the actions of a Police employee.

Australia

In Queensland, for example, Section 4.6 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 requires the Commissioner of Police to furnish to the Minister reports and recommendations in relation to the administration and functioning of the police service, when required by the Minister to do so and otherwise when the Commissioner thinks fit. It also authorizes the Minister to give directions to the Commissioner about:

a)   the overall administration, management, and superintendence of, or in the police service;

b)   policy and priorities to be pursued in performing the functions of the police service; and

c)   the number and deployment of officers and staff members and the number and location of police establishments and police stations.

Two conditions are prescribed. The directions have to be in writing and given "having regard to the advice of the Commissioner first obtained."

The Minister is required to keep a register of all directions given to

commissioner and is required to submit the register on an annual basis to the Crime and Misconduct Commission and Parliamentary Crime and Misconduct Committee. The Minister can also require the commissioner to submit reports to him/her.

The responsibilities of the police commissioner are set out in Section 4.8 of the Act, though the section states that it is not intended to limit the extent of the commissioner's responsibility.

In a similar manner, Section 6 of the Police Act 1998 in South Australia provides that, 'Subject to this Act and any written directions of the Minister, the commissioner is responsible for the control and management of the police', while Section 8 provides that the Minister, 'must cause a copy of any direction given to the commissioner to be:

a   published in the *Gazette* within eight days of the date of the direction; and

b   laid before each House of Parliament within six sitting days of the date of the direction if Parliament is then in session, or, if not, within six sitting days after the commencement of the next session of Parliament.'

Importantly, Section 7 of the Act prohibits the Minister from issuing directions to the commissioner 'in relation to the appointment, transfer, remuneration, discipline or termination of a particular person'.

In addition to defining the scope of ministerial direction on police matters, setting out the responsibilities of the commissioner, and setting out the terms of parliamentary or other oversight of police/government relationships, legislation in various Australian states also regulates the terms of appointment and dismissal of the police commissioner.

Suggested Model for India

Taking guidance from examples mentioned above the following scheme which clearly delineates the Chief of Police's responsibilities to the political executive (through the Minister in charge) and also, importantly what duties and functions the police are *not* responsible to the executive and which must be acted on independently by the police is listed below.

"Responsibilities and independence of State Police Chief"

The supervision, direction and control of the police throughout the State shall, be vested in an officer of the rank of Director General of Police designated as the State Police Chief.

1. *The State Police Chief shall be responsible to the Minister for*

    a carrying out the functions and duties of the Police;

    b the general conduct of the Police;

    c the effective, efficient, and economical management of the Police;

    d tendering advice to the Minister;

    e giving effect to any lawful ministerial directions.

2. *The State Police Chief shall not be not responsible to, and must act independently of, the Minister regarding:*

    i the maintenance of order in relation to any individual or group of individuals; and

    ii the enforcement of the law in relation to any individual or group of individuals; and

    iii the investigation and prosecution of offences; and

    iv decisions about individual Police officers.

3. The Minister may give the Director General of Police directions on matters of Government policy that relate to-

    i the prevention of crime;

    ii the maintenance of public safety and public order;

    iii the delivery of police services; and

    iv general areas of law enforcement.

4. No direction from the Minister to the Director General of Police may have the effect of requiring the non-enforcement of a particular area of law

5. The Minister must not give directions to the Director General of Police in relation to the following:

    i   enforcement of the criminal law in particular cases and classes of cases

    ii matters that relate to an individual or group of individuals

    iii decisions on individual members of the police

6.   If there is dispute between the Minister and the Director General of Police in relation to any direction under this section, the Minister must, as soon as practicable after the dispute arises,

    i   provide that direction to the Director General of Police in writing; and

    ii publish a copy in the Gazette; and

    iii present a copy to the Legislature

Conclusion

It is well known that in any society, the police enjoy immense powers, which must be controlled to prevent their misuse. However, controlling the police itself becomes a source of tremendous power that can be misused to serve partisan interests. Balancing these conflicting ideas of how is the control exercised and the type of relationship that should exist between the police and the political executive that establishes and controls them is what will lead to an accountable and transparent police service.

In the manner discussed above, the need to condition the relationship between the police and the political executive seeks to work toward strengthening democracy, not limiting it. The basic truth is that for policing to transform, it is necessary for the government – to whose authority police are subject to, itself be committed to democratic norms and checks and balances, and importantly see the police as an instrument for protecting the safety and democratic rights of the people.

PEOPLE FRIENDLY POLICE STATIONS

A.Hemachandran

Introduction

Police Station is the basic unit of policing in India. Quality of Police service experienced by a common citizen depends upon the performance of Police Station. Serious complaints about the performance have existed right from the days of British Colonial Rule. The situation continues to be so even now, ie., after more than 6 decades of independence. Efforts to improve the quality of policing have a long history dating back to the early 20th Century. After independence, following reports by various Commissions and Committees, incremental measures to improve the quality of policing have been taken in many states. However the state of affairs continues to be far from satisfactory. Our Police Stations continue to be institutions which are better avoided by citizens. People friendly police is a legitimate democratic aspiration of the citizen.

The objective of People Friendly Police Station cannot be achieved by cosmetic reforms, which may at best have some public relations value for a limited period. For achieving sustainable results, we need to create a society which is cooperative and friendly to police. People friendly police can exist only in a police friendly society. Today public attitude towards police ranges from indifference to extreme hostility. For transforming this attitude to a cooperative and cordial approach, initiative must come from the police. This requires fundamental transformation in institutional mechanisms, processes and programs. Through such fundamental transformations we must aim at achieving positive regard for police as an institution. This cannot be substituted by some individual

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police officers earning appreciation or brownie points here and there.

To begin with we must identify **values which are fundamental to achieving people friendliness.** These are briefly explained below.

1. Recognition of Rights of Citizens.

Under the democratic scheme of constitutional governance every citizen of India is entitled to certain rights. Every Police man must recognize this and respect it in every action which he takes in the discharge of his official duty. There is no doubt that exercise of authority by a police man involves restriction of certain rights of a citizen. This may be in the interest of an investigation or maintenance of public order. It must be borne in mind that under the constitutional scheme, fundamental rights are of paramount importance and restriction in the interest of public order, security of state, etc has to be reasonable. This understanding is essential for a police man to clearly appreciate the limits and limitations of his authority and to enable him to function within the same.

2. Upholding Rule of Law

Rule of Law is fundamental to democracy. Police being a crucial instrument in ensuring rule of law, they must strictly abide by the same. Uncontrolled criminal activities and widespread disorder result in negation of rule of law. Efficiency and effectiveness of policing are tested in such situations. However it needs to be ingrained in the personality of a police officer that whatever may be the nature of crime and disorder which he has to tackle, he has to function respecting the boundaries of his authority. Transgressions of the legal limit may some times result in short term solutions, but sooner than later credibility of police as an institution gets eroded resulting in poor image and alienation from society.

3. Respecting Dignity of the Individual

By the every nature of job police come into contact with large number of people - general public, complainants, accused persons, witnesses, victims, etc. Whatever be the status of the individual a police man comes into contact with his dignity must be respected. 'Assuring the dignity of the individual' is an expression contained in the preamble to Indian Constitution.

Dignity needs to be respected in internal transactions of the police organization also.

4. Need for Service Orientation

In a democratic society, police is an instrument of public service and it owes its authority to the people. Police services are the legitimate entitlements of the citizen. Keeping this in mind a police man must strive to obtain willing cooperation of the public by presenting himself as a person who uses his authority in accordance with law in the public interest. In the absence of service orientation, law enforcement may degenerate into an exercise of clash of egos.

5. Accessibility and Receptiveness to Public

In a democratic society police needs to be accessible to citizens in need, irrespective of their status in society. Democratic police forces are not supposed to cut off from the communities from which their power derives. Lack of accessibility to common man results in emergence of touts and power brokers for obtaining legitimate police service.

6. Responsiveness

More often than not a call to police is a distress call. Our responsiveness to it in terms of speed and quality determines public satisfaction. Responsiveness in terms of registering cases, Complaints, and further steps taken are all major issues which has a bearing on perception of society towards police.

7. Professionalism

If Police has to win over the confidence of the public, we must prove ourselves as competent professionals. Crude, illegal and reprehensible methods adopted for investigation and detection of cases are not conducive for creating sustainable image of police. Cases detected in such manner become liability for police image in the long run. Similarly in issues of public order management, regulation of traffic, VIP security, intelligence collection, etc we must adopt scientific methods. The benefits of technology need to be fully harnessed continuously. Unjustified display of force and muscle power must be replaced by adoption of modern technological innovations which would go a long way to establish credibility and win over public confidence.

8. Transparency and Accountability

Openness and accountability are two signposts of democratic policing. The traditional culture of secrecy has no place in modern democratic policing. In this regard National Police Commission observed that all police activities, to the extent possible, should be open except for four specific areas. These four areas are (1) Operations, (2) the intelligence on the basis of which operations are planned and conducted, (3) Privacy of the individual citizen and (4) judicial requirements. Police accountability has to be ensured through well institutionalised systems.

9.Sensitivity to Women, Children and Vulnerable sections

Protection of law is most needed for vulnerable sections like Women, Children, Dalits, Senior Citizens, etc. Police needs to be sensitized to their problems. When such vulnerable sections become victims of crime and disorder, we must be able to render effective protection envisaged under the law. Failures on such occasions darken the image of police for a long time.

10. Eliminating Corruption and Abuse of Power

If a person has to bribe police even to register an FIR, how can he be friendly to police? For creating a police friendly society problem of corruption for the delivery of services which are their legitimate rights needs to be tackled effectively.

 Allegations of police brutality, complaints of verbal and physical abuse, etc need to be dealt with effectively in a manner which is convincing to the society. We can no longer ignore such behavior as exceptional acts committed by errant police men.

INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR PROMOTING FUNDAMENTAL VALUES.

Fundamental values discussed above need to be inculcated and fostered within the police organization. This calls for legal and administrative measures. A new Police Act which is conducive to promotion of these values is sine-qua-non for achieving sustainable results. Some of the important elements which should go into the new Police Act are given below.

1. Rights of Citizens in Police Stations

Citizens should have right to efficient service at the Police Station. Efficient service should become the responsibility and duty to the public under law. Citizens should have right to peaceful entry to a Police station for meeting SHO and lodging complaints. Complaints of women should be received by women police in a police station with due regard to dignity.

Good conduct and behavior by police to various stakeholders must become a legal responsibility. Similarly special consideration for needs of women, children, Senior citizens and differently abled must be legally provided. Complainants should have the right to get their complaints registered and obtain the receipt.

2. Resources in a Police Station

If police are to be institutionally friendly, then Stations should have people friendly facilities and enough resources to ensure good service.

In every police station the government should ensure adequate manpower, proper infrastructure, public reception area, facility for safe custody of persons, mobility, security, etc. People friendliness cannot be sustained without adequate resources for efficient delivery of services to citizens.

3. Promoting Service Orientation

A Police Act which reflects the values enshrined in our Constitution and recognises the legitimate democratic aspirations of citizens must promote service orientation among police personnel. It calls for mechanisms for creative engagement of the community with police. This can be achieved by providing legal mandate to encourage community policing and beat policing.

A number of services which the citizen expects from police do not have legal mandate at present. Examples are investigation to locate missing persons, enquiry into property lost, Certificate of character and antecedents, enquiry into complaints for preventing escalation of conflict, etc. The law should enable police to render such services to citizens in a speedy and effective manner.

4. Dignity of Constabulary

More than 3 decades ago the National Police Commission observed ' The crux of efficient policing, in our view, is the effective and amiable street presence of a well qualified, trained and motivated Constable'. If dignity and welfare of policemen are neglected by the system, they are unlikely to be enthused about protecting the dignity and well being of the community. If police system is to be people friendly, it is not merely enough that bad behavior by police is punished, but they must be protected against risk and false allegations and their dignity must be respected.

5. Promoting Professionalism

The law should provide a fillip to professionalism. Provisions necessary for adequate training, specialization, etc must find a place in the new legislation. Adoption of scientific methods of investigation, use of Information Technology in policing, etc need to be encouraged through law. Technology must be utilized at the cutting edge level for standardization of procedure and to eliminate/minimize discretionary exercise of authority by police.

6. Measures to prevent Corruption and Torture

The reprehensible practices of corruption and torture in police are centuries old, which has become a major feature of police subculture. For achieving people friendliness, this has to be faced squarely. Stringent provision should be made in the Police Act to deal with the abuses of corruption and torture.

Further an independent and credible mechanism for enquiry into such complaints must be provided in the Act. Such a mechanism should be speedy and efficient, thus ensuring proper accountability.

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION BY THE POLICE ORGANISATION/GOVERNMENT

For creating a people friendly police station, we must take into account the nature and characteristics of the society in which the police station has to function. In a country like India where there is very high social diversity, a uniform strategy applicable for the whole country may not be feasible. However since the values which are fundamental to people friendly policing is universal, we may evolve a common frame work

which can be implemented with appropriate modifications in different parts of the country.

A Police Station cannot exist in isolation as an island of People friendliness in a hostile social milieu. At the same time it may not be practicable to convert all the police stations to people friendly stations together. Keeping these realities in mind a general conducive climate for implementing the project must be created in the state through appropriate measures. Commitment of the Police organization and the Government to the cause is of crucial importance. Before launching the project at field level an elaborate consultative process with extensive participation from various stakeholders will be highly desirable. Such consultations can be carried out at state level as well as the district level. The Police leadership must approach these consultative processes with an open mind and with readiness to listen to the concerns and suggestions from various other stakeholders. Such an elaborate exercise followed by responsive action would help in creating a conducive climate to implement the action plan. The elements in the frame work of action plan are described below.

1. Preparing the Human Element

Motivated, trained and competent constabulary is at the heart of the program. It is vital that within the police organization the dignity of the constabulary is duly respected. This requires a hard look at the state of affairs within the organization. A constable whose dignity is constantly violated within the organization is not likely to respect the dignity of the citizen he comes into contact with. Matters such as transfer and promotion are also important. A person who has not received even a single promotion in more than 20 years is likely to be highly demotivated and even frustrated. Similarly police personnel who are posted at far off places from their families will be thoroughly unhappy. Even the British Police Commission of 1902 recognized this need. The Commission recorded "On the other hand, it has been found to be a great incentive to good work to post men near their homes, when they have earned this privilege by good work, and on the understanding they will be transferred to duty at a distance when they cease to deserve it". The sensitivity and prudence shown by the British Police Commission in 1902 are lacking in some parts of the country even today. These are significant issues which need to be taken into account in the context of creating people friendly police.

Training must be recognized as an important component for successful implementation of this project. Through an intensive training program undertaken preferably by senior officers of the department, the entire philosophy behind the program and the change in processes must be clearly and effectively communicated. More importantly their concerns and apprehensions must be convincingly allayed. Training should have two more components. (1) To develop requisite professional knowledge and skills, skills for operation of modern technical devices used in policing (2) To develop the behavioral competencies required for a people friendly approach.

2. Creating necessary Physical Infrastructure.

The police station building should have adequate facilities for rendering services to citizens in an efficient manner under a conducive environment. There should be facilities for reception of visitors, sufficient space for the police stations staffs, HR friendly custodial facility, storage facility, etc.

There should be equipments such as Vehicles, Alco meters, Speed Radars, Computers, Forensic Tool Kit, Handy Cams, Digital Cameras, Riot Equipment, Weapons, Water purifiers, Fax, Photostat, etc. Infrastructure should include Wireless, Telephone and Internet connectivity. Mobile connection should be provided to all the police personnel.

3. Accessibility to Police Station/Police Officers

Lack of accessibility to Police Stations and Police officers is a major public complaint. Police personnel employed in people friendly police stations must respond promptly to telephone calls. Further facility for reception of complaints and the information by Email and SMS must be established and encouraged.

People should have access to information such as status of their complaint, case, etc. Systems such as Touch Screen kiosks can be introduced for this purpose.

4. Liberal registration of FIRs and Complaints

The traditional statistical approach to crime has proved to be a bane for people friendly policing. We must move away from this approach and adopt free registration of cases and complaints. Increased reporting

of crime must be viewed as increased confidence of public in the police. Rather than frowning upon increased reporting of crime, same should be viewed as a positive indicator in the public confidence in police.

While encouraging free registration, any malpractice by way of corruption, etc must be dealt with in an exemplary manner.

5. Emphasis on Beat Patrolling

Beat police continues to be a key element of good policing. A well trained competent and service oriented beat officer earns trust and confidence of the people in the beat area. He becomes a crucial link to the community.

An efficient system of beat patrol builds bridge to the community and it can be nurtured gradually to the level of community policing.

6. Promoting Professionalism at cutting edge level.

Mere mechanical friendliness in approach without matching professional performance will not help in achieving sustainable results. Efficient discharge of duty by police is possible only through high standard of professionalism. Even in day to day discharge of routine police work, a scientific approach and ability to use modern gadgets should be visible to the public.

Standard operating procedure should be evolved for core functions of repetitive nature and the police personnel should be adept in executing the same. Wherever jobs/tasks can be simplified by resorting to digital technology same should be undertaken on a continuous basis.

7. Police Responsiveness

This is a key component in determining the attitude of people towards police. Through systematic efforts response time to any distress call should be minimized. A high standard must be maintained in ensuring this. The quality of response should also be thoroughly professional, service oriented and people friendly.

8. Citizen Charter

A citizen charter clearly specifying various services available from a Police station must be prepared. It should contain details such as nature of service, time limits for delivery, mode of application by citizens for the service, responsibility of SHO, etc. By providing adequate resources

and by inculcating standardized behavior among police personnel through intensive training the commitments made in the charter must be honored at all times. The citizen charter should be given wide publicity among various stakeholders.

Kerala Experience

Kerala society has undergone rapid transformation beginning from the early 20th century. As a result of these changes Kerala society today has acquired many positive characteristics which have a bearing on democratic policing. Some of these features are very high level of literacy, high media penetration, high level of political consciousness along with awareness about the rights of citizen, urbanization, human development, spread of technology, responsiveness to violation of human rights, etc. After independence, these social transformations have exercised some degree of social control over the police against their traditional feudal/colonial tendencies which militated against rule of law. Police organization and government have responded positively from time to time to bring about improvements in policing in tune with these aspirations of the people. Individual initiatives by police officers for encouraging better police-public partnership have helped in changing traditional attitudes.

It is in this context that the new Police Act of Kerala which is very comprehensive and reflective of the social needs of democratic policing came into existence. Some of the important features of this Police Act which are necessary for creating institutional friendliness to police are the following.

1. Rights of public for peaceful entry, reception and meeting the SHO are legally provided. Special provision for respecting privacy and dignity of women.

2. Government to provide adequate resources for Police Stations

3. Efficient service to citizens is recognized as a right.

4. Compulsion on police for good conduct and behavior

5. Mandates decent behavior to witnesses.

6. Free registration of cases and complaints; cautions against statistical reduction of crimes.

7. Many enabling/empowering provisions for public service. Examples - authorizes to deal with conflicts, empowers to be first respondent in disaster situations, provides for registration and investigation cases of missing persons, provides for issue of certificate of non-involvement in crimes,

8. Stringent provisions to deal with allegations of corruption and torture against the police.

9. Provides for protection against risk and false allegations against police.

10. Institutes elaborate mechanisms for promoting welfare of police personnel, including mechanisms for grievance redressal.

11. Specific provision for creative engagement with the community; beat systems and community policing encouraged.

Over a period of time status of the constabulary in Kerala has improved significantly in terms of their education, training, professional competence, salary and allowances, housing and other welfare measures and most importantly their promotional prospects. Minimum qualification for entry into police is pass in 12th standard. At entry level salary of a constable per month is about Rs.2000/- more than that of an LDC. He is assured of pay of HC/ASI/SI in the 8/15/23 years of service. He gets the rank of HC/ASI/SI in 15/23/28 year of service. In civil police PC and HC are redesignated as Civil Police Officer and Senior Civil Police Officer respectively. Considerable improvements are made in the training program right from the stage of induction.

Capitalising on the above developments and also by inducting technology for professional work, a number of initiatives which promote people friendliness have been introduced in Kerala at the police station level. The major initiatives are listed below.

1. Introduction of Community Policing (Janamaithri Suraksha Padhathi) in 143 Police Stations.

2. Student Police Cadet Scheme.

3. Computers and Internet in all police stations. Receipt of complaints through E-mail.

4. Better accessibility to public through Police Message Centre,

Police Complaints received at General Service Centers, Online submission of Foreigners C-Form, etc.

5. Institutionalised response mechanisms like Highway Alert, Rail Alert, Women and Children Help Line, etc.

6. Introduction of Digital Traffic Surveillance Mechanisms, E-Challan Systems, Bank Payment of Traffic Fines.

7. Establishment of Coastal Vigilance Committees with active participation of Fishermen

It needs to be mentioned that all these schemes could be introduced with participation and support from all stakeholders. Because of the widespread acceptability and political consensus these schemes have received enthusiastic support and encouragement irrespective of bureaucratic and political changes from time to time.

Conclusion

There are no shortcuts to creation of people friendly police. The initiative for promoting people friendliness must come from within the police organization and it should have the total commitment of the police leadership and the government. Experience such as the Janamaithri Suraksha Padhathi and the Student Police Cadet Scheme of Kerala shows that initiatives from police, with support of the government towards creation of a people friendly police would evoke positive and enthusiastic response from the common man. Thus by establishing a creative partnership between police and the people through this process we can build a safe, secure and stable nation with assurance on dignity of the individual.

JANAMAITHRI SURAKSHA PROJECT A DISTRICT POLICE PERSPECTIVE

Debesh Kumar Behera, Rahul R Nair

Forging partnerships between police and people is a concern of all democratic governments. The improvement of policing is a part of the development process itself. Indeed, there cannot be any sustained development unless peace and order are guaranteed. The efficacy of policing will be nullified unless the community is taken into confidence.

Against the backdrop of growing threats of terrorism and globalisation of crime, ensuring community participation in the maintenance of the public order and crime reduction are major challenges before all societies. Police-community partnership is needed not only to ensure economic and social development but also to achieve global peace.

A silent revolution in this partnership has taken place in different police station limits in Kerala in the form of a community policing project, Janamaithri Suraksha. This has followed the acceptance by the Government of the recommendations of the Justice K.T. Thomas Commission on Kerala Police Performance and Accountability. A series of deliberations and consultations on the draft project prepared by the police had been held to decide upon its implementation. A political and social consensus was arrived at before the project was launched. Beat officers were chosen and professional training was imparted to them. Communities were sensitised to the project. The financial commitments were partly met from the State Plan funds.

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The basic objectives are to reduce crime levels and detect crimes through Community participation and forge partnerships between the police and the public in the area of security. The project centres on the beat officer, who will be in daily contact with the people in a locality, typically with around 1,000 houses. The officer will have a thorough knowledge of the area and is supposed to gain the support and trust of the people through regular interaction with them.

A local committee at each Police Station level without political affiliations, comprising members representing every section of society, meets frequently to discuss security-related issues and chalk out plans.

Under Janamaithri Suraksha, schemes such as combined night patrolling, traffic safety, environmental safety, blood and organ donation and legal awareness classes for women were implemented in different police station limits. The Janamaithri Suraksha Samithi decides the project to be chosen for each area.

People started participating in Samithi meetings in large numbers and discussed various local security issues (excluding cases under investigation or trial, and issues relating to criminals to be arrested). Many of the projects implemented were extremely successful, and crime reduction up to 50 per cent was achieved in the police station areas. Janamaithri Kendras have trained youngsters, and have organised sports events apart from involving the youth in awareness campaigns involving security issues of a particular community.

Such was the degree of acceptance of the project that all MLAs (Members of Legislative Assembly) wanted it implemented in their constituencies.

Janamaithri –The Kollam Experience

The project has taken wings in five Police stations of Kollam City District which are Paravur, Kottiyam, Kollam East, Karunagappally and Chavara. Total project area of Kottiyam, Chavara and Karunagappally were divided into 10 Janamaithri Beats each, Paravur 8 and Kollam East 14 to add up to a total of 52 Janamaithri Beats based on geographical margins and population. Each beat covers on an average 1000 houses in an area of about 2 SqKMs.

Each beat is allotted to one policeman as beat officer, supervised by a Community Relation Officer in each Police station under the overall

control of the Station House Officer. The beat officers visit their beat areas frequently. They collect all details from the houses such as address, details of migrant labourers, old couples and women staying alone, occupants of rented building, centres of worship like temples, mosque, church and government institutions functioning in their beat area. A separate register is maintained for all the above details collected.

The beat meetings are conducted every month at different places within a beat area and the minutes are prepared. This facilitates the people from all over the beat area to participate in the meeting. A woman Police Constable is detailed as Assistant Beat Officer in the beat area. The District Police Chief, Sub Divisional Police Officers and the Inspectors of respective area also attend the beat meetings.

The changed strategy of policing alters in important ways the content of police job. Police responsibilities expand beyond attempting to control criminal activity, to prevent crime, promoting order, resolving disputes and providing emergency assistance in crises. The methods of police extend beyond arrest and citations. They now include mediations and negotiations, referrals to other agencies and community mobilization. As police activity focuses on the neighbourhood the demand on the basic police beat officer increases, as do the scope of responsibility and the skills required.

More fundamental than the change in skills, however, is the change in basic work profile of the police beat officer. Instead of primarily reacting to incidents, the beat officer analyses, plans and takes the initiative. Instead of constantly looking up to the chain of command for guidance and assistance, the beat officer looks out towards to the problem to be solved.

This instills a sense of pride in beat officers and empowers them to make independent decisions, make them more responsible and responsive to public needs. Policemen are encouraged to attend to civic problems to gain goodwill and support of the people. Through all this, the police has succeeded in creating an atmosphere that was citizen friendly and was conducive for the public to share information. The people have appreciated the efforts made by the police and volunteered assistance to prevent crimes.

Future Plans.

The existing Janamaithri Kendras will be developed into Community Interaction Centres, which would facilitate Police-Public interface. Various policing activities with the cooperation and help of citizens have been planned for the year 2012-13. Some of the activities are palliative care/First Aid and Trauma Care training, training programme for youth in sports, career counselling, counselling to women and children, domestic violence awareness programme, training on disaster management, awareness on senior citizen care and providing facilities, de-addiction treatment/awareness, traffic awareness to children, youth and drivers etc.

Evaluation of Janamaitri Project

"*Successful community policing involves a major change process in the functioning of the police department as well as in the willingness of the community to get genuinely involved in policing itself. Law abiding citizens usually do not like to call a police station. But through this, Janamaithri Project I can have a face to face interaction with beat officers at my door step. That will give us a sense of security*" says Smt Kala Shibu, Student Counsellor, Social welfare Department. Kollam. She continued "*Community policing must go hand in hand with other professional policing tools i.e. collection of intelligence, surveillance of criminals, analysis of crime trends, skilled interrogation, investigation of crime etc.*"

The community policing concept went down well with the public who acknowledged the efforts of the Janamaithri police in helping the needy, such as those ailing and the elderly living alone. The Janamaithri team worked in close cooperation with the people, setting a model for police stations in the neighbourhood. As was recollected by a beat officer Sukumara Pillai of Kollam East Police Station "*Once I received a telephone call from a lady seeking help to get a vehicle to transport her pregnant daughter to the hospital. Immediately I acted and brought the lady to the District Hospital, where she delivered on arrival.*"

Sri. Ramesh C, Senior Civil Police Officer of Paravur Police Station was recently transferred to a Janamaithri Police Station from Pooyapally. He stepped in to the shoes of a beat officer recently and enjoys that position proudly. He says "*Only now, I got recognition as a Police Officer.*

I have visiting cards; my telephone number is published in different locations of my beat area. I used to interact with citizens of different levels; trying to solve complaints then and there; I visit senior citizens, chat with them, arranging medicines and neighbourhood help."
According to him, "*Police is an excellent agency for social work with all facilities. Every day we enjoy the contribution of others, now it is time to think, what is our contribution back to the society.*"

Janamaithri Suraksha- the Kannur Perspective

Rhetoric apart, Kannur has traditionally been the citadel of political violence in the State and has been the stage for many a spectacular stand-offs between the politically active populace and the law enforcers. Janamaithri Suraksha project was inaugurated in the district in Payyanur Police Station on 2008, and extended to nine other Police Stations subsequently.

While, the Project had met with resounding success throughout the State, it was to be seen as to how the Project could be a success in a society surcharged with political violence, which as a factor was of course not accounted for in any great measure, in the scheme of things. In this milieu, of repeated confrontations within the society, amongst the service providers and sections of stakeholders, more often than not, doubts were bound to arise on the utility and efficacy of a scheme which counts on forging partnership and catalysing a symbiotic interaction between the law enforcement machinery and the larger society towards realization of the exalted objective of increased security of the citizenry. This would have ensured that development takes a backseat in the District and gives a fillip to anti establishment forces in the streets and to anti-social forces in the alleys. Victory of the gutter?...Hardly. Mr. E K Gopinathan, Councilor, Thalassery Municipality would beg to disagree. He is candid while revealing that all people in Thalassery Municipality cutting across political and communal affiliations are benefitted by the project. According to him, a beat officer is more attached to the people at least in his ward than himself! Pun apart, an objective appraisal would show that ready availability of the beat officer in any Janamaithri beat would automatically increase the confidence of the local populace in the ability of the security apparatus, and the State to safeguard their home and hearth in an unprecedented personal manner. The law doesn't recognize faces as per the ancient dictum, but suddenly law itself had a face, that

of the amicable next door Officer who's equally concerned about the safety of your elderly father who lives alone. An ambulance was donated by Janamaithri Police to Samaritan Home, Thalassery, working for the aged homeless. Two bus waiting shelters in Thalassery town have been constructed in co-operation with local stakeholders. Traffic signal boards, and a traffic roundabout were also made with the help of Janamaithri Police in Thalassery. Moreover, Janamaithri Police has played an important role in getting many wandering people of unsound mind and drug addicts to rescue homes in which they were actively assisted by the local resource persons with whom a healthy liaison was made. Janamaithri Police also took part in road maintenance, implementation of ban of plastic articles etc. Awareness classes were also conducted by Janamaithri Police on security related issues along with issues related to waste disposal and the necessity of discouraging the use of plastics which was highly appreciated, as the muncipality really was facing an issue of waste disposal. Heaps of waste materials accumulated at various part of Thalassery town were removed and disposed off by the Janamaithri Police in the name of a project called " Clean City Green City" in which leaders of various political parties and social workers are also involved. So much so, that Janamaithri Police is also playing its own role in cultural activities in the area.

The story in Sreekandapuram Police Station is no different. Nestled along the hilly terrains of the foothills of the Ghats, this small town is no bigger than a village. Sreekandapuram is certainly different from big coastal towns like Thalassery and Kannur demographically. People who had settled here long back, originally belonging to the southern districts of the State, and have prospered from plantation agriculture, are many in number. It is not hard to find houses with only ailing elderly people with the children abroad. Fertile soil for crime for gain?…Sri. K Salaludheen, former ward member of Panchayath opines that since the advent of Janamaithri Police in their Police Station, coupled with other outreach programs of the Kerala Police aimed towards the security of senior citizens, things have changed for the better. Be it in the visible concern for the elderly, regular visits to homes, arranging ambulances and medical assistance, water beds to the bed ridden patients, arranging palliative care for the terminally ill, and above all in lending an ear to their problems and extending a helping hand wherever possible, the Janamaithri beat officers have spearheaded a change for the better, which

has prompted other stakeholders to chip in. In conferences and meeting conducted by various religious institutions, Merchants Associations, Doctors Associations and various proactive social organizations, aiming at some or the other mass action programs beneficial for the society at large, Janamaithri Police has become an inseperable part. This, in the least is proof of the trust enjoyed by the Department and a tribute to the purity of purpose displayed by salaried individuals who have shown exemplary zeal in often stepping beyond their normal calling to reach out to the society. Besides this, remarkable decline in crime rates, have been observed in areas where Janamaithri Suraksha Project has been launched. Instances of social ills like drinking in public places, which apart from being a crime is also the catalyst in a many a case for commission of graver ones, have drastically come down. Unrestricted movement of strangers in the locality are promptly reported and attended to which have certainly helped reduce property offences. Janamaithri Police is also present in Grama Sabhas, providing awareness to people to protect their children from the influence of drugs, alcohol, misuse of internet, mobile phones etc and even to teach basic traffic rules. Besides the public, the Police officers themselves, detailed under this project for various duties are also seen extremely satisfied and much more confident. Beat officer in Thalassery PS Sri. C Sunilkumar witnessed that cases of theft, consumption of alcohol in public places, drug abuse, cyber crimes and other antisocial activities is decreasing comparatively. Organising Medical camps, Blood Donation camps and conducting awareness classes etc have brought out those facets of his personality, which by his own admission, he never knew existed! Beat officers in other Police stations have also involved themselves in many programs beneficial to the society and have revealed many an instance of acts hitherto unsung, of stories displaying utmost civic sense, compassion, and exemplifying qualities of head and heart which were for long limited to only their closest circle. They could grow into much more useful citizens than being limited by the conventional profile linked to his post, rank and uniform. It has been proved true that one is judged by one's actions rather than anything else. The Police men and women, including the initially reluctant ones, unanimously admit that their personalities have developed for the better to a great extent after they were detailed in this project. People who always took the back seat, suddenly found themselves speaking confidently to large audiences, those who were lacking in interpersonal skills found themselves effectively solving issues

in society. Suddenly, they could understand and internalise the problems of relatively vulnerable sections like the elderly and the women. This was evident when beat officers of Thalassery PS hospitalized Musthaque, a native of Chirakkara, who was a mental patient and facilitated his proper treatment. Similarly, in Sreekandapuram PS, beat officers gave treatment to one Surendran Cherikode, who was a cancer patient. However small these steps might be, it was evident that the Project had literally caught the imagination of the common man who till recently knew the Police only as nameless, khaki clad, fearsome face of the State.

Conclusion

Judging by the response to the Project and the inroads which have been made in the direction of forging partnership on an equal footing between the Police and the public, and the transformed perception about the Police itself in public, its quite evident that if a Community Policing initiative has to succeed in achieving it's ends, certain parameters have to be achieved to both on the side of the Police Department, as well as from the society at large. Only when the thought process and overt acts have 'evolved', to a higher level of idealism which tends towards the civilised, modern sense of justice, on both the side of service provider as well as the stake holder, that a healthy cooperation can materialise which by sheer piety of the objective can rise above parochial, sectarian and local political considerations. Janamaithri Project in Kerala has endeavoured for, and has succeeded in doing just that. From the Janamaithri experience in Kannur District, it has been proved beyond doubt that any society which has overtones of elements and sentiments which though strictly not antagonistic, but can be reasonably classified as being 'inconsequential' in fighting crime, the primary spade work of the Police should be in making themselves rise and make the Society feel and believe that they, even while being the 'Strongest Arm' of the State are also the most caring and sensitive to the concerns of the weakest member thereof. In such circumstances, it has to be constantly borne in mind that only absolute political neutrality of the Police, coupled with highest sense of discipline, integrity and social commitment can ensure that the Force retains the confidence of the people transcending political affiliations. This would ensure streamlined and efficient service delivery. Janamaithri Suraksha Project itself can be construed as being a value added service, for policing in its totality is now increasingly perceived as a service, breaking age-old stone-walled traditional definitions which

were constrained by limitations of functionality ascribed to the strong arm of the State. However in the midst of this value added service delivery by the Department, to preserve and to reiterate the sense of purpose which are at the core of Policing, viz, maintenance of law and order and prevention of crime requires skill, tact and a great degree of interpersonal abilities from all members of the force, particularly the Station House Officer. More daunting is the task to ensure that the interaction did not create a new layer of intermediaries and compromise the common man's accessibility to Police assistance by virtue of the channels of interaction being monopolised by groups/ individuals having established objectives which may not be entirely in consonance with the aspirations of the affected individual and thereby at divergence to the broader objectives of the Project itself. The key lies in arranging the causes of various interest articulation groups towards the societal aspirations of increased security and safety. The message is abundantly clear. Janamaithri Suraksha Project, has undoubtedly become the prime mover in achieving a synergy between the Police and the policed and the trail of success, blazed throughout the State is visibly the most befitting salutation to a bold new experiment.

Sir Robert Peel's Principles of Law Enforcement 1829

1. The basic mission for which police exist is to prevent crime and disorder as an alternative to the repression of crime and disorder by military force and severity of legal punishment.

2. The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon *public approval* of police existence, actions, behavior and the ability of the police to secure and maintain *public respect*.

3. The police must secure the willing cooperation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain public respect.

4. The degree of cooperation of the public that can be secured diminishes, proportionately, to the necessity for the use of physical force and compulsion in achieving police objectives.

5. The police seek and preserve public favor, not by catering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to the law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws; by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of society without regard to their race or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humor; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.

6. The police should use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of *persuasion, advice and warning* is found to be insufficient to achieve police objectives; and police should use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.

7. The police at all times should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that *the police are the public* and *the public are the police;* the police are the only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the intent of the community welfare.

8. The police should always direct their actions toward their functions and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary by avenging individuals or the state, or authoritatively judging guilt or punishing the guilty.

9. The test of police efficiency is the *absence* of crime and disorder, not the *visible evidence* of police action in dealing with them.

Observations on Community Policing by Dharma Vira Commission

(National Police Commission (India) 1977-1980)

FIFTH REPORT : CHAPTER XLI

PARA 41.4 One objective of police-public relations should be the direct involvement of the people in the prevention and detection of crime and in the maintenance of order. People may have to take much greater interest in protecting their lives and properties without necessarily taking law into their own hands. They will have to actively cooperate with the police and also participate in organized efforts at self-protection with the support of the police. At the same time community leaders will have to do everything to promote inter-group unity.

PARA 41.32 .... We agree with this view and recommend that beat patrolling should be revived and, in urban areas combined with the system of neighborhood policing. Earmarked policeman can be made responsible for a neighborhood so that they feel a particular responsibility for it and get to know everyone in that neighborhood. They should also get to know everything about that neighborhood and intermittently check with the residents if they need any help.

Observations on Community Policing by Justice K.T. Thomas Commission

(Community Policing was introduced in the Kerala Police, based on the recommendation of the Police Performance and Accountability Commission headed by Justice K.T Thomas)

CHAPTER III - (XV) Community Policing

This is a modern concept for improving the police interaction with common people. Regular public interaction with the police has been tested in western countries. In Britain community consultative committees are set up, while in Canada Citizens Advisory Councils are the counterparts. These committees hold meetings with the members of the public periodically and such meetings have proved to be quite useful for the police as well as community. The Commission recommends that the Government should implement community policing on an experimental basis.

4.31   The major problem faced by law enforcing agencies all over the world is the rising crimes and lawlessness. There is a growing feeling among the public that police are not able to discharge their duties properly in controlling crimes or offer adequate protection to the citizens. The law enforcement agencies have come to realize that in its battle against crimes, the active support and co-operation of the public is most essential. The police will have to evolve mechanisms for discussing crime prevention strategies with the members of the community, by meetings. It is an eye opener to the police to various communities problems hitherto unknown to them and a venue for the members of the community to raise the problems and even criticize the police for their various acts of omission.

4.32 to make Community Policing more meaningful and purposeful with the ultimate object of preventing crimes, police will have to mobilize the resources of the community. It is understood that in many cities of the United States civilians are actively involved in intercepting criminal behaviour. The drivers of radio equipped taxies, delivery vans and telephone repair vehicles are sometimes trained to spot criminal activities and notified to the police. Volunteers wearing distinctive caps and arm bands patrol areas where criminal activities are likely to take place. It is true that mobilization of community support in India for assisting the police did not take place. But against the backdrop of growing crimes and disorders the public will come forward to help the police that they are genuinely interested in helping them and the public can repose confidence in them. Community Policing has three core components, complementary to each other: (i) Police recognizing the value of community partnership (as also partnership with other public and private sector resources) (ii) police identifying specific concerns of the community which should become priorities for work, (iii) achieving the above two would necessitate changes in the mindset and organizational set up of the police.

4.33 To succeed in this partnership, the police personnel are required to work from a place closer to the neighbourhood and not from a remote police station. Typically, this closeness has to be achieved by regular 'beat' officers (foot patrols), who are posted in a locality, for sufficiently long time or through the establishment of neighbourhood police posts. The Officer is required to learn the characteristics of the area, residents, business, become acquainted with leaders of the area, identify problems of the area, plan ways of dealing with the problems, provide citizens information about ways they can handle problems, help citizens develop appropriate expectations about what police can do and teach them how to effectively interact with police, develop resources for responding to problems, implement the solution and assess the effectiveness of the solution. The officer is required to build lasting relations with the community over a period of

time through schools, neighbourhood watch committees, grass root organizations and media. From the Community Policing perspective, a city is viewed not as one homogenous entity, but consisting of many neighbourhoods each with its own characteristics, problems and service needs. The crime patterns may be different in each neighbourhood and the causes of such crime again may be different in each area. Through the interactions, the police officer is required to tap the unused resources of the people. Thus, the police expertise and Community resources are applied to solve the root causes of crime that threaten the welfare of the community.

4.35 State Police Manual should incorporate a chapter on Community Policing explaining clearly the rationale of the approach, the type of programmes that can be taken up, the preparatory work that is required, the implementation details and the techniques of evaluation of the results. Booklets containing these details can be brought out for public distribution. State Government can issue orders which would enable the innovative amongst the police officers to launch such programmes. The fund requirements for these initiatives should be assessed and placed at the disposal of the officers concerned. While the State Governments should issue enabling orders, there should be no insistence on implementation of 'Community Policing' on a routine basis all over the State. It should also be clearly understood that Community Policing takes time to take roots, and its results are not clearly identifiable over a short period. Hence, the tendency to give up the project half-way-through needs to be resisted. The 'Director General' should designate a Senior Officer from his office well trained in 'Community Policing' as Chief Co-ordinator for this Project. Due recognition should be given to those officers who take innovative initiatives and persist with those. It is suggested that the Government in consultation with the Director General of Police may bring out an 'Operation Hand Book' on Community Policing for the guidance of District Police to bring about a certain degree of uniformity in approach by individual Superintendents of police.

GOVERNMENT OF KERALA

Abstract

HOME DEPARTMENT—JANAMAITHRI SURAKSHA PROJECT—MANNER AND MODALITIES—
APPROVED—ORDERS ISSUED

HOME (E) DEPARTMENT

G. O. (P) No. 107/2008/Home.   Dated, Thiruvananthapuram, 21st June, 2008.

Read:— 1. G. O. (Rt.) No. 3161/2007/Home dated 23-11-2007.

2. Letter No. C3-11792/2004 dated 10-1-2008 from the Director General
of Police, Thiruvananthapuram.

ORDER

Government have initiated various activities to bring about People Friendly
Policing initiatives in the day to day functioning of the Police, which is an
abiding concern of the Government of Kerala. The Comprehensive Community
Policing Initiative being implemented by the Government envisages integrating the
aspirations of the local community in the style and system of local policing. The
draft scheme thus formulated to implement the community policing has been
placed before the representatives of Political Parties, Leaders of Public Opinion,
Social Activists, Media, Public Administrators and Police Officers from across the
country. Based on their perceptions and comments, suitable modifications have
been incorporated in the scheme. Based on the aforesaid exercises, an elaborate
scheme has been formulated to implement the scheme which will be known as
Janamaithri Suraksha Project. As such, Government are pleased to accord formal
approval of the project "Janamaithri Suraksha Project" and also to lay down the
manner and modalities for the implementation of the scheme as appended as
Annexure to this Order.

GCPT. 3/2422/2008/DTP.

2. Expenditure for the project will be incurred only under budgetary provision and if any expenditure is additionally incurred, the same will be met only after obtaining separate financial sanction.

By order of the Governor,

K. J. MATHEW,
Additional Chief Secretary to Government.

To

The Principal Accountant General (Audit), Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram.

The Accountant General (A&E), Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram.

The Director General of Police, Thiruvananthapuram.

The Public Relations Department (with C.L.).

The Stock File/Office Copy.

TRAINING FOR COMMUNITY POLICING

The Government of Kerala allotted Rs. 30 Lakhs for the training of Beat Officers and Supervisory Officers on Community Policing, from Plan Fund (2012-13). Training for 205 Officers and 530 Civil Police Officers have been conducted during May - July 2012, in five batches. 500 more Officers will be trained during this financial year.

Expansion of Janamaithri Project :

The Janamaithri Suraksha Project will be extended to 100 more Police Stations during 2012 using Plan Funds

Additional manpower to Janamaithri Police Stations :

Additional Strength of 5 Policemen each has been allocated to all 148 Janamaithri Police Stations during 2011. Government has accorded sanction for the creation of 740 posts of Civil Police Officers.

Fund Allocation :

The Government of Kerala has allotted Rs. 200 lakhs during 2012-13 under the Plan Scheme, for the implementation of Janamaithri Surakha Project.

Police Counter at Friends Janasevana Kendram

The rigours of visiting a Police Station will not deter the public from filing complaints any more, in Kerala.

One can walk into the comfort of the air-conditioned Friends Janasevana Kendram and lodge written complaints with the personnel of the Police Petition Desk. A Police Complaints Desk was opened on 25.06.2012 at the Friends Janasevana Kendram, the Citizens Single Window Government transaction facility, in Thriuvananthapuram.

The complaint would be scanned and sent to the Police Station concerned.

The initiative is expected to come in handy for women and children, the physically challenged, and senior citizens. The facility would save working women and other vulnerable sections the trouble of going to a Police Station to lodge a complaint. The public can also provide information regarding anti-social activities to the desk. The petitioners will be required to produce a valid identity card and provide a telephone number. The petitioner will get an acceptance receipt indicating the telephone number of the Police Station concerned.

Non-Resident Keralites (NoRKs), residing in any country, can forward complaints to the facility via email. They will need to attach a scanned copy of the passport with the complaint.

The Station House Officers had been asked to take action on forwarded complaints in three days. Trained Civil Police Officers well-versed in information technology tools will man the desk from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m.

Presentation of Paper on 'Police and Economic Development, A case Study of Janamaithri Suraksha Project in Kerala".

Dr. K.Alexander, Associate professor, St. John's College, Anchal, Kollam (Dist) attended the 21st Annual Meeting of the International Police Executive Symposium, held at New York, USA from Aug 5-10, 2012. The theme of the conference was 'Economic Development, Armed Violence and Public Safety'. It was conducted in co-operation with the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs NGO Branch. Dr. Alexander, presented a paper on 'Police and Economic Development, A Case Study of Janamaithri Suraksha Project in Kerala".

INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

'Janamaithri'- A Journal of Democratic Policing is published bi-annually in January and July every year by the Community Police Research Centre, Kerala Police, Police Headquarters, Kerala, India.

The Community Police Research Centre, is a research arm of Kerala Police, fully funded by the Government of Kerala, which by establishing deep rooted collaborations with academia, and civil society, aims at breaking new ground, in developing cutting edge practices for Policing in democratic societies, particularly in the developing world.

The journal welcomes contributions in respect of theoretical and practitioner perspectives, empirical studies, critiques, brief write ups in respect of recent good practices in Democratic Policing, comparative studies, book reviews, cartoons, etc; that is of relevance to the policing world in developing and transitional societies. The journal particularly encourages contributions, in respect of current policing innovations, backed by rigorous quantitative analysis. Argumentative essays dwelling on the core thoughts in Police sciences are also welcome. The journal also publishes news of advances in democratic policing in Police forces across the world. Academic articles/ essays should ideally not exceed 6500 words, and practitioner notes should not exceed 1000 words. Contributors are also requested to include an abstract of 100 words, as well as a brief biography of not more than 50 words. Submissions may be made electronically to janamaithri.pol@kerala.gov.in, or janamaithri.journal@gmail.com or by regular mail to the Editor*, 'Janamaithri'- A Journal of Democratic Policing,* Community Policing Research Centre, Police Headquarters, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India- 695010.

The journal follows the American Psychological Association (APA) reference style, based on the *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association* (5th ed)